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Introduction: The United States in the  
Asia and Indo- Pacifics
Inderjeet Parmar
After eight years in office in January 2017, Barack Obama’s time as president of the 
United States drew to a close. Obama made history as the first non- white presi-
dent and the first to have been born outside the continental United States. Yet his 
leadership is being judged by far more than race and upbringing alone.1 From an 
election promise of “Change” and the restoration of America’s global standing after 
George W. Bush’s disastrous wars on Iraq and terrorism, Obama embarked upon a 
host of political projects at home, and leaves a significant footprint abroad. Obama 
began by negotiating the new START nuclear weapons deal with Russia before 
restoring diplomatic relations with Cuba, and signing the Paris Climate Agreement 
as well as a UN Security Council- backed agreement with Iran to halt its nuclear 
programmes. Equally, the Obama administration failed to close the Guantanamo 
Bay detention and torture facility; oversaw a dramatic rise in civilian casualties 
from intensified military drone strikes (including targeted assassinations); backed 
a virtually unrestrained Saudi war on Yemen; and curtailed Bush- era rises in 
development aid to sub- Saharan Africa. This is just a hint of the variations and 
complexities in the set of global legacies Obama’s presidency leaves behind.
Obama’s international legacy of 2009– 17 will be assessed and debated for 
years, and perhaps nowhere more so than in his engagements with the actors 
and institutions of the Indo- Pacific – a region which has only recently become 
more vivid within American political imaginations in the time since Obama left 
office, and which is now typically imagined to encompass the actors and mari-
time boundaries traditionally seen to make up the vast Asia Pacific region, from 
the western coasts of the United States and South America to the territories of 
East and Southeast Asia and Oceania, and then further west to include the Indian 
Ocean and its main constituent state actors such as India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
It was the more narrowly defined Asia Pacific which quickly became a key foreign 
policy priority for Obama as he set about trying to escape the imperial quagmires 






the post- 9/ 11 era. Obama’s “Pivot” (or “Rebalance”) to Asia, formally announced 
in late 2011, was arguably his administration’s key foreign policy programme 
across two terms in office.2 The United States, to quote his Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton, was entering a ‘Pacific Century’. This is where the ‘future of pol-
itics’ would be decided, she argued, and the United States was to be ‘right at the 
centre of the action’.3
What, then, are President Obama’s chief achievements, failures and legacies in 
the Indo- Pacific? Was there a distinctive underlying philosophy and strategy for 
the region that guided Obama’s thinking and policies, for example a “pragmatic 
realism”, hegemonic ordering/ liberal internationalism, or hawkish humanitar-
ianism? And, in its first two years, between early 2017 and early 2019, what has 
President Donald Trump’s “principled realism” meant in practice? How far has 
the Trump administration progressed in challenging or disrupting Obama’s Pivot 
to Asia? What differences can we discern in the declared or effective US strategy 
towards Asia and to what extent has it radically shifted or displaced Obama- era 
legacies? Finally, what might be the longer- term consequences for American power 
and for Asia more generally of the strategies pursued by the Trump administration 
and its predecessors?4 Though we appear to be at a key historical moment, this is 
hardly the first time American elites have faced uncertainty over grand strategy – 
either in general or in relation to specific regions.5 Yet, the stakes now seem a lot 
higher, as the spectre of economic and military conflict hangs over the region.
In Asia, Kenneth Lieberthal argues, ‘Obama moved boldly to shift the center of 
gravity among the key multilateral organizations in Asia, favoring those that include 
the United States and leading them to take approaches favored by Washington 
but are neuralgic for Beijing.’6 Obama ordered bolder US military moves in the 
Yellow and South China seas, pressed Beijing to push North Korea to curb its 
nuclear programmes (to little avail), and advanced US leadership in numerous 
multilateral organisations, especially ASEAN and the East Asia Summit. Obama 
also promoted the Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP) (which excluded China) as 
a strategy of “hegemonic ordering” in the tradition of post- 1945 US- led liberal 
internationalist theory and practice.7
This was designed as a system of rules that claimed to bind both hegemon 
and junior partners in a mutually beneficial regime of transparency, protection 
of intellectual property rights, labour protections and market- promoting trade 
rules. Sometimes referred to as the WTO- plus system, the TPP was in practice 
the adaptation to the Asia Pacific of the hegemonic ordering strategy established 
in Western Europe during the early Cold War. Enhanced economic, diplomatic 
and security agreements with numerous Asian states and institutions were illustra-
tive of Obama’s efforts to promote a more networked and self- reliant international 
order, in a region where the United States had traditionally sustained a “hub- and- 










also partly to force domestic reforms in China, to encourage a weakening of its 
state- capitalist model and the perceived basis of its economic challenge to US 
hegemony.9
Several of the authors in this book argue that Obama had begun to stiffen 
Washington’s positions on North Korea and China, and that neither ASEAN nor 
the East Asia Summit lived up to their potential during his time in office. To this 
extent, change had already begun in ways which came to steer Trump’s more 
aggressive posture after his inauguration in 2017. Obama’s “strategic patience” to 
North Korea was accompanied by additional sanctions and enhanced US weapon 
sales to the region, much to China’s chagrin.
In place of Obama came President Donald Trump in 2017, whose character, 
personal and business background, and broad approach to global affairs are in stark 
contrast to those of his predecessor and, indeed, to perhaps every other US president 
of the recent past.10 Despite this, the broad importance of great powers in world pol-
itics was recognised by the George W. Bush administration, and the shift away from 
the Middle East towards Asia had to some extent already begun before 2009. This 
suggests that stark departures are highly unlikely in grand strategy, however heated 
may be the rhetoric of “Change” from the ineffectiveness, failures and weaknesses 
of previous administrations.11 It is in the context of already heightened bipartisan 
worries about China’s role in Asia and the world – from rule taker to rule maker – that 
the Obama administration’s sense of urgency, and the Trump administration’s radical 
and undiplomatic rhetoric, may at least in part be understood.
Yet, their understandings of how US power should work to mitigate upcoming 
threats (especially from “rising” China armed with a bigger military arsenal, 
including nuclear weapons, new China- centred international institutions such as 
the AIIB, and the world- spanning Belt and Road Initiative), require careful study, 
analysis and interpretation. For instance, after two years in office since 2017, 
President Trump appears to have had greater success than Obama in leveraging 
US market access power over China and other trading partners.12 Hence, there 
remains broad support for an American policy of “congagement” with China – a 
mix of containment with engagement.13 Trump’s tariffs policy has raised the tem-
perature of Sino- US relations and undermined Chinese elites’ confidence that 
the United States will step back from the brink of an all- out trade war, while also 
generating criticism of Xi in China for being too robust in promoting Chinese 
leadership ambitions.14 In this regard, Trump’s “America First” principled realism, 
with its greater focus on ‘bilateral transactionalism’,15 may represent an important 
shift, at least of emphasis, and possibly a return to the hub- and- spokes system 
in Asia. Only time will tell, but the consequences are likely to be globally signifi-
cant in character. The overall goal remains a shared one regardless of the specific 
strategy: to maintain America’s global power superiority by subordinating “rivals” 










Aims of the volume
The primary aim of this book is to analyse Obama’s two- term record in what is now 
increasingly referred to as the Indo- Pacific region, between 2009 and 2017, and 
the legacies he leaves behind. In addition, it is to examine the continuities of, and 
divergences from, that legacy evidenced under the leadership of Donald Trump 
in his first two years in office between 2017 and early 2019. The authors of this 
volume speak to these legacies in the context of both the Asia and Indo- Pacifics, 
to reflect the shifting rhetoric and policy priorities of the two administrations to 
2019; inevitably, and because the term “Indo- Pacific” was routinely absent from 
the lexicon of most scholars and policy makers (both in the United States and the 
Asian region) during Obama’s time in office, the authors individually explore the 
record of Obama in particular within the Asia Pacific region his administration 
identified as the most crucial to American interests.
A key focus of this volume, then, is the examination of transition. Within this 
transition of US foreign policy from Obama to Trump there lie continuities and 
changes, durabilities and disruptions. To interrogate and make sense of these com-
plex dynamics, the volume draws together the expertise of leading academics in 
the field and practitioners of international affairs. It identifies and explores US 
engagements with the key actors and issues of the Indo- Pacific – its nation states, 
organisations and institutions, as well as the events and developments which have 
defined America and the region since 2009.
It is significant that no other volume to date exists which explores in detail 
Obama’s presidential record and/ or legacy across Asia and the Pacific. The rele-
vant literature includes many fine volumes on Obama’s policy approach towards 
Asia with a particular focus on the Rebalance/ Pivot strategy, but not on the entire 
record.16 Our volume, therefore, is unique, and offers readers something entirely 
new. In particular, this volume stands out in three main ways.
First, it offers readers a comprehensive analysis of Obama’s policy approach 
to the region across his full eight- year term as US president, along with the leg-
acies he leaves behind. It does so with attention to Washington’s relations with 
key regional state actors such as China, India, North Korea and Japan, as well as 
its most significant international institutions such as ASEAN and the East Asia 
Summit.
Second, it revisits those relations as they evolved throughout approximately the 
opening two years of the presidency of Donald Trump, to examine the continuities 
and divergences which appeared, and the extent to which Obama’s legacy seems 
set to endure or dissipate in the region.
Third, it reaches beyond academia to incorporate the views of relevant 
practitioners – former diplomats, a former naval officer, and leading scholars – 





Pacific since Obama’s inauguration in 2009, including the direction in which they 
see Washington’s regional relationships heading in the future.
Structure of the volume
The book is organised into three main sections, the first assessing Obama’s 
regional policies and legacies (eight chapters); the second considering Trump’s ini-
tial forays into the Indo- Pacific across his first two years in the White House (three 
chapters); and the third providing selected practitioners’ views of developments 
and challenges in the region (three chapters). Of course, reality is hardly so neat. 
This means that there are critical overlaps and points of connection between the 
issues and themes pursued in each section, helping make more comprehensible 
the identified continuities and change in strategy. In the round, then, the volume 
provides a detailed, systematic study of the United States under Presidents Obama 
and Trump in the decade between 2009 and early 2019 in its policies, approaches 
and effects in the Indo- Pacific. It is, we believe, the most informative, detailed 
empirical analysis in one volume of this globally strategic region’s institutions’ and 
states’ relations with the world’s sole superpower.
In Chapter  1, Turner emphasises that just as the Trump administration 
emerged from deep roots and developments of US domestic politics, culture and 
society, let  alone America’s global hegemony, so the country’s relationship with 
Asia is steeped in its history and culture. This is especially true given the fre-
quent and often violent intrusions of Western colonial empires – British, French, 
Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, German and American – in Asia. Unequal treaties, 
extra- territorialism, treaty ports won through “opium wars”, orientalist attitudes 
and assumptions underpinning Western worldviews, all play a role, more or 
less subtly, in framing relations between the West and the rest, including Asia. 
This is underlined by, for example, candidate Trump’s appeals to ‘socio- racial 
conservatives (white nativists)’ in his references to ‘Yellow Hordes’ imagery about 
the Chinese threat (Gries, Chapter 2). It is further evidenced by Obama’s Secretary 
of Defense Leon Panetta’s complaint about ‘inscrutable’ North Koreans who do 
not care to provide the United States with the information it wants (Cumings, 
Chapter 5). Turner provides an analysis of this historical encounter and how it 
shaped narratives, outlooks and policies. Turner argues that ‘the United States 
has consistently pursued a position of imperial hegemony throughout the Asia 
Pacific’, considering itself a local actor but one whose reach creates local resist-
ance requiring a powerful military presence. The significance of race in US foreign 
affairs in general, and towards Asia in particular, requires serious analysis, espe-









The book then moves to study the United States’ relations with numerous selected 
countries:  China (Gries), India (Colley and Ganguly, Chapter  3), Japan (Dian, 
Chapter  4), North/ South Korea (Cumings, Chapter  5), and Australia (Kelton and 
Rogers, Chapter 6); the regional institutions of ASEAN (Parameswaran, Chapter 7) 
and the East Asia Summit (Cook, Chapter  8); in its regional political/ diplo-
matic, security, and economic strategies (Sutter, Chapter 9; Bisley, Chapter 10; and 
Mastanduno, Chapter 11); and the perspectives of practitioners with regional experi-
ence and expertise (Ljunggren, Chapter 12; Patel and Hansmeyer, Chapter 13; and 
Bhardwaj, Chapter 14). The aim here is to inject rich empirical detail into the discus-
sion of Obama’s Pivot to Asia in practical terms, its legacies, and the platform which 
that established for the Trump administration which followed.
The contributions individually and collectively paint a portrait of anxiety amid 
changing power balances and great power strategies that are difficult to read 
and predict, driven by increased attention to the region by increasingly assertive 
Chinese and American leaders. That anxiety is driven by the real- world meaning 
of potentially clashing “Firstisms” – of both America and China. The dilemma is 
palpable for the United States as well as for its principal allies. The big question is 
how to manage increased (and largely welcome) economic opportunities created 
by China’s economy, and its several international institutions that are potential 
future rivals to those of the US- led liberal order, while at the same time handling 
its undoubted increased naval and military assertiveness. That dilemma became 
increasingly obvious during Obama’s second term of 2009– 13, leading to more 
robust attitudes towards China’s military moves and trade rules violations via the 
offices of the WTO. But it was not China alone that generated anxiety among the 
region’s powers and peoples. Asian states, including India (Colley and Ganguly, 
Chapter 3) also worried about the sovereignty effects of the Asia Pivot and the 
hegemonic ordering strategy built in to the TPP. Similar concerns clearly apply 
to the recently developed US Indo- Pacific naval strategy that Bhardwaj sees as a 
wrong- headed response to the land- based Eurasia strategy implicit in the Belt and 
Road Initiative. A land route that connects eastern China to Western Europe via 
the Middle East, if practicable, would be a significant threat to the sea power based 
American strategy (Bhardwaj, Chapter 14).
Trump’s presidential election campaign and his subsequent administration are 
seen by our authors to have added unpredictability and even greater anxiety over 
the future, especially the potentially devastating levels of conflict that may ensue 
should Trump’s aggressive style and trade tariff strategy be followed through with 
military confrontations (Mastanduno; Sutter; Ljunggren). Obama’s policy of “stra-
tegic patience” over North Korea did not change with the Asia Pivot, although 
continued nuclear testing and development by that country led to greater Sino- US 
cooperation over sanctions (Cumings). From threats of ‘fire and fury’ to militarily 
devastate North Korea, Trump’s volte- face leading to two historic summits with 













Yet, the February 2019 Trump– Kim summit collapsed, which probably indicates 
how insurmountable are the contradictory aims of the two states, contradictions 
no leader could resolve, however skilled a deal maker they claimed to be. The 
twilight of Obama’s more measured, clear, multilateral and hegemonic leadership 
strategy is lamented either overtly or subtextually by several authors (Sutter; Patel 
and Hansmeyer; Gries). The resulting ‘vacuum’, it is broadly agreed, is being filled 
by greater Chinese self- confidence and US allies’ moves to increase cooperation 
among themselves and explore a rapprochement with China (Dian; Ljunggren; 
Gries; Mastanduno; Patel and Hansmeyer).
Nevertheless, the picture remains opaque to some authors (Bisley; Bhardwaj). 
The latter claims that despite rhetoric, Trump has strengthened alliances and 
retained the One China policy; rhetorical change has not been followed up with 
radical action or ruptures with the past. Still, it is noted that even the shift of rhet-
oric and political and diplomatic style has changed the mood music. Seeing the 
region through bilateral lenses, leaving key ambassadorial posts unfilled, means 
policy inertia or neglect has recently strengthened China’s positions (Bisley; Gries).
While the United States under Trump is generating anxiety, uncertainty and 
greater inter- allied cooperation, and though the process began before Trump 
emerged on the political scene, China is currently seen as the biggest winner in 
the region. China reaped the benefits of US- led globalisation, including via admis-
sion to the WTO in 2001 (Ljunggren), when the United States hoped for China’s 
transformation into a (junior) global stakeholder (Mastanduno).
Most ominously, it is the responsibility of the Trump administration to manage 
the dilemma brought about by an undoubted success of the US- led liberal inter-
national order. As such, regional consequences will be profound if US– Chinese 
relations continue to become more confrontational in security, economics, or 
both. The Asia/ Indo- Pacific, it would appear, is not big enough to accommodate 
two dominant powers (Mastanduno).
The stakes could hardly be higher or articulated more baldly:  the future of 
the region’s societies and peoples is, at least in part, being determined by a “great 
game” played between Washington and Beijing. Equally, we cannot underesti-
mate the roles of Japan, India, Australia, ASEAN and others as they each seek to 
steer and influence the contours of arguably the early twenty- first century’s most 
dynamic and rapidly evolving region.
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US imperial hegemony in the American Pacific
Oliver Turner
Introduction
The question of this volume, as important as it is, is not simply of what legacy 
Barack Obama leaves in the Indo- Pacific after eight years in office, or, indeed, of 
how Donald Trump has engaged with that legacy during his first two years in 
charge. It is of the historical legacies of American power in the twenty- first-century 
Indo- Pacific of which both Obama and Trump themselves are constituted, which 
frame and steer their ideas and actions, and which they challenge or reinforce. 
Individuals and their administrations matter, but so do underlying knowledges 
and truths about the world which endure, sometimes for centuries, to be inherited 
by new presidents and their advisors because they defy party politics and the 
whims and cycles of popular opinion. These are the legacies about which this 
chapter is concerned.
The argument is not that Obama, Trump or any other occupant of the 
White House is somehow irrelevant – that there exist timeless and all- powerful 
understandings about the United States and the Indo- Pacific which render any 
given president and their administration a helpless conduit of deterministic 
discourses or wisdoms. It is that in any discussion of presidential legacy, it is useful 
in the first instance to step back to assess the historical conditions which explain 
how they could come to be, and what the past tells us about their likely future 
direction.
This chapter begins by speaking to debates around whether US internationalism 
represents empire or hegemony, and their applicability to the United States’ place 
in Asia and the Pacific. To make sense of that place and its varied manifestations 
across space and time, it is argued that the United States has consistently pursued a 
position of imperial hegemony throughout the Asia Pacific (rather than the wider 
Indo- Pacific, about which this volume in toto is concerned). The next section 
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Pacific framed by the perceived civilisational values and physical authority of the 
American self. The formations of this American Pacific are traced from the earliest 
periods of US expansionism, showing how it has always been seen as an extension 
of US territory and identity. The chapter then turns to the 2009– 17 presidency of 
Barack Obama and how his policies and worldviews were informed by centuries 
of historical logics about the United States and its role in the Asia Pacific. It also 
assesses what the first two years of the Donald Trump presidency reveal about 
the deep- rooted legacies of the American Pacific in the post- Obama era, not least 
with regard the re- imagining of the region into a larger “Indo- Pacific”. The chapter 
concludes by arguing that key legacies of the American Pacific for twenty- first-
century US administrations are of largely unquestioned truths about the United 
States as a local actor throughout a region imagined to extend from the Western 
United States to the furthest reaches of Asia, and that an ever- expanding reach of 
influence and authority has meant an ever- expanding responsibility to sustain and 
defend itself there.
On American empire and hegemony
Debates over whether the United States constitutes an empire are long- running 
and recently oxygenised by the aggressive unilateralism of the George W. Bush 
administration of 2001– 09; Michael Mann criticised the post- 9/ 11 ‘American bid 
for Empire’,1 while Bush- era imperialism also had its proponents.2 In 2000 Bush 
himself argued that ‘America has never been an empire. In fact, we may be the 
only great power in history that had the chance, and refused.’3 Jack Snyder agrees, 
arguing that the United States ‘has no formal colonial empire and seeks none’.4 On 
the contrary, following its creation in 1776 the United States quickly acquired a 
colonial empire and never lost it. The United States, indeed, is perhaps the most 
efficient and “successful” colonial power in history; efficient in the speed and 
vigour by which it occupied and seized the central North American continent, 
and successful in how that occupation was legitimised in the name of civilisation, 
never to face retreat from the lands it claimed.
Beyond the settler colonialism of North America, it is claimed that any inter-
national US empire today is qualitatively different to those of the past. The United 
States, it is argued, has built an informal empire with institutional, rather than state- 
centric, formations. John Ikenberry argues that the American- led global system 
is organised by consent- based networks of rules, institutions and partnerships, 
with the term hegemony more appropriate than ‘misleading’ assertions of empire 
or imperialism.5 Andrew Hurrell concurs, but suggests that notions of an institu-
tional American empire often neglect the centrality of force and coercion to US 
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As suggested by Ikenberry who sees a deeply rooted ‘neo- imperial logic’ in US 
political culture,7 hegemony and empire are not mutually exclusive. Charles Maier, 
indeed, laments the polarising nature of the word empire and resists its application 
to the United States which, he says, ‘reveals many, but not all … of the traits that 
have distinguished empires’ of the past.8 For Maier, empire is not only the accumu-
lation of foreign lands, but the processes by which ‘the social elements that rule in 
the dominant state … create a network of allied elites in regions abroad who accept 
subordination … in return for the security of their position in their own admin-
istrative unit (the “colony” or, in spatial terms, the “periphery”)’.9 Robert Young 
similarly sees imperialism as ‘the exercise of power either through direct conquest 
or (latterly) through political and economic influence’. Imperialism, in this view, 
is ‘the deliberate product of a political machine that rules from the centre, and 
extends its control to the furthest reaches of the peripheries’.10
Following these debates, it is understood here that the historical and contem-
porary American presence throughout the Asia Pacific is not easily termed either 
empire or hegemony. Difficulties emerge primarily from radical variations in the 
spatio- temporal contours of that presence across the region; stark differences in the 
interactions with US power and influence experienced by China, the Philippines 
and Australia, to name just three – including at various points throughout their 
own histories – make single, uniform designations such as empire or hegemony 
analytically problematic. With its devastating defeat and occupation by the United 
States in 1945 and the subsequent rewriting of its constitution by American officials, 
for example, Japan has been more exposed to violently imperialistic dimensions 
of American military and political power than almost anywhere else. Yet Japan 
formally retained its sovereignty. With US support it also experienced rapid eco-
nomic growth for much of the Cold War and entered a close security alliance with 
Washington in which it remains a willing participant today. Elsewhere, of course, 
US authority has been comparatively absent, more typically within continental 
than maritime Asia.
What more meaningfully binds the encounters of the multitudinous actors of 
Asia and the Pacific with the regional American presence is the United States’ 
centuries- long project of what is termed here imperial hegemony. As will be 
shown, this project has always been designed to realise a hegemonic region- wide 
influence of American identity and its core values and practices. US imperial 
hegemony in the Asia Pacific has, particularly in the post- 1945 era, utilised 
Ikenberry’s consent and rules- based networks of institutions and partnerships. Yet 
the establishment and maintenance of those networks has always been enabled by 
the availability, and sometimes direct use of, superior material power. Arguments 
of informal US empire or hegemony can thus be overly myopic, with “willing” 
partners such as Japan and the Philippines the previously unwilling recipients of 
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mid- to- late nineteenth century, as the long- term conditions for core American 
values were aggressively moulded.
To speak of US imperial hegemony, then, is to look to the institutionalised 
and even consensual formations of American power where they are found, while 
affording serious concern to their fundamental reliance upon varyingly intensive 
impositions of political and economic systems and administrative rule – and even 
physical conquest – alongside the critical role of the American military, in enab-
ling the exertion of sometimes violent control from the centre to the peripheries. 
The aim is to make sense of the complex and uneven landscape of the American 
presence across Asia and the Pacific; the United States may not have achieved 
a ubiquitous dominance or hegemony of material and ideational power, but its 
efforts at imperial hegemony have, as explored below, been sustained and ubiqui-
tous in scope. The argument, it should also be noted, is not that these efforts have 
been uniformly unwelcome and/ or harmful. Like in Europe, post- war US involve-
ment in Asia and the Pacific has, at least for some, constituted something akin to 
an ‘empire by invitation’.11
The formations of an American Pacific
The region we know today as the Asia Pacific is not a natural entity. Beliefs that 
an Asia Pacific exists, indeed, are traced only to the 1970s and an emphasis 
on increasing interconnections between North America and East Asia and 
ongoing regional US security concerns.12 As an imaginative geography, the 
Asia Pacific along with its constituent actors are socially and politically 
spatialised, or geographed.13 Their physical realities are made up of powerful 
ideas, so that regional US activities have always been at least partly determined 
by understandings about the American self and its Enlightenment- inspired, 
democratic- capitalist values.
In its pursuit of imperial hegemony throughout the Asia Pacific, the United 
States has sought to establish and maintain an American Pacific. This is a geog-
raphy of the imagination as much as the physical Earth, where civilisational ideas 
and values perceived to represent the core of the American self  – democracy, 
freedom and liberty, and its capitalist economic system14 – as well as material dom-
inance, are seen to be required. As a space defined by the operations of US power 
and values, as we will see, the American Pacific has been conceived in Washington 
not just as a site of material competition, but more fundamentally an extension 
both of US territory and identity, to legitimise its defence against those who seek 
to threaten and/ or rework it.
Early US presidents like Thomas Jefferson declared a need to avoid ‘entangling 
alliances’ abroad.15 John Quincy Adams argued that Washington should refrain 
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set out to discipline and civilise Native Americans of the then- foreign lands of 
North America. With “monsters” in its near- neighbourhood and “empty” spaces 
to occupy, the United States had no cause for risky internationalism overseas. 
Instead, it engaged in an internationalist project to seize the continent. The 
appellation Expansion Era – used to describe the United States’ rapid territorial 
and economic growth during the nineteenth century – subtly glorifies intensive 
and violent colonialism.
Frederick Jackson Turner observed that territorial US expansion towards Asia 
was a ‘logical outcome’ of this westward march to the Pacific.17 What mattered 
was not just physical geography, but the mythical frontier which has always been 
an opportunity for the United States to inflate what Jefferson envisioned as an 
Empire for Liberty. With American self- identity forged not around an ethnic 
group or religion but powerful principles of freedom, liberty, modernity, and so 
on, the United States is ‘peculiarly dependent upon representational practices for 
its being’.18 As such, a frontier to be conquered has always been necessary to the 
United States, for without it the nation would stagnate and risk losing its purpose, 
or Manifest Destiny, of advancing the global good.19 ‘American democracy’, argued 
Turner, ‘gained new strength each time it touched a new frontier’.20 Ultimately, the 
American frontier has always been conceived as ‘the outer edge of the wave – the 
meeting point between savagery and civilization’.21
The United States began laying the foundations of a hegemonic presence in Asia 
and the Pacific and expanding its frontiers there in parallel with its colonial North 
American empire, with the gains of each simultaneously fuelling and rationalising 
the other. In 1844 for example when the Union consisted of just twenty- six states, 
Americans took advantage of imperial China’s weakness after its defeat in the 
first Opium War with the British. Washington drew up the (“unequal”) Treaty of 
Wanghia, which a shell- shocked Beijing promptly signed. The treaty was designed 
to help the United States exploit opportunities through China’s forced abandon-
ment of practices Washington and others considered anachronistic and unciv-
ilised, such as quotas on foreign trade and prohibitions on foreigners in most 
Chinese ports. But the treaty was about more than economic gain. With the inten-
tion to Westernise China, it granted the United States privileges in diplomacy and 
law and gave Americans the previously forbidden right to learn the Chinese lan-
guage. It worked to turn China into an overseas site not just of American profit but 
of the American self.22
Via the gunboat diplomacy of Matthew Perry’s Black Ships, Washington signed 
the Treaty of Kanagawa with Edo (Tokyo) in 1854 which similarly required Japan 
to open its ports to American trade and refuelling vessels, and accept a resident US 
consul. Japan became another site of American political, economic and military 
power as its Pacific frontier further expanded; like China, Japan was geographed 
as backward and uncivilised to be forcibly aligned with Western norms of diplo-
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American navy. Claims were made to, among others, Baker Island, Howland 
Island and Jarvis Island, and after its purchase in 1867 Alaska was transformed 
from a disconnected, largely ungoverned, majority Native American region, to a 
district, then a territory, and finally a state in 1959. By then its white population 
was three times larger than its Native population, and a new constitution remod-
elled its political structures in line with the bicameral legislatures of US states, with 
the creation of a Senate and House of Representatives.
The year 1898 was a landmark in the formation of the American Pacific when 
the United States claimed possession of Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines from 
Spain. As in Alaska, Hawaii’s legal and political institutions were restructured to 
conform to those of the United States, eventually transitioning to statehood in 
1959. Military bases including Pearl Harbor were established on what was seen as 
a strategically valuable settlement. ‘We need Hawaii just as much and a good deal 
more than we did California’, asserted William McKinley in 1898. ‘It is Manifest 
Destiny.’23 The acquisition of Guam and its people meant that the island became 
another de facto US colony, under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense 
and headed by a succession of US Navy- appointed governors. These governors 
had near absolute authority, with supreme legislative, executive and judicial over-
sight. Guamanians had no say in the choice of their governor or head of state, and 
with the island principally for use by the American armed forces, it was in effect 
an American- administered military dictatorship.
During the Pacific war with Japan in the 1940s, the island societies of Hawaii24 
and Guam25 were stripped to their essential elements in the US imagination, with 
President Franklin Roosevelt grouping them with the uninhabited islands of Wake 
and Midway as strategic ‘outposts’ of military- security concern. The 1950 Guam 
Organic Act passed jurisdiction of the island and its people to the Department 
of the Interior. Guam’s reclassification as an unincorporated organised territory 
enabled partial self- governance and democracy for Guamanians, but restricted 
their representation in American politics and codified their location at the political 
and societal periphery. Washington exerted colonial authority over the Philippines 
until 1946. From the beginning, the aim of the United States (in the words of 
former US Secretary of the Philippine Commission) was to transplant ‘the ideas 
and improvements of one civilization upon another’.26 Even after granting the 
Philippines independence, the United States continued to intervene in its affairs 
and the Military Bases Agreement of 1947, which gifted Washington rent- free 
control of Clark airbase and Subic Bay naval base, was signed by a Filipino elite 
with personal motivations.27 Both served as key Cold War US military hubs.
The Cold War saw the foundations of the American Pacific considerably 
widened and reinforced, with permanent military presences established in Japan 
following the close of the Second World War, and on the Korean Peninsula from 
the outbreak of the Korean War. More than 550,000 US troops were stationed in 







US imperial hegemony in the American Pacific 19
19
President Dwight D. Eisenhower invoked the myth of the American frontier when 
he argued that the Korean War was being fought on the ‘frontier of freedom’,29 
and that South Vietnam, South Korea and Taiwan were ‘frontier nations’ in the 
struggle against communism.30 President John F. Kennedy later spoke of reinfor-
cing the ‘frontiers of freedom’ in Vietnam, to counter the non- democratic north.31 
East and Southeast Asia were spatialised in a way that brought faraway conflicts 
closer to home, to within the boundaries of an American Pacific whose “domestic” 
political cultures, economic and trade norms, military- security outposts, and even 
white populations had to be defended. Distant South Vietnam, South Korea and 
others were seen as vulnerable extensions of US territory and identity, at the outer 
edge of the wave between the civilised and non- civilised.
From the 1970s, US troop numbers in Asia decreased through to the end of the 
Cold War in 1989.32 Yet to a significant extent the Cold War in East Asia, not least 
for Washington’s security establishment, endured in a zombie- like form. The war 
on the Korean Peninsula went unresolved, while communism (or more accurately, 
authoritarianism), unlike in Europe, survived in Laos, North Korea, Vietnam 
and elsewhere. A rising China filled the communist threat void left in American 
imaginations by the collapsed Soviet Union, and the United States retained heavy 
military presences in Japan, South Korea and Guam, as well as its extensive hub 
and spokes system of regional security alliances and treaties.
Twenty- first-century legacies of the American Pacific
The Obama presidency, 2009– 17
As an imaginative geography, the material realities of the Asia Pacific and its 
actors remain constitutive of particular ideas which give them meaning, and 
it is here that we find powerful legacies of the American Pacific throughout 
Obama’s two- term approach to the region. In particular, the so- called Pivot 
or Rebalance to Asia formally announced in late 2011, was the flagship inter-
national policy of the Obama presidency. The Pivot was envisioned as a grand 
strategic shift of US attention and resources from the post- 9/ 11 theatres of Iraq 
and Afghanistan to a region deemed of foremost long- term significance. Most 
typically, it has been interpreted by observers as a response to the physical “rise” 
of China.33 However, the decision to Pivot to Asia was grounded not simply 
on understandings of a new material competitor and its physical impacts on 
regional dynamics.
During the Obama era (as before and since) large, rapidly rising India failed to 
generate significant security concerns in Washington. The Obama administration 
repeatedly emphasised India’s democratic credentials and shared values, seeking 
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particular rising identity which reaffirmed the liberal- democratic identity of the 
United States. Non- democratic rising China, meanwhile, was seen to contradict 
the American self. It was routinely described as fundamentally different, requiring 
guidance and discipline and presenting a challenge to regional order. While 
China’s physical capabilities expanded more rapidly than India’s, this alone fails to 
explain Obama- era contrasts in US policy and perception.34
As we have seen, China, alongside regional others, has throughout history 
been understood to lack such essential standards of civilisation as Western- style 
democracy, liberty and capitalism. The 1844 Treaty of Wanghia was designed to 
export these values to China and advance the frontiers of the American Pacific. 
In a 2015 statement on the main economic pillar of the Pivot, the Trans- Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), Obama argued that ‘we can’t let countries like China write the 
rules of the global economy. We should write those rules.’35 Whatever the norma-
tive arguments around the merits or dangers of a Chinese- led global economy, 
‘countries like China’ was code for those who still lack a full display of civilised 
values. The planned inclusion in the TPP of non- democratic Vietnam and Brunei 
demonstrates that China’s physical contours were not irrelevant. However, the 
Pivot was no mere realpolitik response to the challenges and/ or threats posed by 
the capabilities of a material competitor. Obama’s Secretary of State John Kerry 
remarked that ‘The United States and China … have different political systems, 
different histories, different cultures, and … different views on certain signifi-
cant issues.’36 By most measures this applies equally to the United States and 
India. Yet there the focus was on naturally closer ties, ‘rooted in common values 
and interests’.37 In sum, ‘India’s rise is not simply less dramatic and quantitatively 
different to China’s; in American imaginations it is qualitatively so.’38
Modern political leaders, rarely, if ever, speak of Empires for Liberty or the 
savagery or barbarism of others. In 2014, however, Obama explicitly echoed 
Eisenhower, Kennedy and others when he identified the boundary between South 
and North Korea as ‘freedom’s frontier’. South Korea is ‘a country like ours’, he 
asserted, and ‘[t] he 38th Parallel now exists as much as a contrast between worlds 
as it does a border between nations’.39 Countries ‘like ours’ were (and remain) 
embodied by the American Pacific, where a traditional US hegemony of ideas and 
the authority to enforce them had to endure. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
explained, the Pivot was formulated to ‘sustain our leadership, secure our interests, 
and advance our values’.40 Guam could also be seamlessly reduced to Roosevelt’s 
strategic ‘outpost’; for Obama the island was a ‘strategic hub’, to which he decided 
he could transfer thousands of US troops from Japan without significant contro-
versy.41 As it has since the late nineteenth century, the US military remained in 
effective control of Guam, occupying almost 30 per cent of the island and keeping 
the society and its people reliant upon its economic presence.
As will be shown throughout the remainder of this volume, Obama 
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Asia, leaving legacies of his own making. Equally, however, Obama came late to 
ingrained understandings of the region and the United States’ place within it. 
His policies and worldviews were to some extent themselves the legacies of cen-
turies of US imperial hegemony in a fantasised American Pacific he inherited and 
subscribed to. The Obama administration mantra, for instance, was of the United 
States as a Pacific power or nation. It was a term historically driven to situate the 
United States as an organic resident of the Pacific in toto, perpetuating the essen-
tially unquestioned necessity of a Pacific- wide reach of US activity and influence. 
The term “Pacific power/ nation” was ‘an inherently performative call to action, 
turning foreign problems into domestic problems by helping to ensure that the 
United States acts in distant Asia as naturally as Vietnam, the Philippines, and, 
most importantly, China’.42
For the Obama administration, then, China was not rising in a distant Asia 
Pacific, but into a geographed American Pacific defined by American values, 
where long- standing US imperial hegemony was now increasingly questioned. 
It remained an extension of US territory and of the American self, justifying, 
as Obama explained, ‘a larger and long- term role in shaping this region and its 
future’.43 To this end, Obama pledged to increase the proportion of the US naval 
fleet in the Pacific to 60 per cent by 2020, and from 2012 a new contingent of US 
marines was stationed in Australia. Washington strengthened security ties with the 
Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam and others, and regional US arms sales increased. 
As an imaginative geography it could also still be reconstructed at will; Clinton 
argued that it stretched ‘from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the 
Americas’,44 inflating its traditionally accepted boundaries.
When Obama came to office in early 2009 the United States had approxi-
mately 79,000 military personnel stationed throughout the Asia Pacific. By the 
end of his second term in 2016 there remained approximately 68,000,45 a decline 
of around 15 per cent, but in line with post- Cold War trends. A fuller retreat from 
the imaginary frontier (the existence of which, as we have seen, Obama explicitly 
acknowledged), still conveniently reified in such places as the Korean border and 
US military bases in Japan and Guam, could conceivably have been achieved; at 
the time of Obama’s election victory in 2008, nearly half of Americans believed the 
United States spent too much on its military, the highest proportion since the early 
1990s.46 Significant proportions of Americans (just as now) also believed that the 
United States should abandon its military bases in Japan.47
To withdraw, however, would have been to implicitly validate the other, less 
civilised world of which Obama spoke at a time when his administration was 
actively promoting a regional Pivot designed, at least in part, to contain its influ-
ence in the form of a rising anti- democratic China and ongoing threats from a 
nuclear- arming North Korea. Fundamentally, it would have challenged ingrained 
and traditionally unquestioned truths of the United States as a resident actor, 
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boasted territorial sovereignty and in Japan, South Korea and elsewhere its polit-
ical and economic systems had been exported, remaining vulnerable to threatening 
influences from the peripheries. Centuries of US political discourse to this effect 
had been deployed to legitimise wide- ranging internationalist projects in the Asia 
Pacific, often at great cost, and they could not be overturned by one administra-
tion, even had the will existed.
The early Trump presidency, 2017– 19
Donald Trump is an aberration within the roll call of American presidents. He is 
the least formally qualified, having never previously occupied political office, and 
the only one to have seriously questioned Washington’s post- war commitments 
to the so- called US- dominated world order. In the Asia Pacific, President- elect 
Trump’s conversation in late 2016 with Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing- wen broke 
decades of carefully maintained protocol with China; his praise for controversial 
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte was a characteristically Trumpian departure 
from diplomatic norms; and his rhetoric towards North Korea and willingness 
to engage directly with Kim Jong- un has been a radical shift from the strategic 
patience of his predecessors. While the means by which the Trump administra-
tion seeks to advance American interests might diverge significantly from those 
of Obama and his predecessors, however, we find in its regional strategies long- 
spoken truths and historical legacies of US imperial hegemony, and powerful 
underlying continuities of policy and worldview.
Trump’s first US National Security Strategy (NSS), for example, pledged to 
‘rebuild our military, defend our borders, protect our sovereignty, and advance 
our values’.48 It argues not simply that China (alongside Russia) is a material com-
petitor, but a ‘revisionist’ nation looking ‘to shape a world antithetical to US values 
and interests’. With China promoting authoritarianism and expanding its state- 
centric economic model, it explains, ‘a geopolitical competition between free and 
repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo- Pacific region’. Just 
like the Asia Pacific during the Obama era, the Indo- Pacific  – a term increas-
ingly normalised under Trump, for example with the US Navy’s Pacific Command 
renamed the US Indo- Pacific Command – is imagined to stretch ‘from the west 
coast of India to the western shores of the United States’.49
Regular references not simply to an Indo- Pacific, but to a ‘free and open 
Indo- Pacific’, confirm its endurance as a fantasised extension of American 
territory and identity. A Trilateral Dialogue with India and Japan established 
in 2011 (alongside a Trilateral Strategic Dialogue with Japan and Australia) 
continued under Trump, intensifying in mid- 2018 with a collaborative infra-
structure plan.50 Democratic India, whose economy is projected to overtake 
that of the United States before 2050, remains conceived as a strategic partner 
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in Asia stays beyond mainstream debate, even for this most unorthodox of 
administrations, with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo explaining that ‘the 
United States is committed to growing our presence in the region’.52 The 2017 
NSS echoes Eisenhower, Kennedy and Obama by pointing to the importance of 
America’s frontier nations of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in regard to North 
Korean aggression and in defence of the One China policy. The Trump admin-
istration, indeed, is firmly committed to the United States’ ‘forward military 
presence’ in the Asia Pacific53 and, to a significant extent, like those of Obama, 
Bush and Clinton before it, continues to act out the Cold War in the region. The 
long- term decline in the regional US troop presence will likely persist at least in 
the short term, but essential Cold War structures remain intact, most notably in 
its regional military bases and hub and spokes network of alliances which, with 
exceptions such as Vietnam, prioritises non- authoritarian allies.
The Asia Pacific and, increasingly, the Indo- Pacific, under Trump, then, has 
remained an American Pacific, as an imaginative geography of the American 
self defined by the twin requirement for its core values of Western- style democ-
racy/ freedom and capitalism, and its physical authority, to endure. Under Trump, 
the United States continues to pursue imperial hegemony in the region through 
institutionalised and consensual, or Ikenberry’s ‘informal’, networks of power; 
Secretaries of State Rex Tillerson and Mike Pompeo attended the ASEAN Regional 
Forums of 2017 and 2018 respectively and the United States seems willing to 
remain an active participant of the multilateral landscape. The maintenance of 
those networks, however, continues to be enabled by the explicit availability and 
impositions of political/ economic and military power, with some more exposed 
than others.
The Trump White House, for example, has so far avoided such staples of post- 
war US foreign policy discourse as democracy promotion and the protection of 
human rights, while continually restating its seemingly hard power foreign policy 
doctrine of “America First”, including in Asia, with its focus on revising trade 
and other economic agreements in favour of US interests and strengthening the 
American military. Yet as we have seen, the basis for American engagement adheres 
to historically familiar, value- driven logics of the American self. Washington still 
assesses regional partnerships, not least its “great power relations” with India and 
China, on the presence or absence of shared political values.54 In early 2018 the 
Trump administration withdrew financial assistance to Cambodia over ‘setbacks 
to democracy’ there.55 Typically now in the absence of physical conquest, the 
United States still manipulates the long- term conditions for American values to 
exert control from the centre to the peripheries; ‘[T] he US Government doesn’t 
tell American companies what to do’, explained Secretary of State Pompeo at the 
Indo- Pacific Business Forum. ‘But we help build environments that foster good, 
productive capitalism. We help American firms succeed so that local communities 






Obama’s legacy in Asia and the Pacific24
24
In the military- security realm, the Trump administration actioned the Enhanced 
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines, formulated under 
Obama, to help reassert regional US authority from one of its traditional military 
hubs. Like the Military Bases Agreement of 1947, controversy followed the EDCA 
after being approved only by the Philippine Executive, bypassing scrutiny from the 
Senate.57 Obama- era plans to relocate troops from Okinawa to Guam also remain 
in place, so that the island under Trump, still denied full democratic representa-
tion, stays conceived first and foremost as a strategically valuable outpost for use 
by, and deployment of, the US military. As noted by Secretary of Defense James 
Mattis: ‘[H] aving these forces on US territory, whether it be Guam or Hawaii … 
allows us certain freedoms of actions and sustainment out there.’58
Conclusion
Washington’s policy makers ascribe to long ingrained truths of the United States as 
a local Pacific Power, in an American Pacific imagined to extend from the Western 
United States into the furthest reaches of Asia. Like Obama, the Trump admin-
istration uses history to sustain the normality of an American presence many 
thousands of kilometres from the US mainland:  ‘[t] he US interest in a free and 
open Indo- Pacific extends back to the earliest days of our republic’,59 notes the 
2017 NSS, reasserting Washington’s timeless project to secure its Enlightenment- 
inspired, democratic- capitalist values. As ever, this project primes Washington to 
see threats in those whose values contradict the American self. With the reach 
of American power and identity throughout the Asia, and now Indo- , Pacific 
expanding over time in the forms of domestic political cultures, economic and 
trade norms, military bases and outposts, and, in places, its dominant linguistic 
and racial foundations, perceived responsibility over their maintenance and 
defence has expanded with them. These are key legacies of the American Pacific 
for twenty- first-century American presidents.
These physical and ideational legacies have been centuries in the making and 
play a key role in the contemporary operations of US foreign policy. Having 
steadily, if unevenly, transformed the landscape of the region from at least the 
middle of the nineteenth century, from Alaska to Guam to the Philippines to Japan 
and beyond, the United States maintains its pursuit of regional imperial hegemony 
today. It does so through institutionalised and consensual networks of partners 
and allies, enabled by the availability and application of political/ economic and 
military power to extend control from the centre out to vulnerable frontiers. 
Washington’s Cold War security frameworks, in Japan and Korea and in its hub 
and spokes network of bilateral alliances, are maintained in a region seen as one of 
rising challenges as much as economic development. But the United States keeps a 
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Authoritarian China is now the largest trade partner and among the largest 
investment partners of almost every Asian economy. Most regional governments 
also strongly favour a plurality of regional power where no single actor dominates; 
a rising China generates uncertainties and tensions, but from a position of prepon-
derance the United States has a long history of forceful and destructive impositions. 
In historically familiar (“civilised vs. uncivilised”) terms, the Obama and Trump 
administrations have identified the existence of two distinct worlds: one defined 
by the operations of American values and the other by their problematic absence. 
Yet even where democracy and capitalism thrive in Asia, the region has com-
monly conformed to Western models only in Western imaginations.60 In today’s 
less polarised post- Cold War world, moreover, regimes which have long resisted 
US democratisation efforts now feel emboldened and tacitly supported by China’s 
state- centric rise.
Diplomatic and security allegiances in the Indo- Pacific, then, are evolving and its 
geopolitical contours are increasingly fluid. The United States must also adapt, but 
questions remain over the extent to which it is willing to do so and how it will make 
sense of the first long- term diminishments in its regional grip on ideas and physical 
power in at least 150 years. Historical legacies of the American Pacific haunt twenty- 
first-century Washington administrations, handing down the responsibility to sustain 
US authority throughout an ever- inflating imaginative geography now reconstructed 
from an “Asia” to an “Indo” Pacific. Yet established truths can be challenged and cycles 
of policy can be broken. Today more than ever, radical thinking towards Asia and the 
Pacific in Washington’s foreign policy circles is required.
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Humanitarian hawk meets rising 
dragon: Obama’s legacy in US China policy
Peter Gries
Introduction
After seven years of a George W.  Bush foreign policy focused on the “war on 
terror”, Barack Obama came into office in 2009 seeking to “pivot” US foreign policy 
towards a growing Asia. Together with his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, he 
was particularly keen to reset a US relationship with China that had withered 
under a Bush administration engrossed in the Middle East. Working with China, 
Obama and Clinton hoped, would help resolve a growing list of bilateral, regional 
and global security challenges.
Instead, the eight years of the Obama administration witnessed an unmis-
takable deterioration in US– China relations.1 A variety of academic, policy and 
media reports all suggest that Obama was repeatedly rebuffed both personally and 
in his China policy. For instance, at the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao sent a second- tier official to sit in his 
place opposite Obama. This was widely seen as a snub.2 Similarly, Obama’s 2009 
speech to students in Shanghai, in which he spoke of the importance of political 
expression and participation, was censored in the Chinese media after a negotiated 
agreement to not do so. In 2016, Obama was denied a red- carpet reception at 
Hangzhou Airport and forced to unceremoniously disembark from Air Force One 
through the belly of the plane.3
By contrast, on his first state visit to China in November 2017, Donald Trump 
was treated to an ‘unprecedented’ grand red- carpet welcome.4 Does that make 
Obama’s China policy a failure and Trump’s a success? Two years into the Trump 
administration, what can we say about Obama’s China policy legacy?
Appraising the legacy of an individual or group is relatively straightforward. 
For instance, The Beatles’ legacy can be assessed through the music they left 
behind. Assessing a bilateral policy legacy is more complex. At the interpersonal 
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do the wrong things, or not try hard enough? One side can do all the right things, 
but if the other side does not reciprocate the relationship can deteriorate none-
theless. Alternatively, both sides can make an effort and do the right things but 
circumstances can conspire against them. Inter- nation relations are no different; 
it takes two, and the right international conditions, to make a successful bilateral 
relationship.
This chapter will argue that circumstances conspired to undermine Obama’s 
China policy, and that the deterioration of US– China relations during his admin-
istration was largely beyond his control. Obama’s Pivot to Asia suffered from an 
inability to extract the United States from the wars in the Middle East he inherited 
from Bush, and the rise of Chinese nationalism stymied his hopes of resetting 
US– China relations. Obama’s Pivot to Asia did, however, leave both the Trump 
administration and US allies in a position of relative strength in 2017 Asia.
The chapter further argues that despite an ego- gratifying red- carpet welcome 
to Beijing in 2017, bilateral relations deteriorated much more during the first two 
years of the Trump administration. Halfway through his term in office mutual 
trust is at a new low, talk of a “Thucydides Trap” is increasing, and the spectre 
of another US– China conflict looms. Meanwhile, an “America First” Trump has 
turned his back on Asia, not least by rejecting the Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP). 
Trump has undermined the regional position of the United States and its Asian 
allies, and initiated a damaging trade war with China. Together with Chinese 
President Xi Jinping, Trump is also undermining stability in the Taiwan Strait.
To make this argument, the chapter begins with Obama and his administration’s 
broader foreign policy orientation. It then examines his Pivot to Asia, and his plans 
for a reset of US– China relations. It next explores the events of 2008 that conspired 
to undermine the prospects for improving US– China relations even before the 
Obama administration began. Trump’s volatile China policy and the further 
deterioration of US– China relations is then interrogated. The chapter concludes 
with thoughts on the future of Obama’s legacy in US China policy.
Obama: Humanitarian hawk
To understand Obama’s China policy, one must first understand his broader for-
eign policy orientation. Obama was no dove. George McGovern and the anti- war 
activism of Vietnam- era liberals has created the widespread impression that post- 
Vietnam Democrats are doves and Republicans, hawks. Like many stereotypes, 
there is some truth to this view: on average, Republicans are more nationalistic and 
militaristic than Democrats.
Averages can hide important differences within groups, however. A plurality of 
Democrats today are actually ‘forceful idealists’ or ‘humanitarian hawks’, willing 
to deploy military force to achieve idealistic foreign policy goals.5 They want to 
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defend religious liberty, combat hunger and disease, and promote democracy and 
human rights around the world, and are willing to use force to do so.
Obama was one such humanitarian hawk. When the Nobel Committee selected 
him as their 2009 Peace Prize laureate, they likely mistook him for a dovish 
counterpoint to George Bush’s hawkishness. His words and deeds soon proved 
them wrong. ‘Within America, there has long been a tension between those who 
describe themselves as realists or idealists – a tension that suggests a stark choice 
between the narrow pursuit of interests or an endless campaign to impose our 
values around the world’, Obama declared during his Nobel lecture in Oslo. ‘I 
reject these choices.’6
Instead, like Reinhold Niebuhr and other progressive Christians before him, 
Obama did not abandon the Social Gospel but adapted it to a hostile world. 
Following Martin Luther King, he believed that ‘love without power is mere sen-
timentality. Power without love is dangerous. Love plus power equals justice.’7 
‘Clear- eyed,’ he concluded his 2009 Nobel lecture, ‘we can understand that there 
will be war, and still strive for peace.’8
Obama chose a fellow forceful idealist – Hillary Clinton – to lead his foreign 
policy team. ‘I’ve never understood the division between so- called realists and so- 
called idealists’, Clinton said in a 2011 interview with the Atlantic.
I don’t know how you get up in the world every day … if you don’t have some 
sense of idealism, because you have to believe that as hard as it is, you’re going 
to prevent the dictator from oppressing his people, you’re going to help to stop 
the war, you’re going to figure out a way to get clean water to thirsty people and 
cure kids of disease. And at the same time, I don’t know how you go through the 
day and expect to be successful without being very hard- headed and realistic.9
Obama and Clinton did not just talk the talk about a hard- headed idealism, 
they walked the walk. For instance, in March 2011 Obama ordered a military 
attack on the Libyan army that prevented a massacre in Benghazi. Less than two 
months later, Obama overrode the objections of Republican Defense Secretary 
Robert Gates to authorise Operation Neptune Spear, in which US Navy SEALs 
assassinated Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. But neither Obama nor 
Clinton saw force as the solution to every global problem. They were both philo-
sophical pragmatists,10 and that hard- headedness informed their China policy.
China featured prominently in the United States’ foreign policy Pivot to Asia. 
Obama and Clinton sought mutual cooperation, but China was ‘one of the most 
challenging and consequential bilateral relationships the United States has ever 
had to manage’.11 A long- standing critic of China’s human rights record, in 2011 
Clinton declared, ‘we live in the real world … [and] we don’t walk away from 
dealing with China because we think they have a deplorable human rights record’.12
Obama felt similarly on China policy:  tough when needed on humanitarian 
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a lawyer likely contributed to his focus on human rights issues in China.13 Yet 
Obama’s pragmatism and anti- militarism led him to embrace working with China 
to resolve bilateral, regional and global security challenges. Like his predecessors, 
Obama talked tough on China during his election campaign, only to soften his 
stance once in office.14 As president, Obama repeatedly claimed that the United 
States welcomed the rise of China; against many Chinese critics, I believe he truly 
meant it. Obama viewed China as a potential partner.
Many Chinese, for their part, initially judged the new president as easier to 
work with than his predecessor. But timing was against the new administration. 
While the Middle East preoccupied the White House, many Chinese  – proud 
and confident after decades of rapid growth – advocated a more assertive foreign 
policy as China sought to take its historical place as the leading power in East Asia. 
Washington’s alleged containment policy was seen to stand in the way.
A Pacific president: Obama’s Pivot
US– China relations, former Secretary of State Colin Powell declared in 2004, 
were ‘the best they have been since President Richard Nixon first visited 
Beijing more than 30  years ago’.15 That is decidedly not how Chinese at the 
time viewed the relationship.16 Bush had come into office in January 2001 
with a team of neoconservatives who were hawkish on China, and the April 
2001 Hainan spy plane collision sent bilateral relations to lows not seen since 
the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989. Then- Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, 
muzzled during the delicate negotiations over the release of the plane’s US 
crew, held a press conference immediately upon their release to lambast China 
and blame the dead Chinese pilot Wang Wei for both the crash and his own 
death. The Chinese government continued to place full blame for Wang Wei’s 
death on the United States.
Five months later, the US terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 changed every-
thing. The Chinese government sent its condolences, and the Bush administration 
and its neocons turned their gaze towards Afghanistan and Iraq. Powell is correct 
that on the surface US– China relations seemed to improve, but most Chinese 
security analysts viewed 9/ 11 merely as a reprieve from the wrath of the neocons. 
America, in their view, was 霸道 (hegemonic/ bullying) by nature, and only tem-
porarily directing its innate aggression elsewhere.17 After seven years of the war 
on terror and a Bush Doctrine that emphasised unilateralism and a provocative 
policy of preventative war, Obama ran for president on a platform of extricating 
the United States from the Middle East. Where Bush was willing to go it alone 
in Iraq with or without UN support, and even that of US allies, Obama was far 
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Obama billed himself “the first Pacific President” in November 2009, and first 
announced his Pivot to Asia in November 2011. Michael Green argues that Barack 
Obama was not actually the first Pacific president, but the first to pursue a genu-
inely Asia- first strategy.18 Regardless, it is no coincidence that Obama’s first foreign 
visitor was Japanese Prime Minister Tarō Aso. South Korean President Myung- Bak 
Lee received the Obama administration’s first formal state visit, and his Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton’s first trip abroad was to Asia.
Having grown up in Indonesia and Hawaii, Obama may have been better placed 
than many East Coast American statesmen and women to recognise the growing 
geopolitical importance of a rising Asia, and he and Clinton set about Pivoting 
to Asia. Kurt Campbell, Obama’s Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs, and the Pivot’s primary architect, has argued at length that 
Obama’s Pivot to Asia was a ‘necessary course correction’ after a decade focusing 
on terrorism and the Middle East.19 Campbell further argues that as Asia grows 
the US role in Asia must evolve as well, from a ‘gardener’ dutifully tending to 
the region, to an ‘orchestra conductor’ coordinating the increasingly independent 
efforts of Asian states and their multilateral institutions, such as the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).20
Socialised into an anti- imperialist nationalism,21 many Chinese feared the Pivot 
was an effort to block their country’s rise, and yet another effort to humiliate China 
and deny its rightful place atop the East Asian order. Pointing to Obama’s 2011 
announcement of rotations of increasingly larger groups of US Marines through 
Darwin in northern Australia, these Chinese analysts argued that the Pivot was 
a policy of balancing against China’s rise, both through a US military build- up 
and reinforcing US alliances in Asia. Many Chinese considered the economic 
pillar of the Pivot, the TPP, to have been designed to exclude China and its state- 
centric economy, while drawing up an American- designed blueprint for regional 
trade. Many Chinese saw the TPP as a long- term threat to its interests and sought 
to create alternative economic arrangements like the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP).22 The Pivot, they claimed, was containment with 
a new name.
The Pivot was about ‘increasing ties to Asia’, Campbell responded to such critics, 
‘not containing China’.23 It sought to embed China policy within a broader regional 
framework, not to obstruct China’s rise. Campbell would not convince Chinese 
nationalists, and China’s overreaction to the Pivot only confirmed the worst fears 
of American nationalists, contributing to a hardening of many US China policies, 
from cyber security to the South China Sea.24 Indeed, Campbell concludes his 
book, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia, with a metaphor: the 
United States must bolster its Asian partnerships by adding a ‘tire’ to the trad-
itional hub and spokes alliance structure, joining each and every allied spoke.25
For instance, the Obama administration worked hard to reconcile Japan 
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particularly successful at overcoming their misgivings about each other, US efforts 
to bring Japan and South Korea together do suggest that external balancing against 
China was one driver of Obama’s Pivot to Asia. Indeed, the administration’s plans 
to install the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system in 
South Korea drew criticism from China. The Obama administration claimed that 
it was needed to counter the threat of increasing missile launches from North 
Korea, but Beijing argued that it was actually directed against them. The Chinese 
government was consistent and systematic in its repeated criticisms of THAAD, 
extending formal diplomatic protests immediately after its announcement.26 
Beijing also allowed major Chinese nationalist protests and boycotts against 
South Korean companies, and put restrictions on tourism to South Korea, and the 
import of K- pop. The Obama administration further fuelled Beijing’s discontent 
when it approved arms sales to Taiwan, Singapore and other Chinese neighbours 
concerned about Beijing’s future ambitions. For instance, the Obama administra-
tion lifted a half- century embargo on lethal weapons sales to Vietnam.
Ultimately, the Pivot failed to live up to its full potential because Obama could 
not extricate the United States from the Middle Eastern challenges it had inherited 
from the Bush administration. Obama, and China’s new President Xi Jinping, 
appeared to strike an early friendship, manifest in the broadly positive messages 
which emanated from the 2013 Sunnylands Summit in California between the two. 
Their joint statement described a relationship which had the potential to become 
more cooperative and mutually beneficial, rather than antagonistic.27 While Iraq, 
Syria and Afghanistan would continue to occupy Washington’s attention, however, 
China would begin rolling out its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
Belt and Road, and other megaprojects, to take the initiative in East Asia.
The 2008 Beijing Olympics
With hindsight, it becomes apparent that two events in 2008, before Obama was 
even elected, powerfully shaped the prospects for his China policy. The Beijing 
Olympics and the global financial crisis of 2007/ 8 were successfully utilised by 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to boost Chinese nationalism and solidify 
its legitimacy. They also contributed to a more aggressive turn in Chinese foreign 
policy in general, and China’s US policy in particular.
The CCP used preparations for the Olympics to hammer home the core 
nationalist message of its post- Tiananmen Patriotic Education Campaign 
(爱国教育运动):  that the CCP had rescued China from Western and Japanese 
imperialism in the past, and would restore China to its proper place atop the world 
stage in the future. A  Herculean propaganda campaign portrayed the Beijing 
Olympics as the culmination of a ‘century- long Olympic dream’ (百年奥运梦) 
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Humiliation’ (百年国耻) at the hands of European and Japanese imperialism.28 
The placement of countdown clocks in public squares in cities all across China 
in the years leading up to the Games manufactured an intense personal desire 
for redemption and recognition among ordinary Chinese. The Games themselves 
were virtually flawless. The Opening Ceremony, directed by filmmaker Zhang 
Yimou, was on an awe- inspiring scale, featuring 2008 People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) performers and spectacular visual effects. The performance highlighted 
China’s five millennia old “Brilliant Civilisation” and its “Glorious New Era” under 
the CCP. Like a debutante at its ball, China was stepping out into international 
society to be admired by all, and demanding recognition.
Confronting China’s rise from the intimacy of their own homes, Americans 
appear to have become warier towards China.29 US media coverage of scandals 
surrounding an underage Chinese gymnast who denied an American a medal, 
and a lip- syncing girl during the opening events, contributed to an American view 
of the Chinese as cheats. To add insult to injury, China won the most gold medals 
at its Olympics, beating out its nearest rival, the United States.
Ultimately, the Beijing Olympics put pressure on US– China relations from 
both sides. The CCP became a victim of their own success, facing increasing 
domestic pressure from a nationalist public opinion of its own making and 
which increasingly demanded that a newly modernised China must be 
respected. Meanwhile, the Obama administration confronted an American 
public that increasingly viewed China as a cheat which competed unfairly, 
threatening US global dominance.
The global financial crisis and a newly assertive China
Later in 2008, the global financial crisis provided yet another opportunity for 
the CCP to boost its nationalist legitimacy. It was also good for Obama’s presi-
dential election campaign as he and his running mate Joe Biden benefited, while 
their rivals John McCain and Sarah Palin suffered. For Obama, a national eco-
nomic crisis was good electoral fortune; inheriting Republican George W. Bush’s 
economy, McCain declared in September 2008 that ‘the fundamentals of our 
economy are strong’. That very day Lehman Brothers collapsed, just seven weeks 
prior to the election.30
The financial crisis was bad news, however, for Obama’s subsequent China policy. 
Like the Beijing Olympics it fundamentally transformed Chinese expectations 
about their place in Asia and the world. ‘China emerged from the global financial 
crisis cocky on the international stage but insecure at home,’ Tom Christensen 
notes, ‘a toxic combination that has made managing relations with it even more 
difficult than usual’.31 Prior to 2008, China had pursued a largely cautious policy 
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part this was because when “China threat” discourse first emerged in Japan and 
Southeast Asia in the 1990s, Chinese analysts awoke to the dangers of the security 
dilemma.32 Military policies in the East and South China Seas which China viewed 
as benign and defensive were viewed with alarm by its Asian neighbours, bringing 
the possibility of counterbalancing, military build- ups and strengthened alliances, 
with the potential to undermine China’s security environment.
Reassurance quickly became a guiding principle of Chinese foreign policy. 
China’s neighbours would be made to understand China’s peaceful intentions, to 
help ensure they resisted the temptation of working together to obstruct China’s 
rise. Multilateralism was one way in which China sought to reassure its Pacific 
neighbours. Having fought against a US- led United Nations force in Korea, Cold 
War China had long been hostile to international organisations. In the 1990s, 
however, China began a dramatic reversal, actively engaging ASEAN and other 
regional and international organisations.
Were China’s neighbours reassured? Some were not, arguing that Deng 
Xiaoping’s famous dictum of 韬光养晦 or ‘quietly hiding one’s talents and biding 
one’s time’ suggested that the Chinese policy of reassurance was actually a wolf in 
sheep’s clothing; once China was strong, its aggressive nature would reveal itself. 
For the most part, however, the United States and China’s East and Southeast 
Asian neighbours were reassured, and spent most of the first two post- Cold War 
decades benefiting from trade and investment relations with China. At first, there 
was a bipartisan consensus in the United States on engaging China.33
The financial crisis of 2008 changed all that. Contrasting China’s speedy imple-
mentation of a stimulus package and rapid economic recovery to the West’s slower 
response and more difficult recovery, the CCP engaged in a sustained media cam-
paign to argue to its people that China had emerged on top; the crisis was said to 
have proven that the “Chinese model”, or “Beijing consensus”, of state- led eco-
nomic development was superior to the neoliberal “Washington consensus” on the 
centrality of market- based economic solutions.
The success of this triumphalist CCP propaganda campaign (reminiscent of 
Liberal triumphalism and the ‘End of History’34 following the demise of the Soviet 
bloc) was a mixed blessing for Chinese elites. Many Chinese began to brim with 
self- confidence. Former US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson relates how as early 
as 2008 Vice Premier Wang Qishan, China’s anti- corruption tsar, lectured him at 
length about US economic failings, posing China’s economic model as a superior 
alternative.35
This was more than just talk. Chinese elites were soon acting on their post- 
financial crisis confidence. In 2009, PRC Ambassador to the UK Fu Ying threatened 
the oil company BP over a planned development project with Vietnam, implying 
that BP’s much larger China business was at stake. At a 2010 ASEAN meeting, 
then PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi bluntly declared to China’s neighbours that 
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fact’. He had listened to Southeast Asian diplomats express concerns about PRC 
military activities in the South China Sea, but was in no mood to respond calmly.36 
In Chinese foreign policy after the financial crisis, gentle reassurance was out, and 
blunt power displays were in.
But the Chinese elite were arguably also the victims of their own propaganda’s 
success. The Chinese people largely appear to have bought into the CCP’s post- 
2008 message that the Chinese economy was now the world’s strongest, and they 
began expecting that their government demand the respect a newly dominant 
China deserved. For instance, when the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands dispute flared 
up again between China and Japan in 2012, Beijing’s elite foreign policy makers 
appear to have been forced to toughen their policy towards Tokyo to placate 
nationalist public opinion. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests nationalist 
opinion was a powerful driver of a toughening China Japan policy in 2012– 13. 
Spikes in anti- Japanese sentiment online in Chinese cyberspace, and anti- Japanese 
protests on the streets of most major Chinese cities, preceded each sequential 
hardening of China’s foreign policies towards its East Asian neighbour. Chinese 
popular nationalists, furthermore, directed their ire not just at Japan but also the 
CCP for “weak” responses to perceived Japanese provocations.37 These nationalists, 
in other words, were directing the party- state’s own language of nationalist legit-
imation back towards it.38
In short, the 2008 Beijing Olympics and global financial crisis appear to have 
doomed Obama’s attempted reset of US– China relations before he even took office. 
Washington’s conciliatory gestures towards Beijing, Richard McGregor argues, 
went unreciprocated.39 Following the crisis, Chinese nationalism transformed 
confidence and influence into hubris and assertiveness.40 China recalibrated its 
foreign policy from Deng Xiaoping’s tactic of maintaining a low profile to a new 
policy of speaking and acting loudly. History is likely to judge the Obama years as 
the period when China regained its position as the major power in Asia. Towards 
the end of the Obama administration, a fundamental rethinking of US engage-
ment policy of China was well underway.41
A China policy under Trump?
During his presidential campaign, Donald Trump blamed China for a variety 
of American woes, from its trade deficit to unemployment. This was a winning 
strategy in the Republican Party primaries, as cultural (Christian right), economic 
(business) and political (libertarian) conservatives are more anti- communist than 
their liberal counterparts, and as socio- racial conservatives (white nativists) are 
more prejudiced than civil rights liberals.42 Trump thus found a receptive audience 
in the most conservative Republicans when he floated the old spectres of “Red 
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In the first two years of Trump’s presidency however, his narcissism got the 
better of him and his China policy has been incoherent, swaying back and forth 
towards whomever at hand could best satisfy his insatiable need for flattery. As 
E.  J. Dionne and others have noted, Trump’s policies from immigration to gun 
control shift according to whoever is in the room with him.44 His China policy is 
no different.
Taiwan got to Trump’s ego first. In December 2016, ROC President Tsai Ying- 
wen called Trump directly to congratulate him on his election victory. The con-
versation broke decades of established diplomatic protocol between Washington 
and Beijing and talk emerged of the Trump administration revisiting the One 
China policy which China insists upon, and which many Taiwanese from Tsai’s 
Democratic Progressive Party now oppose. In a February 2017 conversation with 
PRC President Xi Jinping, however, Trump abruptly reversed course, affirming 
that the United States would continue to support the “1992 Consensus” on One 
China. ‘Trump lost his first fight with Xi, and he will be looked at as a paper tiger’, 
Shi Yinhong boasted to the New York Times.45
In November that year, the CCP rewarded Trump with a lavish state visit to 
Beijing. Playing to Trump’s vanity, the visit was ‘unprecedented’ in its pomp.46 
Trump basked in the spectacle, and rewarded Xi by avoiding sensitive issues like 
human rights, press freedom, and even the American jobs he had promised to 
defend during his election campaign. Many Chinese lauded Xi’s triumph. ‘The 
leader of the world’s number one power has just made a pilgrimage to him’, 
Shanghai pundit Chen Daoyin gloated, ‘this is naturally how all Chinese people 
will see it’.47 Just a month later, however, Trump’s first National Security Strategy 
(NSS) described China as ‘challenging American power, influence, and interests, 
attempting to erode American security and prosperity’. The NSS argued that 
decades of US engagement with China had not worked, and emphasised US– 
China competition and possible confrontation.48
The January 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) was even more alarmist. 
Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis claimed that China ‘seeks Indo- Pacific regional 
hegemony … and displacement of the United States to achieve global pre- 
eminence’.49 Nationalism was now becoming the predominant framework for 
understanding US– China relations on both sides of the Pacific. The next month, 
the US Senate unanimously passed the Taiwan Travel Act which Trump promptly 
signed, encouraging visits between US and Taiwanese officials at all levels. 
Although non- binding, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned that the 
Act ‘severely violates the one- China principle and the three joint communiques 
between China and the US’.50
The Taiwan issue, largely dormant during the Obama and Ma Ying- jeou 
administrations, is re- emerging under Trump and Xi as a flashpoint in US– China 
relations.51 Seen as a double “window of opportunity”, 2019 is shaping up to be a 
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desperately desire reunification, Trump’s isolationist “America First” rhetoric only 
emboldens such reckless thoughts, while Taiwanese remain passive and unable to 
confront the threat.
Tensions in the South China Sea continue to mount as well. In January and 
March 2018, the USS Hopper and USS Mustin carried out freedom of naviga-
tion operations within 12 nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal and Mischief 
Reef respectively. While the US side claimed they were innocent passages 
well within international law, the Chinese side responded through the lens of 
anti- imperialist nationalism.52 The United States ‘seriously harmed Chinese 
sovereignty and security’, claimed a Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman.53 
Angry words were also paired with action. The People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN) paraded its aircraft carrier Liaoning and over forty other ships and 
submarines through the South China Sea in April 2018.54 Aboard the PLAN 
destroyer Changsha, Xi Jinping, donning a military uniform, instructed the 
PLAN to be on ‘full alert’.55 It is hard to overemphasise how negatively China’s 
aggressive actions in the South China Sea have impacted American public 
opinion towards China.
Trump pulled out of the TPP at the beginning of his presidency, and in March 
2018 he imposed tariffs on steel and aluminium imports. Most of these imports came 
from US partners like Canada, and Trump’s trade policy created as much opposition 
from close allies as it did from China. On the same day in Chile, eleven Pacific Rim 
countries signed a revised TPP, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans- Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), affirming Obama’s vision of regional free trade, 
and rebuffing Trump’s embrace of protectionism. As of early 2019, Trump’s narcis-
sism and pugnaciousness has contributed to a new nadir in US– China relations. An 
‘enormously destructive dynamic’ has developed across the Pacific, in which worst- 
case thinking threatens to become a self- fulfilling prophecy.56
Obama’s China legacy revisited
This chapter has argued that circumstances conspired to thwart Obama’s China 
policy, and that the unmistakable deterioration of US– China relations during his 
eight years in office was largely out of his control. First and foremost, the Middle 
East demanded continued US attention, inhibiting a full Pivot to Asia and China. 
Second, the 2008 Beijing Olympics and global financial crisis were successfully 
utilised by the CCP to boost popular Chinese nationalism, contributing to a 
toughening of Chinese foreign policy in general, and to its US policy in particular. 
An American counter- reaction was predictable. The widespread perception of an 
aggressive turn in Chinese foreign policy, moreover, did not just set US– China 
relations back. Many of China’s neighbours started rethinking their relations with 
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So Obama’s China legacy must be understood within the broader context of his 
Pivot to Asia, which had mixed results. Obama was not able to fully extract the 
United States from the “forever wars” he inherited, so the Pivot did not live up to 
its full potential. However, the Obama administration’s efforts to put tires on the 
hub and spoke system of US alliances in Asia, to borrow Bader’s metaphor, paid 
dividends. From Japan to Vietnam, Asian states were driven by their growing fears 
of China into an embrace of closer relations with both the United States and each 
other. As a result, Trump was handed a robust network of relationships in Asia 
within which to engage China.
From the vantage point of early 2019, has Trump squandered this Obama 
legacy? Yes. The TPP is an illuminating case. Trump withdrew from a partnership 
Obama had promoted since 2009. The Obama administration viewed the TPP as 
more than just a trade agreement – it was to be the political cement that kept the 
United States engaged in Asia. From a political and security perspective, Trump’s 
withdrawal was a major error, ceding leadership in East Asia to China. It was 
also a blow to one of Obama’s China policy successes. Like a zombie, the TPP has 
also risen from the dead, though without American participation. The signing in 
March 2018 of the CPTPP by eleven of Washington’s important regional partners 
not only affirms Obama’s economic vision of free trade and spurns Trump’s pro-
tectionism, but supports the Pivot’s political vision of an Asia Pacific tied together 
through open networks and multilateral agreements.
Trump’s bellicose threats over trade towards both China and some of 
Washington’s closest and most long- standing allies, to fulfil his narcissistic need 
for affirmation from his protectionist supporters, threatens to further undermine 
Sino- American relations and the liberal international order so central to the post- 
war peace. It is also misplaced; the Trump administration has prioritised balance 
of trade issues, at the expense of more important problems including Chinese 
intellectual property theft, non- tariff barriers to free trade, and the probation of 
foreign investment in selective sectors of its economy.
Trump may be squandering Obama’s legacy in Asia, but China also currently 
appears to be wasting the opportunity Trump presents to take a positive leader-
ship role in East Asia, as Xi’s assertiveness alienates a number of China’s Asian 
neighbours. Trump’s successor will therefore likely confront an Asia eager to 
support American re- engagement, and Obama’s Pivot to Asia may well re- emerge 
in a new form.
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The Obama administration and India
Christopher K. Colley* and Sumit Ganguly
Introduction
The dawn of the twenty- first century ushered in an era of new opportunity in 
Indo- US relations. While bilateral ties in the twentieth century were marred by 
the politics of the Cold War, as well as perceptions of American arrogance and 
hegemony, the first decade- and- a- half of the new century witnessed the world’s 
two largest democracies come closer together than they had ever been. There 
are multiple causes for the warming of ties between Washington and New Delhi, 
which range from shared democratic norms, to real and perceived economic 
opportunities, to policies based on strategic hedging and the balance of power in 
the international order. This chapter specifically examines the relationship under 
the two Obama administrations and the first two years of the Trump administra-
tion. It argues that the overriding driver of Indo- US relations during this period 
was the mutual desire to hedge against the rise of China. Additionally, however, 
there were other factors influencing ties, chief among these economic consider-
ations. As will be demonstrated, the focus on China and increasing trade links 
between the United States and India were not always sufficient to prevent domestic 
obstacles in both the United States and India from posing political challenges to 
bilateral ties. However, when examining America’s relations with India during the 
Obama era and into the Trump regime, it is nearly impossible to decouple the 
broader geostrategic situation in which both states have concerns over how Beijing 
will wield its increasing power.
While China’s rise served as a backdrop to expanding ties between Washington 
and New Delhi, other important (and related) events took place during Obama’s 
eight- year presidency. Specifically, this chapter focuses on three key interrelated 
* The opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not reflect the 
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aspects of bilateral ties. First, we analyse the diplomatic and political relationship 
between India and the United States with a focus on the major summits and pol-
itical meetings at the top levels of government. This section will demonstrate that 
the honeymoon period of the last three years of the Bush era gave way to a more 
realistic bilateral relationship with the Obama administration. The second section 
examines economic ties and highlights the major successes, as well as significant 
challenges, that confronted both New Delhi and Washington. The final section 
focuses on the cornerstone of relations, the strategic partnership, and how this is 
heavily impacted by the rise of China as both a regional and global power. This 
segment also argues that by the end of Obama’s second term, security ties between 
the two states were robust, but for political reasons were not at the level of a formal 
alliance. We conclude with a brief discussion of policy changes and continuity 
under the Trump regime.
Background
Throughout most of the Cold War India and the United States held different 
worldviews. The United States was determined to maintain its dominant pos-
ition as a global hegemon and supported its allies while opposing the USSR and 
other communist states. India’s leaders quickly saw the United States as less of 
a defender of post- colonial states and more of an heir to British imperialism.1 
American support for India’s rivals Pakistan, and later China, further divided 
Washington and New Delhi. Although the United States did support India in its 
war with China in 1962, and even supplied it with military equipment, Washington 
did not view New Delhi as a major ally or force in the global war against com-
munism. In fact, America did not view India’s policy of “nonalignment” as a form 
of genuine neutrality.2 India’s 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation 
with the USSR, where Moscow and New Delhi promised to aid each other in 
the event of a military conflict, confirmed American suspicions.3 Washington’s 
ties with Pakistan also posed a significant obstacle between India and the United 
States. Perhaps the best concrete example of the divergent interests between the 
United States and India during the Cold War is found in the 1971 USS Enterprise 
incident where the American aircraft carrier entered the Bay of Bengal as a 
token show of support for Pakistan during the 1971 Indo- Pakistani War. This 
conflict ended in the dismemberment of Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh. 
India’s poor economic performance throughout most of the Cold War also led 
Washington to not take New Delhi seriously. Added to this was India’s “peaceful 
nuclear test” in 1974, which resulted in various legislative acts by the American 
Congress designed to prevent nuclear proliferation in South Asia, and the 1998 
nuclear tests by both Pakistan and India, which resulted in additional American 






Obama’s legacy in Asia and the Pacific46
46
The George W.  Bush administration, over the course of two terms, brought 
about a virtual transformation of Indo- US relations. Specifically, Bush removed 
one of the most trying elements in the relationship: the US attempt to induce India 
to abandon its nuclear weapons programme.5 This policy shift had a transformative 
effect on the Indo- US relationship. In turn, it benefited from some key initiatives 
launched in the waning days of the Clinton administration.6 It is important to note 
that Bush expended an enormous amount of political capital to assist India. In 
particular, the administration set out to change domestic American laws in order 
to accommodate New Delhi. Additionally, Washington worked with friends and 
allies to alter international regimes in order to allow full civilian nuclear cooper-
ation with India.7 From a strategic perspective the Bush administration made it 
clear that it wanted to assist India in joining the ranks of the great powers. As 
far back as the 2000 American presidential campaign, Condoleezza Rice argued 
that India had the potential to become a great power, and that the United States 
would do well to assist in this endeavour. It was also Rice who, in her position as 
Secretary of State in 2005, put forth a ground- breaking framework for cooperation 
with India.8 Consequently, when the Obama administration assumed office in 
January 2009, the Indo- US relationship was on an extraordinarily secure footing.
Indo- US diplomacy during the Obama years
Despite the significant progress that had been made in Indo- US relations during 
the 2000s, the Obama administration did not have an auspicious start with India 
in its first year in office. Almost at the outset the administration caused distress 
in New Delhi when its Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the 
seasoned diplomat Richard Holbrooke, mentioned that he might include the 
Kashmir dispute in his portfolio. When rumours about this impending decision 
emerged from Washington, DC, it invoked a swift and belligerent response from 
New Delhi. Indian officials felt the new administration was not respecting Indian 
concerns on a core issue of sovereignty. Interestingly, India even hired lobbyists 
and used personal connections to keep Holbrooke from including India in his 
portfolio.9
It is crucial to note that upon taking office in 2009, President Obama confronted 
the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression and preventing the United 
States from collapsing into a second depression was of paramount importance to 
the White House. While relations with India were important, they simply did not 
garner the level of attention that the Bush administration had accorded to India. 
The lack of focus on India in the first six months of the new administration is 
illustrated by that fact that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Japan, South 
Korea, Indonesia and China, but not India.10 Nicholas Burns, the American Under 
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India that New Delhi was not a priority in Washington. He points out that during 
Obama’s first term the administration was preoccupied with the financial crisis, 
and its focus in foreign policy was directed at the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
as well as preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Even though strong 
ties with India were strategically important, India was not a major issue. With 
regard to India, Burns states, ‘it was a classic Washington story of near term crisis 
crowding out long- term ambitions’. Indian officials privately complained to their 
American counterparts of the lack of attention Obama was paying to New Delhi.11 
In fact, it would take eight months for the contours of Obama’s India policy to 
emerge.12
The first breakthrough in Obama’s first term came with Secretary Clinton’s four- 
day trip to India in July 2009. This visit significantly eased concerns in India that 
the United States no longer viewed New Delhi as a major actor in global affairs. 
Clinton’s trip was the longest ever for a Secretary of State to India.13 Most import-
antly, Clinton’s trip set the stage for Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s 
November 2009 visit to Washington.
Singh’s visit was significant for multiple reasons. Crucially, by inviting the 
Indian Prime Minister to the White House for the first state visit of Obama’s 
presidency, Obama was making clear to New Delhi that he attached great import-
ance to bilateral relations, as well as Indian concerns over the threat of terrorism 
confronting India.14 Obama openly encouraged India to take a leadership role 
in Asia by stating, ‘In Asia, Indian leadership is expanding prosperity and the 
security across the region. And the United States welcomes and encourages 
India’s leadership role in helping to shape the rise of a stable, peaceful and pros-
perous Asia.’15
Singh’s trip to Washington was followed a year later with a visit by Obama to 
India. During this visit, Obama announced support for India to become a per-
manent member of the United Nations Security Council.16 Obama’s support for 
India on the UNSC is best viewed through the lens of public diplomacy. While his 
remarks gave face to India and demonstrated to New Delhi that Washington was 
serious about building robust ties in multiple areas, the fact that China would veto 
another Asian permanent member on the UNSC made this a somewhat limited 
diplomatic gesture. In addition to calling for India to get a permanent seat, Obama 
stated that India was ‘an indispensable partner’ of the United States in the twenty- 
first century.17 A more concrete gesture from Obama was in his announcement that 
the United States would help India obtain membership in four non- proliferation 
regimes, these being the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar 
Group, the Australia Group and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.18
While there were frequent visits by top diplomats and heads of state on both 
sides during the period under review, two major events stand out. The first was the 
visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the United States in September 
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Modi’s trip to America
Prior to becoming India’s prime minister in the spring of 2014, Modi was banned 
from entering the United States. The US State Department had refused to issue 
him a visa by citing the International Religious Freedom Act, which banned for-
eign officials who were responsible for serious violations of religious freedom from 
entering the United States. In 2002, an anti- Muslim pogrom had taken place in 
the Indian state of Gujarat during Modi’s term as the chief minister of the state. 
However, the American position began to change in late 2013 and early 2014 as 
it became increasingly likely that Modi would be India’s next leader. In February 
2014, the American government ended its visa ban on Modi and shortly thereafter 
he became India’s prime minister in May. Importantly, Obama was determined 
to keep Indo- UN relations on stable ground, and personally contacted Modi on 
the phone after his election victory.19 While Modi’s visa ban meant that he lacked 
strong ties with Washington, his September 2014 visit went exceedingly well. In 
New York, Modi sold out Madison Square Garden, he was greeted by thousands 
of members of the Indian diaspora, and in Washington with Obama, he renewed 
the 2005 Defense Cooperation Agreement for another ten years. This agreement 
stated that India and the United States would treat each other at the same level as 
their closest partners on issues of defence.20 The Obama– Modi summit surprised 
many observers in that the two leaders appeared to establish a form of personal 
rapport with each other. The summit also helped to allay fears in India that the 
United States was not a reliable partner and that it would be willing to provide vital 
spare parts to the defence sector in a time of conflict.21
Under Obama, the United States enjoyed a relatively high favourability rating 
with the Indian public, and perhaps more importantly a very low unfavourable 
rating. As can be seen in Figure 3.1, America’s favourability ratings were roughly 
consistent with those of his predecessor, George W. Bush. Figure 3.2 shows that 
while unfavourable perceptions declined under Obama, there was a dip in favour-
able perceptions. In addition, in the years where data is available, Figure 3.3 shows 
that the Indian public had ‘confidence in the US President’.
America’s relatively high approval ratings in India, along with Obama’s rela-
tionship with Modi, help explain why Obama was the chief guest at the sixty- sixth 
Republic Day on 26 January 2015. This was the first time an American president 
had this honour, and in making the journey, Obama was the first American presi-
dent to visit India twice while in office.22 Obama attached so much importance 
to the visit to India that he even had to reschedule the annual State of the Union 
address.23 A joint statement issued by both Obama and Modi the day before the 
Republic Day event stated, ‘A closer partnership with the United States and India 
is indispensable to promoting peace, prosperity and stability.’ Importantly, this 
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thus clearly elevating India beyond the domain of a regional power.24 As will be 
discussed below, major progress was also made during this visit on a nuclear 
liability law that stood to benefit American companies. It needs to be noted that 
Modi’s decision to invite Obama to the Republic Day parade constituted a costly 
signal in that it demonstrated that he was willing to stand up to the Indian left and 
the America- baiters within India’s “attentive public”.
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Political and diplomatic challenges during the Obama era
While Obama and Modi were able to reconcile their differences and come together 
in Obama’s last two years in office, several political/ diplomatic challenges showed 
that as Indo- US relations evolve and mature, significant hurdles remain. While 
not a major event, it is useful to briefly mention the arrest and strip search in 
New York of Devyani Khobragade, who was the Deputy Consul General for India, 
in New York. Mrs Khobragade was charged with visa fraud for bringing to the 
United States a domestic worker she planned to employ and for failing to pay the 
worker a minimum wage. The episode demonstrates that Indo- US relations during 
the Obama period were not strong enough to bypass such events. India retaliated 
to the arrest by downgrading security at the American Embassy in New Delhi 
(which could have had serious consequences) and by denying visas to American 
teachers employed at the American International School in New Delhi.25 This 
event also underscores Indian sensitivities towards real and perceived slights by 
the United States.
A much deeper political challenge is the fact that significant constituencies 
in India do not wish New Delhi to move towards a closer strategic partnership 
with the United States. From an ideational standpoint, closer ties to Washington 
could compromise India’s room for political manoeuvre expressed in terms of its 
commitment to “strategic autonomy”. The political left and the communist parties 
all harbour deep mistrust of the United States and American intentions. This 
fear of being seen as too close to Washington played a role in scuttling the multi- 
billion dollar fighter- bomber deal with US defence contractors.26 At the national 
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level, the Congress Party has concerns that it may lose support from the left, and 
Muslims, if it is perceived as being too close to America. Additionally, various 
defence related projects were held up for political reasons. For example, during a 
three- year period when A. K. Antony was India’s Minister of Defence, the United 
States proposed seventeen defence- related projects, but did not receive a response 
from the Indian side.27
On the issue of diplomacy and foreign policy, the Obama administration had 
to contend with Indian strategic ties with Iran relating to its role in Afghanistan, 
and its fraught relationship with Pakistan. Afghanistan is a major concern to India 
and New Delhi sees it as a strategic rear base for Pakistan. India seeks to limit 
Pakistani influence in Afghanistan and to that end is the largest regional donor in 
Afghanistan with over US$2 billion invested in reconstruction and development 
aid. New Delhi was not consulted or involved with American decision making 
in regard to pulling out of Afghanistan, which caused significant irritation in 
India.28 Washington and New Delhi do not always agree on how to deal with Iran. 
While a nuclear armed Iran is not in India’s interest, Iran plays a significant role 
in India’s energy imports, as well as being a transit point for goods to and from 
Central Asia. New Delhi is planning to build rail and road links from Afghanistan 
to the Iranian port of Chabahar to facilitate the flow of raw materials and goods 
from Afghanistan to India. In addition, India’s large Shia Muslim population is a 
powerful constituency that promotes Indo- Iranian relations. These factors mean 
that New Delhi does not always endorse American sanctions on Iran.29
Overall, the Obama administration’s public diplomacy towards India evolved 
over his two terms in office. While domestic factors and the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan kept India on the back burner in the first six months of his adminis-
tration, by the end of 2009, relations with New Delhi were back on track. In terms 
of diplomacy, it is difficult to compare the Obama era with the previous Bush 
administration. Obama was constrained by the enormity of the financial crisis 
as well as the two wars he inherited from Bush. As ties between the two states 
started to mature, the economic links between the two increased, but not without 
challenges.
Indo- US economic relations under Obama
One of the reasons India was not taken seriously by the United States during much 
of the twentieth century was because of its anaemic economic record. In 2002, 
Robert Blackwell, then the American Ambassador to India, described the US 
trade flow to India as ‘flat as chapatti’.30 However, bilateral trade in goods picked 
up in the second term of the Bush administration, doubling from US$21 billion 
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between the two states were rapidly expanding. As Figure 3.4 demonstrates, trade 
increased by over 600 per cent from 2000– 17.
Opportunities for Indo- US bilateral trade
On the surface, the United States and India should have relatively complemen-
tary economic ties. India’s former Ambassador to the UN, Jaskaran Teja, argues 
that at the centre of Modi’s diplomacy is the need for high technology and capital 
resources from Western countries, but primarily from the United States.32 India 
has an abundance of cheap labour and if it is able to push further economic liber-
alisation, could become a major source of manufacturing for Western markets. As 
Tellis and Mohan argue, India must understand that long- term economic growth 
is based on increasing global trade links, and increasing ties with the United States 
will enhance this.33 The United States has also become a major trading partner for 
India over the past fifteen years. In 2001, India was America’s twenty- fifth largest 
trading partner and by 2014 it had risen to eleventh. While America was India’s 
second largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2001, it fell to fifth lar-
gest in 2014. The overall increase was from 370 million in 2001, to 1.7 billion in 
2014.34 Crucially, when all goods and services are taken into account, the United 
States is India’s largest trading partner.35
Links in the form of FDI with the United States have expanded dramatically 
since 2000. As Figure 3.5 shows, with the exception of the period surrounding the 
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Challenges to Indo- US bilateral trade
While the data shows increasing economic ties between the United States and 
India, under the Obama administration there was still limited economic inter-
dependence.36 One of the greatest obstacles to further economic integration during 
the Obama era stemmed from Indian domestic politics. The difficulties associated 
with the landmark nuclear deal exemplify this problem. After it was signed in 
2008, a nuclear liability law in 2010 made it nearly impossible for American firms 
to benefit from the deal. Specifically, the new law did not cap liability exposure 
for nuclear suppliers, thus discouraging private American firms from taking part 
in a deal established by their own government.37 Importantly, the legislation was 
passed in August 2010 just as Indian courts were releasing their final judgments 
on the horrific Bhopal incident where, in 1984, a chemical leak killed up to 16,000 
Indians in the country’s worst ever industrial accident.38 While the courts’ concern 
for the impact that such industries may have on local populations is justified, it has 
a severe impact on foreign perceptions of doing business and investing in India. 
What should have been a cornerstone and shining example of Indo- US economic 
ties, turned out to be a warning and deterrent to American investors in India.39
As the Indian economy slowed in 2012– 13, New Delhi started to impose dis-
criminatory taxes on foreign investors and began to erect protectionist measures. 
Trade disputes followed with American firms complaining about Indian protec-
tionism, and both countries filing suits in the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The United States banned imports of more than a dozen Indian plants used by 
the pharmaceutical industry.40 One basic measure that compares the comparative 
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the start of Obama’s second term the tariff for all products in the United States 
was 3.5 per cent, while in India it was 48.6 per cent. When this is compared to 
the average GDP per capita in each country, with the United States at US$53,000 
and India at US$1,500, the lure of the Indian market is greatly diminished for 
American firms. New Delhi resists opening the India market because of the 
political costs and the inability of Indian firms to compete with more efficient 
American ones.41
Under Obama, American firms also frequently complained about violations 
of intellectual property rights (IPR) by Indian firms. Specifically, the Office 
of the United States Trade Representative placed India on its priority watch 
list and scheduled an Out- of- Cycle- Review (OCR) in the autumn of 2014 to 
look into this issue. Creating an OCR was an escalation because it can lead to 
recommended sanctions based on the trade representative’s report. Realizing the 
negative impact of such a report, the September 2014 Summit between Obama 
and Modi addressed issues such as IPR and set up a working group to deal with 
this issue. In addition, the Indian Ministry of Commerce established a think- 
tank that focuses on IPR issues.42 The full impact of these measures has yet to be 
seen, but it is necessary to note that New Delhi is at least cognizant of American 
concerns over IPR.
Overall, economic ties between India and the United States increased substan-
tially during the Obama era. Talk of reaching US$500 billion a year in total trade 
may be premature, but if Washington and New Delhi are able to work out some 
difficult challenges on a potential free trade agreement, it is possible that bilat-
eral trade would explode. However, there are also severe roadblocks to sustained 
increases in trade. Domestic Indian political calculations may well tie Modi’s 
or his successor’s hands. In addition, some of the structural deficiencies of the 
Indian economy, such as poor infrastructure and a small middle class, may pre-
vent deeper economic ties.43 While the structure of the Indian political system and 
economy may hinder deeper economic ties, the changing dynamics of the inter-
national system is driving them closer together.
Indo- US security ties during the Obama era
While America’s political and economic ties experienced challenges under Obama, 
security relations between the two were robust and even strengthened during his 
eight years in office. This section argues that the best explanation for Washington’s 
strategic embrace of New Delhi is found in an attempt to hedge against a rising 
China. Both the United States and India are involved in strategic rivalries with 
China44 and, over the past decade and a half, these two separate rivalries are 
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Liberation Army and Navy (PLA and PLAN), as well as China’s overall growing 
power, is causing states all over Asia to rethink their security strategies vis- à- vis 
China.45
The rise of China provides Washington and New Delhi with both opportunities 
and strategic threats. The opportunities lie in the potential economic benefits that 
working and trading with China can deliver. The threats stem from the strategic 
rivalry that China poses to both the United States and India. For the United States, 
working with India in the security realm helps to preserve American hegemony 
while also assisting India in its rivalry with China. While both states are engaged 
in hedging, they are not aiming to “contain” China. A  strategy of containment 
requires a state to prevent another state’s rise by attempting to exclude it from 
the international community, while also working against it in multiple arenas.46 
Hedging, according to Tunsjo, is:
The development and implementation of government strategies aimed at rec-
onciling conciliation and confrontation in order to remain reasonably well- 
positioned regardless of future developments … States hedge by combining 
contradictory cooperative and confrontational strategies to produce a balanced 
approach in order to manage uncertainty.47
India is both actively working with China in the economic realm, while also 
preparing for a worst- case security scenario. Figure  3.6 shows the expanding 
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Rivalry dynamics
Indian leaders have harboured deep suspicions about China dating back to the 
foundations of both states in the late 1940s.48 The 1962 war between India and 
China, where mechanised PLA forces quickly defeated the ill- equipped Indian 
army, had a traumatic impact on leaders in New Delhi. As the Chinese military 
has recently increased its power and, more importantly, its ability to project power 
into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), threat perceptions in India have increased 
dramatically. The rise of China has the potential to radically alter the geopolit-
ical strategic landscape in ways that may be detrimental to American and India 
interests. Given these circumstances, it is understandable that Washington and 
New Delhi work together to deal with a much more powerful and increasingly 
assertive China. As Paul Kapur argues, India’s policies towards the United States 
and China are interconnected, and it is ‘impossible to understand the Indian pos-
ition on one without understanding its position on the other’.49
Obama’s Pivot to Asia was a way to shift America’s strategic focus to the Asia 
Pacific region. Behind this was a critical aspect that encouraged American part-
ners and allies to work together to balance the rise of China. A key component of 
this was to increase military interoperability amongst America and its allies.50 For 
American strategists India was an important component of the Pivot. American 
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta specifically referred to India as the ‘linchpin’ 
of this strategy,51 while Secretary of State John Kerry spoke of India as playing a 
critical role.52
Arms sales
Between 2009 and 2017, the Obama administration played a key role in providing 
the Indian military with advanced weapons systems. High profile purchases 
included C- 130JS Super Hercules and ten C- 17 transport planes; twenty- four 
Harpoon Block II missiles; eight P- 8Is (vital for anti- submarine warfare); as well 
as Apache helicopter gunships. In addition, the Pentagon helped the Indian mili-
tary in ways less visible such as sharing information about key choke points in the 
IOR where PLAN submarines are likely to transit, working with the Indian navy 
on undersea sensors, and assisting in the construction of catapults on India’s new 
aircraft carriers.53 While the United States is not India’s largest source of foreign 
military hardware, as Figure 3.7 demonstrates, during the Obama administration 
American arms exports to India increased dramatically.
By collaborating with the United States in the security realm, India is able 
to gain access to not only American technology and know- how, but improve 
its tactics in military exercises such as Malabar, Salex and RIMPAC (Rim of 
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a participant from 2012.)54 The Chinese are acutely aware of the strengthening 
security ties between the United States and India but seem tone deaf to India’s 
concerns of Chinese encirclement. A prime example of this was Xi Jinping’s state 
visit to India in September 2014 during which Chinese forces crossed the Line 
of Actual Control that separates India and Chinese controlled territory in Tibet. 
The manoeuvre was viewed as a major insult to Prime Minister Modi and left 
Indians speculating why the crossing was ordered.55 This episode along with the 
Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), through which hundreds of billions of 
dollars will be invested in hard infrastructure in the region, increases Indian fears 
of Chinese encirclement. The BRI’s China Pakistan Economic Corridor crosses 
through disputed territory in Pakistani controlled Kashmir. China did not consult 
India about this massive project and because New Delhi sees it as a violation of 
Indian sovereignty in Kashmir, it has boycotted the initiative.
Change or continuity under Trump?
The Obama administration remitted office with Indo- US relations on a mostly 
even keel. President Trump, during his election campaign, had only focused on 
India when dealing with the issue of the apparently questionable allotment of H1- 
B visas which permit foreign professionals to work for specified periods in the 
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mentioned India on a few occasions. His anti- immigrant remarks, though not spe-
cifically directed against those of Indian origin, have nevertheless caused some 
concern in New Delhi.
On the issue of trade, as of early 2019, the Trump administration is considering 
withdrawing the privileges India was granted under the Generalized System of 
Privileges. Through this agreement India has been able to export billions of dollars 
of goods to the United States tax free. The Trump administration’s action follows 
a surprise move by New Delhi in December 2018 that made it more difficult for 
the American firms Amazon and Walmart to conduct e- commerce in India. India 
took action out of concern that Indian firms will not be able to compete with the 
two American companies.56
That said, in other areas, most notably regional security, the Trump adminis-
tration has, for the most part, maintained the policies of his predecessor. To that 
end, in September 2018 he sent former Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, to 
India. During his visit Mattis made clear that the administration saw India as a 
bulwark for regional stability and that the United States was willing to continue 
weapons sales to India. Also, much to the delight of New Delhi, in early 2018 
Trump announced that he was suspending over $2 billion worth of aid to Pakistan, 
India’s nettlesome neighbour, because of its failure to rein in support for terror. In 
addition, the announcement in mid- 2018 of the name change of the US Pacific 
Command (PACOM) to the US Indo- Pacific Command is an important piece of 
diplomacy. Even though PACOM had jurisdiction over India since the end of the 
Second World War, the symbolic renaming demonstrated to New Delhi that India 
matters in American geostrategic calculations.57
Given the Trump administration’s significant misgivings about China on a var-
iety of fronts, as of early 2019, it seems reasonable to conclude that it will continue 
with the trajectory laid out by the George W. Bush and Obama administrations 
and seek to engage India in an attempt to balance against China. Of course, the 
scope and dimensions of this engagement to some degree also depend on India’s 
willingness to work with the United States. As argued earlier in this chapter, elem-
ents within India’s political establishment still remain wary of the prospect of an 
overly robust strategic partnership with the United States. Unless a significant shift 
takes place within India’s political culture despite the progress that has been made 
in the recent past, there may be distinct limits to the Indo- US strategic partnership.
Conclusion
Indo- US relations during the Obama era had a fitful start. On the domestic front, 
the financial crisis was a clear and present danger that the White House had to 
deal with immediately. In terms of foreign policy, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
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Clinton’s July 2009 trip to India and Prime Minister Singh’s trip to Washington 
in November of that year placed the relationship back on track. As bilateral ties 
increased, challenges that could be ignored, or did not exist during the Bush years, 
began to demand attention. Concerns over IPR and market accessibility became 
major impediments in the relationship. These were partially offset by the personal 
ties between Obama and his Indian counterparts. While economic ties between 
the United States and India increased dramatically during Obama’s two terms, the 
full potential of economic ties were blocked by both political factors in India and 
by the structural deficiencies of the Indian economy.
While political and economic ties may not be as robust as they could be, 
the foundation of the relationship is centred on security ties. Faced with a 
rising China that exhibits increasingly assertive behaviour, and that is locked 
in a strategic rivalry with both India and the United States, New Delhi and 
Washington have found common cause to work together. This is unlikely to 
change dramatically during the remainder of the Trump administration unless 
trade and immigration issues really come to the fore and cause the relationship 
to flounder. Furthermore, as argued earlier in this chapter, significant political 
constituencies are against a form of direct external balancing and it is not clear 
how eager India is to join the United States in a strategic alignment specifically 
designed to confront China.58 This situation could change in the near future as 
China continues to make major inroads into the IOR and on India’s northern 
periphery. These developments may induce those within India’s political estab-
lishment who remain leery about a closer alignment with the United States to 
reconsider their stance.
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Obama and Japan: An endangered legacy
Matteo Dian
Introduction
This chapter will discuss the legacy of the Obama administration of 2009– 17 
for US– Japan relations. It will highlight elements of change and continuity that 
characterised the Obama years in the realms of security and economic policy, 
as well as the significance of historical memory and the processes of reconcili-
ation between the two countries. It will also discuss policy shifts promoted by 
the administration of President Donald Trump at around the halfway mark 
of his 2017– 21 presidential term in office. The Trump presidency, it is argued, 
has injected a high degree of uncertainty into the bilateral relationship, causing 
perceptions of declining American influence in the region, especially in the 
economic realm.
Obama’s relations with Japan can be divided into several phases. During the 
period from January 2009 to March 2011, and particularly the tenure of former 
Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama (September 2009– June 2010), the 
Obama administration had a difficult relationship with the government led by 
the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Hatoyama’s intention of promoting political 
equidistance between the United States and China, and to achieve a higher degree 
of autonomy from Washington, appeared to be a threat to the stability of the US- 
led regional security architecture.
The crisis generated by the earthquake and tsunami of 11 March 2011 and 
resultant incident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, as well as increasing 
Chinese assertiveness over the maritime and territorial disputes in the East and 
South China Seas, contributed to what the United States considered a return to 
normality in its relations with Japan, with a strong emphasis on the centrality of the 
alliance and a more adversarial relationship with China. Operation Tomodachi, by 
which Washington provided assistance to Tokyo in the aftermath of the disaster, 
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The most significant elements of discontinuity and change during the Obama 
era occurred in the period following the announcement of Obama’s Pivot to Asia, 
not least after the return of Shinzo Abe to power in December 2012. With Abe, 
Obama found a partner who was particularly eager to embrace the role the Pivot 
had designed for Japan: that of democratic security provider and main supporter of 
the US- led regional order. By early 2019, however, some of these progresses appear 
endangered by the policies promoted by the Trump administration. As we will see, 
Japan has reacted to Trump’s unpredictability and the perceived decline of US influ-
ence by upgrading its cooperation with other Asian democracies in the economic 
and security realms, and promoting a more accommodating policy towards Beijing.
Obama and the Democratic Party of Japan: From 
Futenma to Tomodachi
Following the 2008 US presidential elections, Washington’s relations with Tokyo 
were not among the most pressing priorities in Obama’s foreign policy agenda. 
Early American policies towards Japan reflected a substantial continuity with the 
Bush era; in the first months of the presidency, bilateral relations were expected 
to continue on the established trajectory of incremental progresses towards a 
closer military and diplomatic partnership.1 The Japanese general elections, held 
in September 2009, completely changed this situation. The Obama administra-
tion perceived Hatoyama’s victory as the beginning of an upheaval of the domestic 
foundations underlying the security arrangement with Japan, if not the entire US 
position in East Asia.2
Obama vs. Hatoyama
The relations between the Obama administration and Japan suffered a downturn 
after the 2009 Japanese elections, when the centre- left DPJ achieved an historic 
success, momentarily ending the five decades- long political hegemony of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The DPJ promoted both a distinctive inter-
pretation of Japanese identity and a different strategic vision of the country’s 
interests. The first rested on fundamental assumptions of Japan’s Asian identity. 
As Hatoyama stated in 2009, ‘the Japan– US relationship is an important pillar of 
our diplomacy. However, at the same time, we must not forget our identity as a 
nation located in Asia … [T] he East Asian region … must be recognized as Japan’s 
basic sphere of being.’3 Hatoyama considered the main objectives of his govern-
ment to be ‘restraining US political and economic excesses’, as well as to ‘maintain 
[Japan’s] political and economic independence, and protect its national interest 
when caught between the United States … and China’.4 Consequently, Hatoyama 
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The key initiative from this point of view was the creation of the East Asia 
Community which brought mechanisms for financial and monetary cooperation 
and a security framework aimed at solving territorial disputes. China and Japan 
agreed upon negotiations aimed at approving rules for dispute resolution in the 
East China Sea, and proposed defence dialogues and exchanges, affirming that 
the Sino- Japanese relationship would advance mutually beneficial economic and 
strategic ties. These policies, along with Hatoyama’s statements on the necessity 
to ‘further enhance the mutually beneficial relationship with China based on 
common strategic interests’,5 were considered in Washington to be potentially 
destabilising to the security order based on US hegemony and the centrality of the 
US- led system of bilateral alliances.
The other crucial problem regarded US military bases in Japan. The Bush 
administration and the Japanese government had reached an agreement on a 
revision of the US presence in Japan in 2006, as part of a comprehensive posture 
review started in 2004.6 The agreement foresaw the relocation of the Futenma Air 
Station to Henoko Bay, a less populated area of the Okinawa Prefecture. During 
his 2009 election campaign, Hatoyama promised the complete relocation of 
Futenma ‘outside of Okinawa Prefecture at the very least’.7 The Obama adminis-
tration considered this a major violation of the agreement and a danger for the 
entire process of the posture review. However, the DPJ made another move that 
signalled its will to contest established relations and practices in the alliance. In 
2009, the Japanese cabinet discussed the idea of calling the US to renounce the 
policy of first use of nuclear weapons in the event of conflict. This exposed a 
major disagreement on the centrality of the US nuclear umbrella in East Asia and 
beyond.8
All these policies received a negative response from Washington. Almost for 
the first since the 1950s, the United States faced a political leadership different 
from the LDP, which secured a strong majority in the Japanese Diet that appeared 
willing to reorient the nation’s foreign policy. The Obama administration and 
wider US foreign policy community perceived DPJ policies not as a legitimate 
reorientation of an allied country priority, but rather as a threat to the foundations 
of the alliance and consequently to the entire US strategic position in East Asia.9 
The Obama administration’s response was to nudge, and if necessary coerce, Japan 
into adopting a foreign policy aligned with Washington’s interests.10
Hatoyama resigned in June 2010, nine months after his election. Resistance 
from the United States over his attempts to reorient Japanese foreign policy was 
by no means the only cause of his resignation. Disagreements with coalition part-
ners, opposition from the Japanese establishment and the powerful state bureau-
cracy, and a corruption scandal, all played important roles. However, the Obama 
administration had demonstrated its disdain for Japan’s new course, assuming 
an uncompromising stance on all the main issues under bilateral negotiation, 
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as a new ‘Battle for Okinawa’ played a crucial part in the demise of the Hatoyama 
government.11
Hatoyama’s resignation made several realities of US– Japan relations more evi-
dent. First, the Obama administration, in continuity with the bipartisan consensus 
that has characterised US East Asia policy in the post- war period, openly favoured 
conservative over progressive forces, to the point of questioning their foreign 
policy credentials and legitimacy. Second, the Obama administration considered 
Japan’s attempt to rebalance its foreign policy towards Asia and China, and to 
achieve a degree of diplomatic autonomy from Washington, a serious threat to 
regional American interests. Finally, Obama reminded Japan that, as theorised by 
Paul Schroeder, alliances are ‘tools of management’, namely instruments of influ-
ence on allies’ foreign policy.12 On this occasion, the United States demonstrated 
its capacity and will to derail Japanese attempts to promote significant changes in 
the country’s foreign policy orientation.
Tomodachi and the “return to normal”
Hatoyama’s resignation and the election of Naoto Kan at Kantei led to an improve-
ment in the alliance. Reignited territorial disputes with China over the Senkaku/ 
Diaoyu Islands led Tokyo to accelerate the return to an alliance- centred for-
eign policy. A clear sign of this change was the publication of the 2010 National 
Defense Program Guidelines, a strategic document that introduced the concept of 
‘dynamic deterrence’ which significantly expanded the role of the Japanese armed 
forces beyond the traditional ‘defensive defense’.13 The document also stressed the 
strategic value of Japan’s anti- submarine warfare capabilities, and the joint US– 
Japanese Ballistic defence system.14
Japan was already returning to an alliance- centred defence policy when it was 
hit by the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis of 11 March 2011 (3– 11 crisis). 
Aside from the massive human and social damage this triple disaster caused, it had 
notable political consequences. First, it continued to undermine public confidence 
in the DPJ government. Second, it contributed to improve the image both of the 
Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) and US forces in Japan; Operation Tomodachi 
oversaw unprecedented logistical coordination and integration between American 
and Japanese forces to help victims, demonstrating to the Japanese public the 
utility of military cooperation with American forces in the country. US forces in 
Japan, along with the broader alliance, enjoyed unprecedented approval among 
the Japanese public.15 As importantly, members of the JSDF were celebrated as 
heroes by the Japanese media, arguably for the first time in the entire post- war 
period. This opened a window of opportunity. For instance, one of the effects 
of the response to the 3– 11 crisis was public acceptance of the dispatch of the 
JSDF abroad in peacekeeping missions, and the approval of measures aimed at 
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The prime ministership of Yoshihiko Noda, who succeeded Naoto Kan in 
September 2011, led to several areas of progress for the US– Japan relationship, 
such as the decision by Tokyo to purchase the American F- 35 fighter jet and to 
enter discussions for the Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP).16 Over the longer 
period, the legacy of 3– 11 and Tomodachi has been palpable, paving the way for a 
return to power of Shinzo Abe who promoted a narrative of recovery from crisis 
and national rebirth, together with a return to a foreign policy centred on the US 
alliance and “special relationship” with Washington.
Obama, Abe and the Pivot to Asia
Abe and the alliance
The election of Shinzo Abe as Japanese Prime Minster in December 2012 
instigated a fundamental change in the relationship between the Obama 
administration and Japan. Abe’s vision of national recovery largely coincided 
with the agenda and the strategic priorities of the Pivot, both in the security 
and economic realms.
The authors of the Pivot envisaged an expansion of the Japanese security role 
and a further strengthening of the alliance. On this point, the Pivot did not entail 
fundamental departures from previous strategies, since the United States had been 
pressuring Tokyo to “do more” since the early 1950s. The difference was found in 
the speed and extent of the changes. Abe actively embraced the role of democratic 
security provider which the Pivot envisaged for Japan, promoting reforms that 
would enable such an outcome as well as fundamental progresses for the alliance. 
Indeed, Abe presided over five particular reforms towards the expansion of 
Japanese security involvement: the creation of a National Security Council, mod-
elled on the American example; the approval of a state secrecy law which allowed 
enhanced intelligence- sharing with the United States and other friendly countries; 
the reform of arms export principles that allowed Japan to jointly develop weapon 
systems with the United States and allies; and the release of the first ever National 
Security Strategy for Japan.
The most consequential step for the alliance, however, was the re- interpretation 
of Article 9 of the Constitution which allows Japan to perform “collective self- 
defence”. This interpretation allows Japan to use force not only to defend its ter-
ritory, but also ‘when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close 
relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival’.17 This 
allows Japan, for example, to protect US forces deployed in East Asia, to intercept 
missiles directed at the United States, and to expand its role in exercising deter-
rence autonomously and jointly with the United States towards both China and 
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deterrence in so- called “grey zone scenarios”, namely, situations in which adver-
saries promote coercion and changes to the status quo, without reaching the 
threshold of an open conflict.19
Overall, these reforms paved the way for the approval of the 2015 Guidelines for 
the Alliance, which define the division of roles and duties in the bilateral relation-
ship.20 Previously, they have been modified only twice, in 1978 and 1997. The new 
guidelines clearly demonstrate both a renewed convergence of strategic interests 
and the will to reach higher levels of interoperability, intelligence- sharing and 
coordination. The most important concept they articulate is the idea of “seamless 
cooperation”; while traditionally the alliance was supposed to work only in case 
of attack against Japan, the new document announces cooperation in peacetime 
as well as in “grey zone contingencies” such as in the East and South China Seas 
where China aims to disrupt the status quo with coercive and hybrid measures 
short of outright conflict. To deal more effectively with this new type of challenge, 
the guidelines introduce new coordination mechanisms in the realms of intelli-
gence, surveillance and reconnaissance; missile defence; joint maritime patrolling; 
outer space and cyberspace; and joint training.21
The renewal of the alliance and progresses in the security sphere, however, 
were unable to prevent disagreement between the Obama administration and the 
Japanese foreign policy establishment, not least regarding US policy towards China 
and North Korea. A key moment came in 2013 when senior White House officials, 
including former National Security Advisors Tom Donilon and Susan Rice, endorsed 
the Chinese concept of “new type of great power relations”, implying the recognition 
of China’s core interests.22 From a Japanese standpoint that concept entailed the pos-
sibility that the United States could sacrifice Tokyo’s security interests to achieve a 
long- term security bargain with Beijing. The Obama administration later dropped 
all references to the idea, but Donilon and in particular Rice gained the nickname of 
“Kissingerians”, which carries negative connotations in Japan.23
The second significant point of disagreement came with Washington’s “stra-
tegic patience” towards North Korea. This has been judged as weak and inef-
fective in the Japanese foreign policy community, since it proved ineffective in 
forcing Pyongyang to stop or even limit its nuclear programme. As with the 
Obama administration’s policies towards China, Susan Rice – who admitted that 
both Washington and Tokyo need to ‘learn to live with a nuclear North Korea’24 – 
attracted the focus of Japanese criticism.
TPP and the economics of Obama’s Pivot to Asia
The economic dimension of the Pivot, including the promotion of the TPP, represents 
a key element of discontinuity with previous US strategies towards Japan and East 
Asia, together with the comprehensive engagement of East Asian multilateral 








Obama and Japan: An endangered legacy 69
69
Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, his successor Daniel Russell, and Director 
for Asian Affairs in the National Security Council Evan Medeiros, understood that 
Washington faced a major strategic problem in Asia, namely, the increasing diver-
gence between US security and economic relations in Asia.25 In the security realm, the 
United States remained the “indispensable nation” in East Asia. Yet the rise of China 
had revolutionised the economic realities of the region, with all of Washington’s main 
regional allies increasingly dependent on China for trade and investment. Moreover, 
since the arrival of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Beijing has promoted a comprehen-
sive blueprint of economic governance in Asia, based on Chinese leadership, values 
and rules. The most evident manifestations of this Chinese attempt to build alterna-
tive forms of economic governance have been the promotion of the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
Overall, at least since the beginning of Obama’s second term, it appeared clear 
that the Asian region was facing a competition between two models of economic 
governance:  a Sino- centric model, rooted in Beijing’s leadership and hospitable 
to state capitalist practices, and a trans- Pacific model based on renewed leader-
ship by Washington and advanced via free market capitalism.26 Here, the fun-
damental differences are in respective norms and principles. China promotes a 
state capitalist form of economic integration in which its state- owned enterprises 
play a key role. The TPP promoted a so- called “gold standard” level of regulation 
which set a high bar of economic practice, and severely limited the influence of 
these enterprises (and of the Chinese government) from participating member 
states. The Abe government, in deciding to participate in the TPP, made a clear 
strategic choice to re- align Japan’s security interests with its economic policies; 
Japan needed to side with the United States to promote the trans- Pacific model of 
regional governance, and oppose the rise of a Sino- centric economic order. This in 
turn revealed two strategic assumptions. First, Japan considered the United States 
able and willing to continue to shape the regional order in East Asia in the foresee-
able future. Second, Japan’s best interests were understood to be in resisting, rather 
than participating in, Chinese initiatives such as the AIIB and BRI.
The fact that these assumptions were considered relatively uncontroversial in 
Japan, at least up to the 2016 elections, makes the legacy of the Pivot and Obama– 
Abe cooperation evident. The Pivot prescribed for Japan an active role both as 
security partner and active promoter of a trans- Pacific, free market- oriented, form 
of regional economic order. Abe embraced this twin role, considering it essential 
both to the Japanese economic revival and achievement of the status of “first tier 
nation” in Asia and beyond.27
Hiroshima, Pearl Harbor and the “end of the post war”
The final months of the Obama administration were defined by the president’s will 
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embodied by his visits to Hiroshima and by Abe’s visit to Pearl Harbor in 2016. Both 
leaders considered these visits instrumental to the consolidation of their legacies, 
albeit in very different ways. For Obama, the Hiroshima visit represented an ideal end 
point to a path mapped out in the Prague speech of 2009, where Obama envisioned 
a world characterised by successes in nuclear non- proliferation and international 
arms control; the creation of the global Nuclear Security Summit; the Iran nuclear 
deal; and the START (“Strategic Arms Reduction”) Treaty with Russia. Moreover, 
Obama used his speech in Hiroshima to articulate a vision of American exception-
alism. Inspired by the concept of “Christian realism”, Obama reasserted the moral 
and ethical value of US global leadership as well as the need to oppose, even by force, 
authoritarianism and tyranny in the promotion of peace and freedom.28
Obama’s aims were also practical. Promoting historical reconciliation with 
Tokyo meant laying the groundwork for further consolidation of the US– Japan 
alliance, as well as providing an example for other Asian states such as South Korea 
and the Philippines. Such partners still limit their cooperation with Japan from 
disagreements over their warring past and perceptions that Japan has failed to 
adequately apologise for crimes committed during the Second World War. From 
the American perspective therefore, historical reconciliation is aimed at pro-
moting the multilateralisation of the San Francisco system, complementing bilat-
eral alliances with new forms of cooperation, and connecting different Asian allies 
of the United States.29
From Abe’s perspective, the visits to Hiroshima and Pearl Harbor spoke 
to another long- standing symbolic objective:  the end of “the post war” as the 
period in which Japan needed to apologise for its wartime behaviour, accept legal 
constraints such as Article 9 of its Constitution, and limit its role in the regional 
security order.30 In practical terms, this would allow Japan to finally and legitim-
ately embrace a role of active regional security provider and even assert its status 
as “first tier nation” in Asia.31
Ultimately, and in stark contrast to their predecessors, as well as to the Trump 
administration from 2017, Obama and Abe conceived the development of the 
US– Japan relationship within a comprehensive strategic vision, including the use 
of different instruments of economic, political and security statecraft to shape 
the contours of the rise of China and uphold the regional order. The election of 
Donald Trump, and Washington’s decision to leave the TPP in 2017, put Japan into 
a difficult position by throwing into question its ability to rely upon an American- 
led rules- based international order.
Japan and Trump: The age of uncertainty
The election to president of Donald Trump in November 2016 introduced uncer-
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administration with Japan, as well as over the broader aims of the overarching Pivot 
to Asia. It is however important to differentiate between the security realm (and 
the bilateral alliance in particular), and other dimensions of US– Japan relations.
Trump’s rhetoric during his election campaign greatly alarmed the Japanese 
leadership. In April 2016 Trump stated that Tokyo needed to defend itself against 
North Korea, even suggesting that it should acquire nuclear weapons.32 Prime 
Minister Abe, sensing the risks the Trump administration could comport, quickly 
sought to establish a productive personal relationship with the new president. Abe 
was the first foreign leader to visit Trump Tower following the late 2016 elections, 
and the meeting of the two leaders at the Mar-a-Lago resort in February 2017 
was one of the first high- profile summits hosted by the new administration. On 
both occasions, Trump and Abe restated the centrality of the alliance for peace 
and stability in East Asia. Trump’s state visit to Japan in November 2017, together 
with high- profile visits by Vice President Mike Pence (April 2017, February 2018), 
Secretary of Defense James Mattis (February 2017)  and Secretary of State Rex 
Tillerson (March 2018), helped reaffirm the US commitment to the region and 
reassure Japan of the strength of the relationship.
Three other factors momentarily diminished fears of early strategic abandon-
ment by Washington during the first twelve months of the Trump administration. 
First, many in the Japanese foreign and security policy community appreciated 
an uncompromising US position on North Korea in the ‘fire and fury’ period in 
2017.33 This position was often compared with Obama- era statements by Susan 
Rice on the impossibility of stopping Pyongyang’s nuclear programme. Second, 
Trump’s public endorsement of Tokyo’s position on Japanese citizens abducted by 
North Korea was interpreted as another positive signal in this direction.34 Third, 
despite Trump’s volatile crisis management tactics, most Japanese officials seemed 
to trust the so- called “adults in the room”, particularly such senior cabinet officials 
as National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and 
Secretary of Defense James Mattis. During the first twelve months of the Trump 
presidency, a number of scholars were ready to characterise US– Japan relations 
as returning to “normality” after an initially difficult period.35 Subsequent events 
testified how those analyses were, arguably, overly optimistic.
A series of policy choices made by Trump created serious anxieties in Tokyo. 
In 2018, the Trump administration reversed its previous approach towards North 
Korea, abandoning the policy of maximum pressure to promote a new period of 
dialogue, culminating with the summits of Singapore in June 2018 and Hanoi in 
February 2019. Japan sought to maximise policy coordination on North Korea, 
and it officially expressed its support for the negotiations. Nevertheless, a number 
of developments seriously concerned Tokyo. Trump’s stated intention of ‘ending 
the wargames with South Korea’,36 as well as his failure to mention the issue of 
Japanese abductees during the Singapore summit, created doubts over Trump’s 
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2019, to achieve any progress towards the denuclearisation of North Korea, and 
the subsequent failure of the Hanoi summit, also generated fears in Tokyo of a new 
cycle of provocation by Kim Jong- un’s regime. Moreover, two years after Trump’s 
inauguration, the “adults in the room” had either resigned or were dismissed by 
the president. The most significant departure in this sense was that of Secretary 
of Defense Mattis, considered a key guardian of the US security strategy in East 
Asia.37
Overall, the Japanese government remains wary of the Trump administration, 
not merely in terms of its management of the alliance, but also its willingness and 
capacity to uphold the current international order and its key pillars, from nuclear 
non- proliferation to free trade and beyond. These fears were confirmed by the 
withdrawal from several significant agreements in different policy realms, such as 
the Paris agreement on climate change, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
with Iran, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the TPP. The Trump 
administration also issued tariffs against China and threatened trade restrictions 
against Japan, South Korea and others. A good indicator of the Japanese mood at 
around the halfway point of the 2017– 21 Trump presidency is found in the docu-
ment, ‘Towards a Greater Alliance’, promoted by a non- partisan commission of 
policy experts and scholars. The document defines Trump’s approach to foreign 
policy as ‘the injection of the highest level of uncertainty to be seen in the world 
order since the end of the Cold War’.38
Across the first two years of the Trump administration, the Abe government 
reacted to the uncertainty it has generated, and the perceived decline of regional 
US influence, by advancing three main policy strategies. First, in the security 
realm, Tokyo promoted the idea of a ‘free and open Indo- Pacific’, which entailed 
the expansion of security cooperation between major democracies including India 
and Australia.39 This proposal envisages both an American presence and the devel-
opment of a network of security relations aimed at balancing the rise of China. 
Further, it underlined the fundamental political and ideological fault lines div-
iding China from the United States and its allies and partners.40 This idea gained 
considerable traction in Washington. Trump, as well as senior members of the 
administration, quickly began referring to the Indo- Pacific with increasing fre-
quency.41 From a Japanese perspective this represented a significant success, testi-
fying that Tokyo can effectively exercise the role of thought leader in a moment of 
US retreat.
Second, something similar happened with the negotiations among the eleven 
remaining signatories to the TPP. Japan led the negotiations aimed at approving 
the new version of the agreement, now renamed the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for the Trans- Pacific Partnership.42 The Japanese initia-
tive was motivated by the will to uphold high standards in trade as a key com-
ponent of the current international order, while shaping the contours of China’s 
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however, the Japanese government also assumes that the current protectionist 
trend in Washington will not endure in the longer term, and that the policies of 
the Trump administration on trade are likely to be reversed by the administration 
which follows.44
The third line of action regards the bilateral relationship with China. The 
perceived decline of American influence in the region, the possible escalation of 
trade wars generated by Trump’s protectionist policies, and, above all, the intensifi-
cation of geopolitical competition between Washington and Beijing, have consid-
erably affected Sino- Japanese relations. As Funabashi and Dempsey recently put 
it, ‘Tokyo has begun serious contemplation of a clean- slate foreign policy absent 
US primacy. In the case of a recalibration like this, no relationship would be more 
important to stabilise than that with China.’45 As a consequence, Abe sought to 
diminish the tension with Beijing. After June 2017, Abe became open to a Japanese 
cooperation within the framework of the BRI. In October 2018, on the fortieth 
anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with China, Abe visited Beijing 
for a summit meeting. Abe’s accommodating stance reflected the need to stabilise 
the relationship with China and the necessity to defuse tensions in the realm of 
security and uphold the basic foundations of the regional economic order, to 
reduce the consequences of the instability generated by Trump’s policies.46
Ultimately, however, the Abe government had up to early 2019 been very 
aware of the indispensability of the United States. As a consequence, Abe himself 
appeared ready to ignore even very relevant disagreements, such as those on the 
TPP and trade policies, to help preserve the overall relationship. Moreover, during 
the first two years of the Trump presidency the Abe government further inten-
sified its international role, being active both in terms of security relations and 
economic governance, to try to fill the vacuum generated by the perceived decline 
of US influence and leadership. Nevertheless, as evidenced by the more accom-
modating policies towards Beijing, the perceived unreliability of the United States 
undermined Tokyo’s position vis- à- vis China, making any resistance to Beijing’s 
attempts to contest the current rule- based order more difficult.
Conclusion
Obama’s legacy on US– Japan relations is a complex one. Many accounts of the 
relationship in the Obama period tend to overlook the fact that the administration 
navigated through one of the most severe bilateral crises of the post- war period, 
during the Hatoyama premiership. The Obama White House demonstrated the 
extent to which the United States can exercise strong political and diplomatic 
pressures to avoid unwanted foreign policy changes in Japan. The quick demise of 
Hatoyama, the aftermath of the 3– 11 crisis, the return of the LDP as well as Abe’s 
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Between 2012 and 2016 the relationship arguably reached a historical peak 
in terms of strategic coordination. Despite differences in values, for both leaders 
the relationship was part of a broader strategy encompassing security, economic 
and symbolic dimensions. Washington and Tokyo jointly worked to consolidate a 
trans- Pacific regional order, rooted in an enduring US power and will to provide 
stability and security as well as a renewed capacity to enforce rules and norms of 
economic governance. In this order, Japan represented the fundamental ally, both 
in the exercise of deterrence towards main security threats and in supporting such 
trans- Pacific forms of economic regionalism as the TPP.
Overall, the Obama era cannot be considered an exception in the history of 
post- war US– Japan relations. Like previous eras, it included moments of intense 
friction, especially during the first twelve months, as well as episodes of solidarity, 
not least after 11 March 2011. Only the period between 2013 and 2016 can be 
considered somehow exceptional. The two countries actively worked together to 
make progress in terms of security, economic governance, and around historical 
reconciliation. This level of comprehensive coordination appears rather rare in the 
history of a bilateral relationship that has been often affected by frictions either in 
the economic or in the security realm.
Two years on from Donald Trump’s inauguration as president in 2017, the 
landscape of US– Japan relations had changed markedly. The bilateral relation-
ship survived and adapted to a rapidly evolving East Asian security environment. 
Nevertheless, Japan remained deeply troubled by Trump’s policies towards North 
Korea, by the trade disputes with China, and by mounting geopolitical competi-
tion in the region. Tokyo also remained concerned about his administration’s will 
to uphold key pillars of the current international order, in particular over nuclear 
proliferation, multilateralism, and free trade. The Abe government, meanwhile, 
showed itself determined to endure even significant setbacks in the relationship, to 
preserve the alliance and the rules- based order in Asia. So too did it seek to com-
pensate for a leadership vacuum quickly generated by Trump. With a longer- term 
view, Tokyo seemed aware that any the alternatives to US leadership would lead to 
an unwelcome rise of the Chinese influence.
In modern history, Trump’s position up to early 2019 seemed unprecedented. 
Japan navigated its way through intense trade disputes during the Reagan (1981– 
89) and Bush (1989– 93) administrations, as well as periods of strategic uncer-
tainty during the Nixon (1969– 74) and first Clinton (1993– 97) administrations. 
What made the situation under Trump different is, first, the magnitude of the 
challenge posed by China. Unlike in previous eras, twenty- first-century China 
has ample resources to reshape Japan’s surrounding political- economic- security 
environment in its favour. Second, no administration before Trump ever ser-
iously questioned the basic tenets of American grand strategy in East Asia, or 
cast the strategic value of security alliances or Washington’s commitment to 
uphold the regional order into doubt. Ultimately, the Trump administration has 
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to this point not just actively worked to tarnish some of the most significant 
accomplishments of Obama and the Pivot to Asia, it has also threatened the sta-
bility of the United States’ long- standing hegemonic role throughout the Asia 
Pacific region.
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Obama, Trump and North Korea
Bruce Cumings
Introduction
President Barack Obama’s historic “Pivot” to Asia, formally announced in late 2011, 
would come to have little appreciable effect on US policy towards the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), other than a dramatic uptick in Kim Jong- un’s 
nuclear weapons development programme. Obama’s “strategic patience” towards 
Pyongyang failed to halt or slow its development of weapons of mass destruction, 
but it did manage to initiate greater levels of Sino- US cooperation over sanctioning 
the regime, the introduction of more US resources and weapons to the region (of 
which China disapproved), and helped tighten the security relationship between 
the Republic of South Korea (ROK) and Japan. Frustrations in Washington over 
North Korea intensified towards the end of Obama’s second administration as 
bipartisan support for a more assertive or aggressive policy grew. Obama therefore 
set the stage for a more aggressive American stance for his successor to the White 
House, yet no one anticipated the intensity of the rhetoric which President Donald 
Trump would employ as he threatened ‘fire and fury’ and total annihilation on 
the tiny Asian state. Historic summits with Kim Jong- un in late 2018 and early 
2019 brought some hopes of a potential for the denuclearisation of the Korean 
Peninsula, but familiar underlying patterns in the relationship endured.
North Korea in Obama’s Pacific Century
President Barack Obama’s initial stance towards North Korea can at least partly 
be inferred from his inaugural address in January 2009. ‘To those who cling to 
power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent,’ he asserted, 
‘know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if 
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long- range missile in April 2009, and test an atomic bomb on American Memorial 
Day in May. On 4 July, they tested seven short and medium range missiles. These 
provocative actions put North Korea on Obama’s back- burner for most of his first 
term, and he instead reached out to other former enemies or pariah states which 
he felt might be more receptive to overture, including Cuba, Iran, Burma and 
even Laos.
One might have thought North Korea would have been a bigger concern because 
it was the most dangerous actor in the region Obama had quickly come to identify 
as his foreign policy priority, namely the Asia Pacific. Obama’s Pivot promoted 
a series of defence policy moves which, at the time, appeared to foreshadow the 
most significant transformation of the United States’ global military position since 
the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The shift began 
with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s declaration of America’s ‘Pacific Century’. 
Clinton announced a shift away from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and ‘a stra-
tegic turn’ towards the Asia Pacific, a region now said to be ‘the key driver of global 
politics’ where nearly half the world’s population lives, and where ‘key engines’ 
of the world economy reside. The security of those engines, she noted, ‘has long 
been guaranteed by the US military’, and their region would be more important 
and more central to American interests than any other for the remainder of the 
century.2
Meanwhile, Obama’s Defense Secretary Leon Panetta expressed preference that 
the United States voluntarily relinquish the ability to fight large wars along both 
the central front in Europe and in East Asia. This “two war” posture had defined 
Pentagon strategy for the past six decades. He also indicated that the defence triad 
of air, naval and land forces was outmoded.3 The seemingly endless European 
crisis over national debt in Greece, Portugal and Spain, with the future of the euro 
and the European Union itself hanging in the balance, added its own punctuation 
to the apparent eclipse of Europe and the dawn of a new Pacific era. Still, it may 
just have been that Panetta had run some new ideas up the flagpole to see what 
would happen; the Pentagon later appeared to retreat from giving up the two- war 
strategy and the triad.4
The Obama administration was the first since the Cold War ended to pay 
little or no attention to nuclear- armed North Korea. This was perhaps guided by 
Colin Powell’s warning to Pyongyang that ‘you can’t eat plutonium. You can’t eat 
enriched uranium’, and that those who could help feed poverty- stricken North 
Korea would not do so until it ceased its development of nuclear weapons.5 But the 
White House paid particularly close attention to easing strains both with Tokyo 
over US bases in Okinawa (which brought down the Hatoyama cabinet in 2010), 
and with Seoul over changes to the US defence posture in Korea. Indeed, US– 
South Korea relations had been at an all- time low from 2002 to 2007, with George 
W. Bush and President Roh Moo Hyun barely on speaking terms throughout that 
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to Seoul to Tokyo, diplomatic efforts were underway with the permanency of the 
US Pacific defence posture in mind. That posture, with its political- economic cor-
ollary, is now around seventy years old and has provided a remarkably durable 
regional order for the vast economic exchange taking place in recent decades. 
A key difference now was the remarkable emergence of China as a leading global 
actor, and a recognition that the significance of this issue had gone largely unad-
dressed during the Bush administration.
Obama meets regional historical legacies
For his East Asia policy, Obama from the beginning relied on battle- tested, tried- 
and- true insiders (that is, inside the Beltway) who typically move in a lockstep, 
bipartisan fashion  – regardless of which president or party happens to be in 
office – towards their desired policies. Hillary Clinton was the perfect Secretary 
of State for such people, as a quintessential product of the Beltway herself, begin-
ning with her Watergate investigation days in the early 1970s. And on his arrival 
to the White House in 2009, Obama found a big problem, a smaller problem, and 
a clear remedy.
The big problem was the physical rise of China, which needed somehow to be 
contained, while not disrupting global economic exchange. The remedy was to 
get Japan and South Korea working together under the umbrella of the American 
alliance. The smaller problem, however, was that Seoul had been through a fit of 
“anti- Americanism” as Beltway denizens saw it, under Presidents Kim Dae- jung 
(1998– 2003) and, especially, Roh Moo- hyun (2003– 8). Fortune eventually smiled 
in the form of President Lee Myung- bak (2008– 13), a former Hyundai executive 
who harked back to the days of Korean– American amity when the dictators were 
in power (1948– 87). Even better, they thought, was the subsequent election of 
Park Geun- hye, a daughter of one such former dictator, who stayed in power until 
2017. Also in 2012, however, came Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe yet again, 
and the best laid Beltway plans went awry.
Abe’s grandfather, former Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, was in 
charge of munitions in Manchukuo when Kim Jong- un’s grandfather, Kim Il- sung, 
was fighting the Japanese in the 1930s. Grandchild Kim and grandchild Abe were 
thus always likely on a collision course. The arrival of Park Geun- hye stirred the 
pot, since her father, Park Chung- hee, had been an officer in the Japanese Imperial 
Army, also in Manchukuo, and had colluded with Kishi in the still- controversial 
normalisation of Japan– South Korean relations in 1965. Standing behind all 
this was the United States, which, after momentarily designating Kishi a Class 
A  war criminal and incarcerating him in Sugamo Prison, promoted him as an 
anti- communist and moderniser. The US Military Government in South Korea 
(1945– 48) guided Manchukuo officer Park through its military academy in 1946, 
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and supported him after he led a successful coup of the national government in 
1961. The Americans then pushed hard for a normalisation of Japan– South Korea 
relations, but have never shown much regard for long- standing Korean hatreds 
and grievances arising from nearly four decades of Japan’s colonial rule (1910– 45). 
Instead, from the 1940s to the present, Americans have urged Koreans to unite 
under the fabled US– Japan alliance.
This and other important elements of twentieth- century history severely 
constrained President Park, as she sought to manoeuvre between a voting public 
that suspected she was pro- Japanese, and an Obama administration that wanted 
her to ally with Abe to help in the containment of China. But to all appearances 
Park hated Abe; for years she refused to consent to a summit with him in spite of 
sustained pressure from Washington and Tokyo to do so. Park denounced visits 
by Abe and his close aides to the Yasukuni Shrine and was particularly vociferous 
on the issue of Tokyo’s continuing unwillingness to deal honestly with the legacy 
of its wartime sex slavery and the “comfort women” it abused, the vast majority of 
whom were Korean. So, while Park would talk to President Xi Jinping of China, 
and vice versa, she would not talk to Abe or Kim Jong- un. Xi would also not talk 
to Abe or Kim. That nobody at all talked to Kim was no doubt of great personal 
consternation.
A former Soviet official who had worked in North Korea once told me that 
you could try to direct, or cajole, or nudge the leadership in Pyongyang to do 
something which, to a foreigner, looked to be in their best interests. They would 
smile, seem to nod assent, or might even say yes. Then they would do the opposite, 
even when it directly contradicted their presumed interests. You could call it 
stubbornness or solipsism; they didn’t care. But this dogged insistence on going 
their own way is as much a part of North Korea’s historic behaviour pattern as it is 
a palpable obstacle to international cooperation today.
In March 2013, Obama responded to North Korean threats and intransigence 
with a US$1 billion acceleration of the American ballistic missile interceptor pro-
gramme, adding fourteen new batteries in California and Alaska. (Such anti- missile 
forces were also recognised as useful against the type of antiquated Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) held by China.) Later that month, Obama sent B- 52 and 
B- 1 Stealth strategic bombers over South Korea to drop dummy bombs. It was a 
needless and provocative move. In 1951 Washington initiated nuclear blackmail 
of the North when it launched B- 29s on simulated Hiroshima– Nagasaki bombing 
missions. Operation Hudson Harbor sought to ascertain the feasibility of atomic 
weapon use on the battlefield, and B- 29s were sent over North Korea on practice 
atomic runs, dropping dummy A- bombs or heavy TNT bombs.6 Ever since, nuclear 
weapons have been part of American war planning against the North. They were 
not used during the Korean War because the US Air Force was able to raze every 
city in the North with conventional incendiaries. Few Americans are familiar with 
this horrific experience, but North Koreans are. It is little wonder, then, that some 
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15,000 underground facilities have been dug in the name of national security. In 
short, however provocative the North appears, the United States is reaping the 
whirlwind of historic nuclear bullying.
Failed talks and culture wars
In early 2012 Washington moved to revive local dialogue by tabling a package 
of proposals aimed at restarting the Six- Party Talks between the United States, 
the DPRK, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia. The talks had run intermit-
tently from 2003 but collapsed in 2009 when the DPRK withdrew in protest of 
UN sanctions imposed by its April 2009 missile tests. The result was the so- called 
Leap Day Deal, signed in Pyongyang on 29 February 2012. The Deal would see 
food aid to North Korea in return for a moratorium on testing nuclear weapons 
or launching long- range missiles. Pyongyang claimed the agreement did not pre-
vent it from launching satellites, which DPRK forces claimed they were attempting 
with the launch of a long- range rocket. Washington argued that this violated the 
agreement, and the Leap Day Deal was quickly rendered void.7 The death of Kim 
Jong- il in December 2012, while the talks were in full swing, disrupted the course 
of discussion before Kim Jong- un could take his place. The United States, however, 
treated it as a direct stab in the back, ending any attempts at engagement, while the 
DPRK claimed it had informed the Americans of the coming launch.
While Obama had been quickly greeted with North Korean bomb and missile 
tests on entry into office, it was also China’s turn to consider the knife sticking 
out of its own back. PRC forces saved North Korea from oblivion when they 
intervened in the Korean War in 1950 and has, certainly since the end of the Cold 
War, represented its closest (arguably only) ally. After the North’s third nuclear test 
in February 2013, however, Beijing was openly critical of Pyongyang’s actions and 
argued that they threatened world peace.8 Relations between the two countries 
became unprecedentedly cold. Xi met several times with South Korean President 
Park, and on the eve of Xi’s visit to Seoul in July 2014, Pyongyang showed its pique 
by launching several short and medium range missiles.
As 2014 came to an end, an unpredictable set of events involving North Korea 
mingled tragedy and farce in ways that simultaneously reflected both the absurdity 
and the perils of that country’s place and significance in the world. Hackers who 
may or may not have been North Korean unloaded huge tranches of data from 
Sony Pictures in protest of the film, The Interview, which climaxed with a gruesome 
assassination of Kim Jong- un. The hackers then threatened to attack any theatres 
that would show the film. Large theatre chains opted not to screen it, and Sony 
pulled the movie before later relenting to pressure and releasing it.
Had the film depicted the decapitation of Barack Obama, Xi Jinping, or many 
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aimed at North Korea, a country with no real friends. As such, the American media 
can say and do anything it wants, and very few protest. Most interesting then, and 
most typical of any number of crises over North Korea, is that Pyongyang made 
wild charges – in this case that the US government backed The Interview – and 
media commentators mocked Pyongyang’s paranoia. Further examination, how-
ever, then reveals that a kernel of truth lay at the bottom of the North Korean 
claims; the American media was not only wrong, but as usual failed to do any 
investigative reporting into the matter.
During a US Strategic Command symposium in August 2014, Major General 
John MacDonald, formerly of US Forces Command in Korea, advocated the assas-
sination of North Korean leaders. The video of this symposium was circulated by 
the Strategic Command, in the knowledge that officials in Pyongyang watch this 
periodic symposium every time it airs.9 Furthermore, Sony emails show that com-
pany executives consulted with the State Department and CIA about any back-
lash that might occur from releasing the film; Bruce Bennett, a consultant with 
the US government, told Sony in June 2014 that the only way to get rid of the 
North Korean regime was to assassinate its leader. Bennett also told Sony that the 
imagery of Kim’s gruesome murder in The Interview should be kept to be leaked 
into North Korea as a samizdat DVD to help destabilise the regime.10 In the midst 
of this episode, Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, 
published an editorial in the Wall Street Journal which advocated regime change, 
or as he put it, ‘ending North Korea’s existence as an independent entity and reuni-
fying the Korean Peninsula’.11
If a North Korean leader, including Kim Jong- un, were to be assassinated by 
American forces, it is very possible that the truce on the Korean Peninsula would 
break and open war would resume. It seems it did not occur to Americans working 
for Sony that Pyongyang would naturally see the film not just as an American 
product but one manufactured in Japan, the North’s colonial enemy and bête noire 
for seventy years.
Chinese frustrations and American failure
China’s reliance on North Korea as a problematic but useful “buffer” between 
itself and the South necessitates its uneasy alliance with Pyongyang; no Chinese 
leader wants the ROK, with 28,000 American troops in its territory, to control 
the Yalu River border. Indeed, Obama’s strategy throughout his time in office 
of seeking to persuade the leaderships of both South Korea and Japan to leave 
behind their nations’ historical grievances and unite in reinvigorating the United 
States’ regional influence by proxy was not lost on Beijing. To this end, in late 2015, 
Beijing sent Politburo Standing Committee member Liu Yunshan to Pyongyang 
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the highest- ranking visitor from the PRC in several years. Some analysts surmised 
that the deal to be struck on the visit was a pledge from the North not to test any 
more A- bombs or long- range missiles. Liu reportedly asked Kim to stop testing 
atomic weapons, but more quickly followed.12 In February 2016 Beijing sent top 
North Korea specialist Wu Dawei to Pyongyang to request a halt to tests of long- 
range missiles. Wu was barely back home before reports of more tests.13
The key irritant in Sino- North Korean relations, including throughout the 
Obama era, has been that with every A- bomb or missile test Washington ramps up 
its deterrence efforts in Northeast Asia. US carrier task forces have been rerouted 
to the Yellow Sea; B- 1 and B- 52 bombers have been sent to the Korean theatre; and 
ever more anti- ballistic missile batteries, which China sees as a threat to its older 
missiles including its antiquated ICBMs, have been sold to allies or dispatched. 
On the surface, this would appear to be a problem for Pyongyang. Most goods 
available in its markets are made in China and it earns significant amounts from 
Chinese firms exploiting its natural resources. However in recent years China has 
also become more accepting of UN sanctions on the North. This invites a uniform 
view of the Chinese Communist Party’s attitudes towards North Korea when in 
fact the leadership, and the general public, are in fact quite split. Many hardliners 
in the Chinese military and the CCP empathise with the North. This often co- 
exists with a mistrust or even acrimony for the United States. Xi Jinping is the first 
Chinese leader to so openly denounce Pyongyang’s provocations; his predecessor, 
Hu Jintao, lauded the North’s closed political system for its ability to repel subver-
sive Western ideas and practices.14
The general view of North Korea across the American political spectrum, 
Democrat and Republican, meanwhile, has long been that it is an evil regime. 
Perhaps it is this which inhibits serious US investigative reporting and debate on 
North Korea. That deficiency, in turn, means that even the highest US officials often 
know next to nothing about the country. For instance, former Defense Secretary 
Leon Panetta writes about the Korean War as if he just discovered it, with a boiler-
plate description of his visit to Panmunjom that could have been written forty 
years ago. In passing, Panetta trots out a venerable shibboleth from the Orientalist 
playbook; he eyeballs an ‘inscrutable’ North Korean soldier across the DMZ, ‘just 
as inscrutable as the regime behind him’. ‘[I] t is an exasperatingly difficult culture 
to observe and understand …’, he writes, ‘… our insights into the regime were 
few and shallow … Still, the regime was infuriatingly hard to penetrate.’ Yet he is 
curiously matter- of- fact in saying that, ‘[i]f North Korea moved across the border’, 
the United States would command the ROK’s military and would ‘defend South 
Korea – including by the use of nuclear weapons, if necessary’.15
This is a naïve but telling passage. A small Asian country is seen as ‘inscrutable’, 
and that is infuriating; power needs to know, so why don’t they let us know every-
thing we want to know? Following the launch of the North Korean rocket which 
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was prepared for ‘any contingency’ with regard to North Korea. ‘We’re within an 
inch of war almost every day in that part of the world’, he said, ‘and we just have 
to be very careful about what we say and what we do.’16 For American presidents 
and their officials to contemplate unprovoked attacks against the North is both a 
stunning example of American arrogance and an astonishing admission of failure, 
the roots of which extend for perhaps seven decades. This has been a failure to 
remove the risk of war in Korea, and to make peace with an adversary determined 
to wait the United States out forever, if that is what it takes.
In 2015, an Obama Doctrine seemed finally to have emerged. ‘We will engage, 
but we preserve all our capabilities’, he claimed. Engagement while ‘meeting 
core strategic needs’, he said, would serve American interests in new relations 
with Iran, Burma and Cuba.17 The Obama administration, then, was to end with 
new relationships with nearly every former pariah state. Yet the most important 
one, North Korea, remained out in the diplomatic cold. (As of early 2019, battle- 
torn Syria occupies its own unfortunate political space, clinging precariously to 
statehood.) Despite, or perhaps because of, this, North Korea arguably remains 
far more dangerous than the others, not least because of its precisely unquanti-
fiable nuclear arsenal. At the very least, however, it has on occasions shown itself 
to be receptive to US presidential diplomacy towards its nuclear and missile 
programmes. This, indeed, has always been a crucial element of its design.
Trump and the return of US unilateralism
The election of Donald Trump in November 2016 brought into the White House 
a person with no foreign policy experience, riding a swell of opposition to free 
trade, internationalism, and the rules of the international game since 1945. Trump 
has shown he is an American nationalist of the first order. His appeals to racism 
and anti- immigrant sentiment, and opposition to free trade and a determination 
to set tariffs on exporters to the American market, put him in line with prominent 
isolationists of the 1930s.18 During his campaign, Trump complained that ‘we 
defend everybody’, and that ‘we will not be ripped off anymore’. He then threatened 
to withdraw American protection from Japan and South Korea, including the 
nuclear umbrella, asking why they don’t defend themselves against North Korean 
nuclear weapons and missiles.19 His naïveties had already been illustrated in 2016 
when, as a presidential candidate, he announced that he would be willing to meet 
with Kim Jong- un without preconditions or concessions, a desire he reiterated a 
year later as president.20
Notably, Trump said he wanted to renegotiate security pacts with Japan and 
South Korea, among others, unless they start ‘paying their way’. Asked by the 
New  York Times if he was isolationist, he denied this but asserted that he was 
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peak of American power, he identified the era of Theodore Roosevelt, and said that 
two of his favourite Americans were generals Douglas MacArthur and George S 
Patton.21
The cunning of history is such that its emissaries sometimes arrive in strange 
form. Donald Trump is no exception. Andrew Bacevich’s 2005 critique of 
American power coincided with my own sense that a fundamental rethinking 
of America’s relationship to the world is required.22 Bacevich outlines a number 
of principles, the first of which is to ‘heed the intentions of the founders’. Nothing 
in the Constitution, he observes, ‘commits or even encourages the United States 
to employ military power to save the rest of humankind or remake the world in 
its own image’. He argues for Congress to reassert its constitutional obligations in 
foreign affairs: ‘to view force as a last resort’; to limit American dependence on for-
eign resources; to organise US forces for national defence rather than power pro-
jection; and to reconcile the professional military with the realities of American 
society. These principles, which I  share, call for a full rethinking of the many 
American bases and garrisons abroad, and truly significant reductions in defence 
spending. This would only bring the United States into consonance with what its 
advanced industrial allies spend on military power projection.23 As of early 2019, 
it does not seem that Donald Trump is serious about bringing the troops home. At 
the same time, however, he is the only president since 1945 to repeatedly suggest 
his intentions to do so.
In February 2017 Trump was having dinner at Mar- a- Lago with Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe when it emerged that under Kim Jong- un’s direction, 
North Korea had tested a new, solid- fuel missile fired from a mobile (and therefore 
difficult to detect) launcher. The president discussed the issue on his own tele-
phone in front of the various people sitting with him.24 This missile was a pointed 
nod to history that no American media outlet grasped; as already noted, Shinzo 
Abe is the grandson of former Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, a polit-
ical leader in 1930s Manchuria. Kim Jong- un’s grandfather, Kim Il- sung, spent a 
decade fighting the Japanese at the same time in the same place.
The American media appear to live in an eternal present, with each new crisis 
treated as sui generis. Likewise, every episode with the DPRK during the first two 
years of the Trump administration seemed to be accompanied by the refrain that 
the country has a history of violating one agreement after another. In fact, Bill 
Clinton struck a deal which saw Pyongyang cease plutonium production between 
1994 and 2002. In October 2000 Washington and Pyongyang reaffirmed their 
commitment to that Agreed Framework, and another was signed in the White 
House with General Jo Myong- rok stating that neither country would bear ‘hos-
tile intent’ towards the other.25 The Bush administration ignored both agreements 
and under John Bolton’s influence as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control 
and International Security Affairs, later National Security Advisor under Trump, 
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have no nuclear weapons today if Clinton’s agreements had been maintained by 
Washington.
Breakthroughs and false hope (?)
North Korean technological advancements of weaponry, evident throughout 
Obama’s time in office, continued throughout the first two years of the Trump 
administration. Indeed, 2017 saw a flurry of long- range missile tests from North 
Korea, demonstrating its ability to strike the mainland United States. It also saw 
the tragic death of Otto Warmbier, an American citizen held captive in Pyongyang 
after being accused of stealing a propaganda sign while on a visit to the country. 
UN sanctions followed, and in August 2017 Trump asserted that North Korea 
would be met with ‘fire and fury like the world has never seen’ if it continued to 
threaten the United States.26 In his September 2017 address to the United Nations, 
he threatened ‘to totally destroy’ North Korea.27 Kim Jong- un called Trump a 
‘dotard’ and ‘deranged’; Trump nicknamed Kim the ‘little rocket man’.28 US– North 
Korea relations had become dangerously unstable as two cantankerous and highly 
egotistical leaders clashed.
In November 2017 Trump declared the era of “strategic patience” over.29 Trump’s 
early approach to North Korea, then, in almost every respect, could hardly have 
presented a more striking contrast to that of Obama. Around the same time, the 
centrist Council on Foreign Relations issued a report stating that ‘more assertive 
military and political actions’ towards the DPRK should be considered, ‘including 
those that directly threaten the existence of the regime’.30 Secretary of State Rex 
Tillerson had warned of pre- emptive action during his trip in March to East Asia,31 
and a former Obama administration official, Anthony Blinken, wrote that a pri-
ority for the Trump administration should be to work with China and South Korea 
to ‘secure the North’s nuclear arsenal’ in the event of regime change.32
The dawn of 2018 saw Kim Jong- un deliver an unusually conciliatory New Year’s 
address. South Korean President Moon Jae- in quickly invited a North Korean team 
to the PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games in February, in which the delegations 
competed under a symbolically powerful unified flag. Kim’s sister, Kim Yo- jong, 
and Kim Yong- chol, a former intelligence chief, impressed the crowds with their 
quiet dignity and apparent rapport with Moon. A concomitant shift in rhetoric 
followed between Trump and Kim, for which Trump claimed responsibility. Kim 
made his first foreign trip as leader to Beijing for talks with Xi Jinping in March, 
before then- CIA Director (and nominated new Secretary of State) Mike Pompeo 
travelled to Pyongyang in April. In June 2018 Trump and Kim met at a historic 
summit in Singapore; Trump became the first sitting US president to meet a North 
Korean leader. From the summit came an eye- catching but vague commitment 
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the Korean Peninsula.33 The summit also drew criticism from those who noted 
that it handed Kim Jong- un a valuable domestic propaganda opportunity he 
had always craved. Regional governments nonetheless expressed hopes that US– 
DPRK tensions, which had so recently all- but boiled over, had abated, and that a 
path towards denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and geopolitical stability in 
Northeast Asia might lie ahead.
Hopes of genuine sea change come rarely around North Korea and so the 
expectations of experienced observers were understandably cautious. Credible 
reports nevertheless emerged that the Kim regime was dismantling missile testing 
and production facilities and that anti- US propaganda materials were being 
removed from North Korean streets. The DPRK’s large, annual “anti- US imperi-
alism” rally was called off in the summer of 2018. Trump, meanwhile, proclaimed 
that he and Kim Jong- un ‘fell in love’ in Singapore and joint military exercises with 
the South were postponed to avoid antagonising the North.34 Yet, by December 
Pyongyang made it clear that they would not relinquish their nuclear capabilities 
until the United States removed its own from the South and the wider region, 
raising questions about exactly what had been agreed in Singapore.35 Investigation 
also indicated that the DPRK maintained numerous active, undeclared missile 
sites.36 A  second summit between Trump and Kim in February 2019 ended 
without major agreement. An announcement in March that annual US– South 
Korea military exercises were being permanently cancelled to aid denuclearisa-
tion efforts brought criticism that the tail of Pyongyang was wagging the dog of 
the United States and its allies, by succeeding in eroding the regional American 
security presence.37 In truth, North Korea has to varying extents been steering 
and manipulating the security environment of East Asia for decades, not least 
since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of its main communist support 
structures. In early 2019 it continues to do so, despite the unorthodox theatrics 
initiated by Trump.
Conclusion
Across President Obama’s two terms in office, his “strategic patience” towards the 
DPRK got very little from Pyongyang besides an ever- growing reliability of its 
A- bombs and missiles. Still, there was little real choice but to talk to the North 
Koreans, by broadly adopting the logic of Siegfried Hecker, former Director of 
the Los Alamos National Laboratory, who argued to sustain a message of “three 
no’s” towards North Korea: ‘No more nukes, No better nukes, No proliferation’. In 
return, Pyongyang would be able to keep its existing stockpiles but expand them 
no further, in exchange for concessions.38 Over time Beijing became more active in 
backing UN sanctions against Pyongyang, though it is an open question as to how 
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diplomatic and security resources to the region, including the THAAD missile 
system in Hawaii and Guam, and eventually, in South Korea. It also encouraged 
closer security ties between Seoul and Tokyo.
To this extent, Obama left a legacy of sorts in Washington’s relations with 
Pyongyang; by embracing regional multilateralism over unilateralism and rejecting 
the rhetoric of an “Axis of Evil” – both key features of the Bush administration’s 
regional strategy  – and even to some extent by simply neglecting North Korea 
altogether, Obama succeeded in defusing some of the tensions brought by his 
predecessor’s obsession with terror and “rogue states” like North Korea, espe-
cially in his first term. The arrival to power of Kim Jong- un in 2012 brought a 
renewed acceleration of the DPRK’s nuclear and long- range missile capabilities. 
This, combined with Obama’s focus on securing a nuclear deal with Iran (achieved 
in 2015), emboldened Pyongyang. In many ways then the Obama administration 
kicked the North Korean can down the road. Its aim was to seek closer diplo-
matic and security agreements with its neighbours, particularly South Korea and 
Japan, but also China, to reinforce Washington’s regional authority and exert 
indirect influence over Pyongyang. This effort towards “outsourcing” security was 
a key feature of the Pivot in broad terms. China’s increased willingness to support 
US- led sanctions on North Korea also reflects well on Obama, though this also 
contributed to frustrations in Pyongyang and its relationship with Washington 
progressively worsened.
From 2017, Donald Trump took the US– North Korea relationship on a dip-
lomatic rollercoaster up until the time of writing in early 2019. Trump’s open 
admiration for historical figures including Theodore Roosevelt and Douglas 
MacArthur, as well as his notoriously fragile temperament, help explain his nat-
ural recourse to military solutions and markedly aggressive rhetoric towards 
Pyongyang, especially in his first twelve months in the White House. Trump’s 
fondness for disparaging the record of his presidential predecessor led him to 
declare an end to Obama’s “strategic patience”, though this was likely as much for 
show as a sign of personal conviction. More broadly, by immediately questioning 
the benefits Washington derives from its alliances and military presence in Asia, 
and arguing that its closest regional allies needed to “do more”, Trump began to 
erode Obama’s two- term project of local trust and consensus- building. Neither 
president, sadly, has taken at all seriously the plight of the millions of inno-
cent North Koreans starving and/ or locked away in prison camps. These are the 
timeless victims of both a murderous regime and a lack of American leadership 
on human rights.
The regime in Pyongyang senses an opportunity in Donald Trump; by carefully 
playing to his curious admiration for authoritarian “strongmen” and questionable 
commitment to regional security, Kim Jong- un has become closer to an American 
president than either his father or grandfather managed, yet both Trump and Kim 
are highly unpredictable characters. The problem for North Korea is that its image 
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among the American public and many of their policy makers (Trump’s personal 
up- down relations with Kim notwithstanding) is so negatively charged, and one 
of an almost inhuman authoritarian machine the world would be better without. 
Leon Panetta’s observation that the two sides so often come ‘within an inch of war’ 
is therefore a result of American politics as well as those of the DPRK. Ultimately, 
long- term solutions to the challenges posed by North Korea must have the support 
and participation of neighbouring South Korea, China and Japan. Trump may see 
America First, but to cement a positive legacy of his own on the peninsula he 
would need to reach out to those he has already criticised for not contributing 
enough.
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The United States and Australia: Deepening 
ties and securitising cyberspace
Maryanne Kelton and Zac Rogers
Introduction: Strengthening the alliance
Obama’s politics of liberal internationalism promoted the rule of law, free trade 
and democratic values throughout the Asia Pacific. At the same time, his prag-
matic realism was designed to secure the United States’ position in the region. This 
approach extended to deepening ties with regional allies and fostering the growth 
and corporatisation of US cyber capability. On both counts, he found a willing 
ally in Australia. Obama’s specific legacy, then, was to consolidate US– Australia 
political and economic relations while simultaneously strengthening security ties 
across all strategic domains, with cyber security, space, and maritime collabor-
ation key features.
In these developments, US regional policy was prominent in Australian 
concerns. Here, long- standing policy principles drove Obama’s two- term approach 
in Asia. These principles included sustaining stability in Asian markets to provide 
access and conditions conducive to the US commercial sector, technology, and 
investment. Obama’s backing for the Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP) provided 
the means by which the United States would underwrite the rules of trade and 
investment for the new economy and confirm the United States’ position as the 
region’s leading trade and investment partner. In the security sector, US policy 
principles had been to sustain American power and command of the regional 
commons and advance the position of the dollar, technology, and investment. To 
do so Obama proposed the “Pivot” strategy, which comprised the focus of sea 
power and deployments to the region.1 It also required renewed commitment to 
US primacy by alliance partners.
For the most part, this strategy was welcomed by Australia. However, Obama 
was restricted in his reach and effectiveness by the demands of the global financial 
crisis, the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, and congressional partisanship. The realisa-
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also becoming both more important and more difficult because of the uncertainty 
surrounding the re- emergence of China. US frustrations in forging better relations 
with Beijing also created significant challenges for Canberra,2 particularly given 
burgeoning Australian economic ties with China. Obama’s Pivot also oversaw a 
less visible but highly consequential reprioritisation of the cyber domain in allied 
security ties, which was dependent on the integration of US entrepreneurial, 
innovative, and technological resources to maximise Washington’s position.3
If it was clear in the first months of the Trump presidency from January 2017 
that Obama’s diplomatic legacy was vulnerable to revision, it has become corres-
pondingly evident two years in, that the underlying calculative pragmatism of US 
foreign policy remains. To date, the US force posture in the Pacific remains largely 
unaltered, as has Australia’s integration into its architecture. So too, the pace of 
cyber change and the processes of cyberspace securitisation and corporatisation 
so evident during the Obama administration, are not diminishing under Trump.
This chapter argues that the Obama legacies and the Trump disruptions for 
Australia are these: first, Australia’s diplomatic relations with the United States, 
which largely flourished during the Obama years, have now become more fraught 
and unpredictable at the leadership level but remain institutionally strong. 
Regional uncertainty which was intensifying under Obama and, indeed, which 
he could not control, has been exacerbated by Trump’s unpredictability across his 
first two years in charge. Second, security ties have been deepened and continue 
apace despite the change of administration. Third, while a gradual expansion of 
security ties with Australia characterised the public face of the Obama administra-
tion, the alliance’s cyber contours, still evolving under Trump, represent a decisive 
yet publicly under- recognised infusion to the relationship. Nonetheless, the 
cyberspace remains problematic given the uncertainty surrounding its evolution. 
Accordingly, the chapter is divided into a three- part analysis of: the US– Australia 
public diplomacy and internationalism; the traditional security relationship; and 
the developing processes in securitising the cyberspace.
Obama’s cooperative diplomacy; Trump’s threat 
to liberal order
After the stark unilateralism of the Bush administration, Obama’s frequent display 
of liberal internationalism and progressive cosmopolitanism was welcomed in 
Australia.4 His support for liberal norms and international regimes drew marked 
support. From his understanding of America as a Pacific nation, to his repeated 
visits to the region, his familial connections with Indonesia, and his cooperative 
diplomacy, Obama’s intent to work with the region was clear. In these respects, 
Australia was reassured by the presidential interest in its immediate region. 
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Julia Gillard’s 2011 statement to the US Congress, in which she announced 
that Australia was ‘[a] n ally for the sixty years past and Australia is an ally for 
all the years to come’.5 Obama reciprocated in November 2011 in an address to 
the Australian parliament where he announced his signature regional policy: the 
wide- ranging Pivot to Asia. The Pivot would also involve incremental moves 
towards a US federated Pacific security architecture, where its bilateral alliances 
would be cross- braced through minilateral relationships. For example, Australia 
would be party to the continued evolution of a trilateral strategic dialogue with 
the United States and Japan. Notably, Obama’s intent to strategically Rebalance 
US global policy by upgrading US Asia Pacific regional engagement was met with 
local bipartisan support. Australia’s response, to further upgrade US relations, was 
aided by Obama’s popularity, which by now was intersecting with official concern 
over China’s rising power and the attendant regional uncertainty generated.
Integral to the Pivot was the pursuit of a regional economic agenda to which 
Australia lent support. Obama argued that the vehicle to do so, the TPP, based 
on shared liberal values and harmonised standards for the new economy, would 
facilitate deep economic integration and establish the rules of the new order. 
Washington’s initial intent was to align its economic allies in a liberal venture so 
successful that China would eventually seek to join and, by doing so, participate 
in the American- authored economic standards and norms. As a middle power, 
despite a number of bilateral trade disputes with the United States, Australia trad-
itionally has been well served by the generally cooperative, open, rules- based 
economic system Washington has sponsored. Bilaterally, between 2009 and 
2016, two- way goods and services trade with the United States increased from 
AUS$49.5 billion to AUS$68.4 billion, and by 2017 the United States was the lar-
gest investor in Australia, with AUS$896 billion, or 27.5 per cent of the total.6 That 
said, Australia is integrated economically into the region. By far, its largest trade 
partner is China in both goods and services exports (30 per cent of the total export 
profile in 2017) and imports (18 per cent) with Japan and South Korea second and 
third largest export destinations respectively. Despite Obama’s resolve, however, 
the United States struggled to exercise power in shaping the regional and global 
trading landscape. The World Trade Organization (WTO) had not concluded the 
Doha Round since negotiations began in 2001, while in the United States itself 
the Obama administration failed to steer the TPP through Congress. Australian 
government dismay at the failure to ratify and implement the Partnership was not 
universally shared however, as some domestic analysts continued to argue the loss 
of sovereign control in new generation trade agreements in sectors such as health, 
quarantine, and intellectual property rights.7
Early in office too, Obama’s vexation with a lack of progress in US– China 
relations was evident.8 The East and South China Sea disputes intensified, as did 
American accusations that China continued its human rights abuses, perpetrated 
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companies the freedom to operate in China.9 By 2016, Obama’s Pivot in its dip-
lomatic and economic manifestations was compromised. The rules of the new 
economy could not be written in Washington, and the United States could do little 
to manage instability surrounding the 2014 Thai coup; new Philippine President 
Rodrigo Duterte’s hostility; and a seeming fracturing of ASEAN with the contin-
ental states increasingly leaning towards China. Ostensibly, then, US command 
of the regional commons, with Australia in the slipstream, was beginning to 
appear more tenuous. Beyond the continuity of Washington’s new Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue with Beijing, the United States’ ineffective attempts to pro-
gress Sino- US relations in a way that suited American interests, which reflected 
China’s strengthening economic position and enhanced capacity to exercise the 
tools of economic statecraft, concerned Australian policy makers. They were, how-
ever, encouraged by Obama’s cooperative diplomacy in maintaining relations with 
many regional states. Relations with Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and 
Singapore demonstrated the assurance and confidence that underpinned trusting 
relations.
These efforts can be more starkly appraised and appreciated with the inaugur-
ation of Donald Trump as president in January 2017. Trump’s posturing business 
tactics were unsuited to the strategy and sophistication of foreign policy, while his 
complete disregard for the foundations of the liberal order and international dip-
lomacy provided an immediate disruption to the Obama legacy. So too his failure 
to comprehend that the functional cooperation, reciprocity, consistency, and rela-
tional arrangements on which trust is constructed and maintained underpins 
the international system.10 The characteristics of contempt and the influence of 
domestic political imperatives were evident at the leadership level of analysis in 
the tense telephone discussion of January 2017 between Trump and Australian 
PM Malcolm Turnbull surrounding a refugee swap. Nevertheless, the refugee 
exchange of sorts eventually proceeded and so too Australia negotiated a steel 
tariff exemption in 2018. Both negotiations exemplify Australia’s reliance on trust 
in the bilateral institutional arrangements and bureaucratic attention to the rela-
tionship that have been developed since the Second World War.11
Illustrative of Trump’s broader disdain, however, included his critiques of Asia 
Pacific allies such as Japan and South Korea as free riders on American strength, 
his decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris climate negotiations, and 
the dismantling of the US State Department’s diplomatic capacity. Furthermore, 
the region has become awash with uncertainty and concern. Trump’s unpredict-
ability was evident in the variations between the dramatic exchange of nuclear 
threats with the DPRK’s Kim Jong- un in early January 2018 to the fanfare of 
the Singapore meeting in June where few details were disclosed. For Australia, 
instability on the Korean Peninsula may adversely affect Australia’s Northeast 
Asian regional friends; jeopardise its extensive trading relations; and raise 
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1953 Korean armistice. In the economic realm, though Obama understood the 
long- term benefit to the United States of the TPP and sought to realise its benefits 
institutionally, Trump has so far failed to grasp the bigger picture of its utility 
beyond the immediacy of the deal and promptly terminated the prospect of a US- 
led regional trading regime (at least to date). Over and above trade agreements per 
se, disturbingly for Australia, Trump’s reticence through to the beginning of 2019 
in approving judiciary appointments for the WTO appellate body were commen-
surate with a broader approach that failed to support the functioning liberal order 
on which Australia depends.
Continuity in US– Australia alliance strategy
Though Obama’s Pivot in its political and economic manifestations was proving 
increasingly difficult to execute, substantive and enduring changes in the security 
domain were evident. And as is demonstrated in this section, part of the Obama 
legacy was the intensification of a hard- headed pragmatism aimed at maintaining 
US regional primacy through the relocation of US forces and upscaling of assets to 
the region. Australia, through its part in intensifying relations, further interlinked 
with US security strategy. In doing so, however, Australia’s room to manoeuvre 
became more limited. As RAAF Air Marshal Leo Davies was later to explain, 
heightened interoperability fosters a shift in US– Australia ties further along a con-
tinuum towards institutional integration.12
Obama’s plan had been to maintain the regional power balance by dissuading 
China from seeking regional hegemony. It was a strategy inherited and pursued 
since 2001, with Washington providing access for regional allies to integrate into 
key US cyber, space, and electronic warfare technology networks through which it 
‘would lead a web of more powerful allies and partners with stronger links to one 
another’.13 One of the differences between the Bush and Obama administrations, 
however, was that the former had sought to avoid disclosure of a strategy to which 
China would object, and indeed respond to by escalating its military modern-
isation, presence, and regional relations. In Australia during this period, official 
government documents, including the Australian Defence White Papers of 2009 
and 2016, and the 2017 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade White Paper, 
acknowledged concerns regarding China’s rising power.14 Australia’s continued 
assertions of the importance of the rules- based order were coupled with statements 
noting China’s rising ‘power and influence’15 and Chinese militarisation of South 
China Sea islands.16 Such threat perceptions were critiqued by Beijing.17 Australia’s 
concerns were manifest because of the complexity of its strategic hand: security 
connected intimately to the US alliance, with China trade surpluses sustaining 
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terms, the rising frequency of specific policies embodying choice highlights the 
challenge.
The 2011 decision to station up to 2,500 US Marines from the Air- Ground 
Task Force on a rotational basis in Darwin underscored Australia’s importance to 
Obama’s Asia Pacific strategy. The agreement was the expression of the evolving 
upgrade in Washington– Canberra relations and contextualised by Obama’s Pivot 
to Asia. Located on Australia’s northern reaches, Darwin is proximal to Southeast 
Asian waterways and the strategic Pacific– Indian Ocean transit straits of Malacca, 
Sunda, Lombok and Ombei- Wetar. The Marine contingent was a key manifestation 
of enhanced bilateral relations and expected to contribute to the strengthening 
of a cooperative naval posture, particularly towards a much needed amphibious 
and ship- to- shore capability for the Asian littoral environment. The Enhanced Air 
Cooperation Initiative also enabled heightened interoperability, the use of fifth 
generation air capability, and renovated training and air facilities throughout nor-
thern Australia including for US strategic bombers.
Elsewhere, the Space Situational Awareness Partnership announced in 2010 
provided oversight on the integrity of the US and allied space system, enabling 
event information and assessment, including tracking satellite orbits, missile 
launches, space debris, and foreign and adversary space intelligence, including 
strategies, tactics, intent, and knowledge.19 A renewal of space surveillance through 
the Northwest Cape facilities and a modernised Kojarena Australian Defence 
Satellite Communication Station permitted a more extensive contribution to 
the US global interception system.20 The location of these space surveillance and 
communication assets in Western Australia not only provided better surveillance 
north to China and through the increasingly contested reaches of maritime East 
Asia, but also served access to US and Australian operations out to the Middle 
East. These developments additionally contributed to Obama’s aim of securing sta-
bility in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the rise of ISIL in Syria and then the fall of 
Fallujah in 2014, the United States and Australia redeployed defence personnel 
in the Combined Joint Task Force and, in the process, Australia acquired invalu-
able interoperable battlefield experience. Australia remained a willing alliance 
partner in Obama’s intent to ‘degrade and destroy’ ISIL through a light footprint, 
multilateralised, counter- terrorism approach. Given Australia’s promotion of reci-
procity in alliance arrangements and the opportunity to institutionalise interoper-
ability, through Operation Okra Australia deployed an Air Task Group, Special 
Operations Task Group, and the army’s Task Group Taji, to respectively con-
duct airstrikes, and train and assist Iraqi forces. An Australian naval contingent 
led maritime security.21 Similarly, Australia’s commitments to Afghanistan were 
shaped by Obama’s strategy of deploying 68,000 additional troops there in 2009. 
Now, around 300 members of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) still remain in 
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Joint US and Australian threat analysis had also progressively linked the Middle 
East battlefields to the Asian littorals. The return of foreign fighters from Iraq and 
Syria to the East Asian region was of profound concern to Australia, and as such 
converged with the US interest in maintaining regional stability. Given Australia 
was also apprehensive about resurgent nationalisms, military modernisation, and 
an attendant decline in trust in East Asia, Obama’s support for regional cooper-
ation to address transnational security threats was welcome. For instance, and 
though modest, the 2015 Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative, which 
provides for maritime domain awareness and capacity building, exemplified 
Washington’s interest in fostering functional regional cooperation around issues 
such as piracy, disaster management and relief, sea lane security, and surveillance 
of extremist activities. This initiative, however, also sits within a more extensive 
US and allied strategic plan progressed through Obama’s tenure: the construction 
of a maritime surveillance system extending from Japan through the East Asian 
archipelagic waters of the Philippines and Indonesia, to the Andaman Islands at 
the northwestern reaches of the Malacca Strait.22
While the Pivot itself was not rolled out in Australia in an entirely smooth 
fashion (the US Marine rotations were delayed, for example, with a cost sharing 
agreement for the AUS$1.5 billion project only finalised in 2016 and the entire 
complement of Marines was estimated to take up residency only by 202023), 
the theme of Australian territory and assets enhancing US operational reach 
was consistent. And, what was clearly observable in the Obama era, was the 
continuity of the realist pragmatic theme in US foreign policy – for example 
through the military Pivot to Asia, the development of a cyber exploitation 
strategy, and the increasing use of drone strikes in Western Asia and the 
Middle East. Similarly, while Obama’s overt liberal internationalism may have 
obscured some of the hard- nosed defence decisions, the publicity around 
Trump’s “America First” policy and its prospects in the demands for increased 
burden- sharing masked the continuity of US regional defence strategy. Through 
Trump’s first eighteen months in office, continuity remained in the nature of the 
US and Australian deployments in the Middle East, with 1,100 Australian per-
sonnel plus a naval contingent remaining on station there. Undeniably too, the 
substantive strength of the Pivot was preserved through the first year of the 
Trump administration, as evident in PACOM’s (US Pacific Command) main-
tenance of its regional strategy.24 PACOM’s threat analysis of both China’s mili-
tary modernisation and the asymmetric threat to US primacy in the western 
Pacific, and the potential regional instability arising from ISIL- inspired groups 
or returned fighters from the Middle East to littoral states, continued to inform 
Trump’s strategy of engagement. Events such as the five- month siege in the 
southern Philippines city of Marawi in 2017 by ISIL- affiliated groups were an 
acute reminder of the dangers for regional security to which the United States 





The United States and Australia 101
10
As such, the Trump administration sustained the pressure on Australia to 
actively respond to threat analyses. Flights from Australia’s RAAF Butterworth 
base in Malaysia under the Five Powers Defence Arrangements consistently 
surveilled the regional waterways. However, as of April 2018, and despite US 
pressure, Australia has refrained from sailing within twelve nautical miles of the 
new islands created by China’s South China Sea terra formation projects in the 
strategic triangle of the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoal. 
While Australia’s decision to lease the port of Darwin to a Chinese commercial 
entity was criticised stridently by Pentagon officials, more recently Turnbull’s 
conservative government has also progressively reviewed Chinese investment in 
Australia through a strategic prism. The government, increasingly sensitised to the 
broader strategic rivalry, has constrained Chinese investment in Australian infra-
structure such as power grids, agricultural holdings, and even political parties. 
Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei continues to be blocked from participa-
tion in the new local access broadband network being rolled out across Australia.26
Under the radar, however, another development has been taking place of crucial 
significance for Australia. While commercial innovations and technological devel-
opment have been assimilated into the realisation of US geopolitical ambitions 
since the Second World War,27 recent developments revealed the integration and 
extant potency of Silicon Valley heavyweights (big Internet and data primes whose 
commercial substrate is the digital domain) into the fray. Under Obama, these 
newcomers, with albeit competing and sometimes unruly agendas, began to fly 
as birds of a feather – flocking together in a fashion to transform and increase 
American strategic power. As a close US ally with long- standing commitments 
to technological and institutional interoperability, Australia’s strategic comfort is 
being buffeted by the ongoing effects.
Securitising cyberspace: Origins of a crisis
The cyber age, to quote Lucas Kello, remains in ‘a revolutionary condition’.28 
Its inherent uncertainty is generating deeply disruptive strategic and political 
contours from which even the closest of alliances are not immune. A shift of stra-
tegic weight to the cyber domain forced an improvised reappraisal of threats to 
regional security. Cast from outside the rubric of a post- Bush administration era 
to which Obama’s thinking was initially set in contrast, the ongoing improvisa-
tion is marked by uncertainty.29 Incongruous with an alliance whose stated goals 
for decades have centred on the certainty brought about by a public commitment 
to rule- making in international relations, the cyber age to which Obama was 
inducted, and Australia has followed, permitted no such certainty.
Obama’s introduction to America’s cyberwar began before he was even sworn 
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subsequently advanced more aggressively and rapidly than at any time prior. 
Shortly after winning the presidential election in November 2008, Obama was 
briefed by ex- NSA Director and then Director of National Intelligence Mike 
McConnell, one of the United States’ most influential figures in the development 
of cyber warfare. McConnell outlined to the President- elect the contours of the 
digital battlefield – America’s alarming defensive weaknesses, the efforts already 
underway to strengthen them – and later, in a transition meeting with President 
George W.  Bush, a snapshot of the growing offensive side of cyber operations. 
Among these were Operation Olympic Games – underway since 2007 – the infiltra-
tion and exploitation of computer networks in Iran that would later become known 
as Stuxnet, and the CIA’s drone programme. Bush encouraged the President- elect 
to continue these operations.30 Obama not only agreed, he would pursue an even 
more aggressive agenda in cyberspace. Obama was entering the White House at an 
inflection point in the short history of cyber warfare. His tenure oversaw the insti-
tutionalisation of cyberspace as a legitimate domain of strategic competition and 
the demise of the idea that the Internet was an apolitical global space. The expan-
sion and development of cyber capabilities and the increasing involvement of a 
host of actors challenged the very constitutive elements traditionally associated 
with international security which, for a middle power reliant on stability and pre-
dictability such as Australia, was unsettling.
The fundamental insecurity of the digital medium presented Australia with the 
typical dilemma facing all advanced industrialised nation states, whose economic 
competitiveness has become increasingly tied to leveraging the advantages in effi-
ciency and innovation offered by the digital age. As a strategic and military ally of 
the United States, however, Australia’s dilemma runs deeper. The digitisation of 
warfare offered the ADF an attractive pathway to pursue its long- standing goal 
of regional superiority based on the technical and operational sophistication of 
small but highly capable armed forces. This was manifest in the late 1990s in the 
ADF’s embrace of Network- Centric Warfare, which closely tracked the American 
effort with a few minor caveats. Networked warfare is predicated on robust and 
seamless information flows, which are in turn reliant on the integrity, assurance, 
and security of data stored in and transiting the platforms and systems embedded 
in the digital medium. Cyber security, therefore, sits at the centre of Australia’s 
strategic security in both civilian and military terms. In 2008, Australia was 
underprepared at a tactical and operational level for the age of cyberwar, despite 
the maximising of self- reliance being a central theme of its defence community. At 
the strategic level Australia’s security remained deeply intertwined with its senior 
ally, and cyber insecurity was set to introduce a new level of uncertainty.
2007 was a very big year in cyber security. By 2008 it had reached a point 
of departure. In April and August 2007 Russia launched cyber- attacks against 
Estonia and Georgia in what are generally understood as the first such instances of 
interstate attacks;31 in September four Israeli Air Force F- 15s destroyed a half- built 
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nuclear reactor in eastern Syria, evading Syria’s Russian- made air- defence systems 
by hacking its computer network and spoofing the radar systems;32 and April 
saw the US National Security Agency (NSA) debut its revolutionary Real Time 
Regional Gateway (RTRG) in Iraq as part of the “surge”. For the first time, NSA 
operatives were on the battlefield coordinating the use of computer network 
exploitation (“hacking”) to find, arrest or kill terrorists and insurgents in real 
time. At the operational level, Australia’s Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) station at 
Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap underwent a significant expansion. Embedded 
cross- institutional rivalry in the US intelligence community was wrestled closer to 
alignment. The nature and structure of digital computing across global networks, 
and indeed of the various groups the United States found itself in conflict with in 
cyberspace, meant any clear demarcation between civil, military, state, non- state, 
individual, networked, and commercial domains were being erased. The non- 
ergodic implications of cyberwar hit home at the highest level.
The strategic substance of the ANZUS alliance lies in signals intelligence under 
the UKUSA agreement,33 colloquially known as the Five Eyes. Yet SIGINT, the 
interception of information in transit via the electromagnetic spectrum, was 
challenged fundamentally by the onset of the digital age. SIGINT was evolving. 
Unlike an analogue signal, digital information transits a heterogeneous global 
communications network in packets via the most efficient route and reconfigures 
at its destination. Since the continental United States hosted some 80 per cent 
of the network’s physical infrastructure and bandwidth, most digital packets at 
some point travel through the United States on route to their destinations. Yet, 
they were legally off limits to the foreign intelligence collection activities of the 
NSA and CIA. The impact of 9/ 11 was pivotal. If another homeland attack was to 
be averted, the NSA argued that it required quick access to the phone calls and 
emails of suspects who may be US citizens and whose data packets may be stored 
on servers or travelling through networks in the United States; that is, there was 
no time for warrants. The NSA argued it only required the meta- data to estab-
lish “contact chains” that would enable it to identify threats for further attention. 
President Bush signed the order to give the NSA these powers on 4 October 2001. 
The NSA’s mass meta- data collection programme, known as Stellar Wind, began 
immediately and grew exponentially. Though contact chaining using meta- data 
had its limitations, the new laws represented an opening to the goldmine of global 
digital communications.
Turbulence and the Pine Gap expansion
US Army General Keith Alexander’s arrival as NSA Director in 2005 catalysed 
the NSA’s leap into the cyber age. A new system, Turbulence, consisted of a subset 
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approach provided redundancy regarding potential intelligence gaps, granularity 
by overlaying vectors of analysis, and speed. It gathered and combined SIGINT 
from satellites, microwave transmissions, mobile phone networks, and packets of 
data traversing the Internet either via undersea and overland fibre optic cables 
or at the gateway of Internet service providers. Turbulence spawned numerous 
specialised programmes, many of which were revealed to the public by Edward 
Snowden in 2013. One of them, RTRG, focused these tools on a specific region and 
undertaking. It was commanded from early 2007 by General David Petraeus and 
used in the Iraq War in unprecedented coordination with the military, to target 
and remove terrorists and insurgents from the battlefield. NSA equipment and 
analysts were deployed inside Iraq to enable genuine “real time” operations. Hand- 
in- glove intelligence– military operations alongside US Special Forces developed, 
exploiting the digital communications networks of insurgents with lethal effi-
ciency. RTRG heralded a new operational art of warfare with cyber at its core. It 
also had significant implications for Australia’s operational involvement.
Pine Gap among other joint facilities is the primary locale for the US– Australia 
SIGINT relationship over five decades.35 The facility underwent significant expan-
sion between 2006 and 2008 with regard to its operational remit, number and 
depth of multi- agency involvement, and customer base for the ‘actionable intel-
ligence’ it produced.36 In sum, this period saw Pine Gap expand its remit beyond 
ground control of orbital systems (since 1967)  and relay station for ballistic 
missile- defence data (since 1999)  into support for real time military operations 
worldwide.37 Expansion paralleled significant organisational changes at the US 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), with the above mentioned shifts in oper-
ational focus at NSA. The NRO established a Ground Enterprise Directorate 
with the explicit mandate of transforming Pine Gap and similar Mission Ground 
Stations into premier providers of integrated real time intelligence tailored for 
war- fighting, as manifest in the NSA’s RTRG.38 This put Pine Gap’s 2006– 8 expan-
sion at the fulcrum of developments in cyber warfare, its integration into military 
and intelligence operations, and their battlefield debut in 2007. It gave Australia, 
via the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) co- located with US agencies at Pine 
Gap, ‘access to the heart of frontier advances in information operations’.39
Catching up and collective cyber security
In 2008 Australia’s civilian and military capacity for both computer network 
defence and offensive countermeasures in cyberspace were underdeveloped.40 For 
the ADF, cyber security was a critical enabler inside broader efforts to stand up 
a fully networked force that sought to take advantage of competitive opportun-
ities for small but technically sophisticated militaries in the digital age.41 As stra-
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the forbearance of the alliance under the Trump administration, Australia has 
been expanding its reach and competency in cyberspace in both the civilian 
and military spheres. In January 2010 the ASD (then Defence Signals Division) 
established the Cyber Security Operations Centre, a defence- based centre hosting 
liaisons with other agencies. In November 2014 it became the Australian Cyber 
Security Centre housing all contributing agencies42 under a one roof, whole- 
of- government approach. In April 2016 the government released its inaugural 
Cyber Security Strategy,43 while the 2016 Australian Defence White Paper quietly 
prioritised cyber security as a key capability area, flagging expansion of the cyber 
workforce with the intention of establishing a research and development cap-
ability to help strengthen the ADF’s military information systems.44 Parliament 
passed laws introducing mandatory reporting of data breaches for businesses with 
responsibilities under the Privacy Act which came into force in February 2018. 
Standards Australia developed a priority list of standards to support development 
of blockchain technology, a key element in the effort to build security and prov-
enance into Web 2.0.45 For all of these efforts, Australia draws on its partnership 
with the United States, leveraging its multi- decade membership of the Five Eyes 
intelligence sharing agreement. In addition, Australia in 2017 looked to bolster 
partnerships with established cyber- leaders, including Japan, Israel and Estonia.
By the time Obama handed over the presidency to Trump in January 2017, the 
reality of cyberspace was that the constitutive elements of international security 
were effectively garbled. Cyberspace emerged as a ubiquitous yet opaque battle-
field. Its physical attributes are as tangible as any other, but do not conform to 
a typical pre- twenty- first-century geopolitical outline. This does not mean that 
states are not competing to control it. Similarly, the status and functions attributed 
to cyberwarfare remain very much in their infancy. Obama’s legacy to Trump is 
that the race to secure the US strategic stake in the physical and institutional real-
ities of cyber warfare is very much on. Perhaps no geographical region is more 
strategically consequential in this race than the Indo- Pacific – a region in which 
Australia is ‘top- centre’, no longer ‘down- under’.46
Conclusion
Obama’s progressive and persuasive expression of liberal internationalism found 
resonance in Australia. The rules- based order Obama promoted overtly was 
one which Australia necessarily endorsed and has supported both publicly and 
consistently. As such it marked a departure from the Bush administration that 
preceded it and the Trump administration that would follow. In its vocal nation-
alism, the Trump administration’s derision for international norms, including a 
ready failure to support the international trading system, climate change regimes 
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the State Department’s influence, generated concerns in Australia regarding the 
sustainability of the liberal international order. Regionally, a spiral of distrust,47 
unable to be moderated by Obama and exacerbated in 2017 by the variations in 
the DPRK– US relationship, aggravates the discomfort currently experienced in 
Australia, as indeed elsewhere in the region.
And yet, two years into the Trump presidency in early 2019, these observations 
of the public divergence between US administrations and the repercussions for 
Australia belie the continuity of a realist pragmatism in US foreign policy: a prag-
matism to which Australia also subscribes.48 Arguably, if Trump is inclined to any 
arm of government, he appears most disposed to the Pentagon’s hierarchy and 
strategy. Though presidential rhetoric in 2017– 18 was more dramatic, inconsistent, 
and risk laden, few substantive changes were made to the US force posture in the 
Asia Pacific. Cold War- era security agreements have thus far been maintained, and 
some reweighting of US forces to the region continued, defining the continuity of 
the US military presence. Divergences between Trump’s diplomacy and US mili-
tary strategy, however, revealed to Australia that as it marks the southern anchor 
of US presence in East Asia, it must work to reconstitute trust with regional states 
as they reassess their great power hedging strategies.
As argued in this chapter, Obama rigorously pursued policies to maximise US 
authority at an inflection point of an emerging and rapidly developing cyberspace 
commons. Moreover, the United States did so in the full embrace of state power 
as constituted by the entirety of its public and private resources. The weight of 
its innovative technological resources was central to its pursuit of cyber exploit-
ation and in maintaining primacy in the Asia Pacific. Thus, US security policy 
was increasingly cyber and corporatised, and as such more exposed to attendant 
uncertainty as it was by necessity interlinked with the big Internet and data primes. 
Australia, as a US ally and middle power with a vital interest in the vanguard of 
high- tech advancement, is a willing partner but unsupported by indigenous cap-
acity. Yet the more significant implications for Australia at a time of dynamic 
change in the international system arise from the tapering of Australian choices in 
and beyond the strategic setting, as it progressively integrates with US technolo-
gies and systems. Australia’s discomfort, which has also risen with the unpredict-
ability of the Trump policy choices, is now more likely to be accelerated as rapid 
and far- reaching technological change generates greater uncertainty.
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Southeast Asia has traditionally occupied a marginal role in US foreign policy 
in general and US Asia policy in particular, and American commitment to the 
region has remained quite ambivalent since the end of the Cold War. But during 
his time in office, US President Barack Obama raised the level of US attention 
given to Southeast Asia and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
to a level not seen since the end of the Vietnam War.1 Seeing Southeast Asia and 
ASEAN as vital to preserving what it referred to as the rules- based international 
order, the Obama administration made the region and the regional grouping a 
vital part of its so- called “Rebalance” to the Asia Pacific and took measures to con-
cretise this across countries and realms.
Yet as this chapter will show, by the end of his second term, Obama’s legacy in 
US– ASEAN relations in fact remained quite mixed. On the one hand, the adminis-
tration achieved some notable success in increasing and institutionalising a higher 
level of attention to Southeast Asia, committing Washington to Asia’s multilateral 
diplomatic framework, and improving relations with Southeast Asia’s people. But on 
the other hand, it faced challenges in confronting the reality of China’s growing influ-
ence in Southeast Asia, crafting an economic approach for the region, and articu-
lating a clear and comprehensive approach to dealing with democracy and human 
rights questions. The Trump administration added another layer of complexity to 
assessing Obama’s legacy in this respect, because while it continued or built on some 
aspects, it also departed from, and in some cases undermined, others as well.
The legacy of US– Southeast Asia relations
Southeast Asia has traditionally occupied a marginal role in US foreign policy 
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loomed much larger and much earlier. Even though there was some level of US 
involvement in some Southeast Asian states previously, the region really first rose 
to prominence in the context of threats to the United States and to its European 
and Asian allies and partners during the Second World War and then the Cold 
War.2 That prominence was followed by a pattern of waxing and waning of US 
commitment after the end of the Vietnam War and continued from the end of the 
Cold War and thereafter, which some characterise as various forms of neglect.3
As a result, by the late 1990s and early 2000s, a clear gap had emerged where 
Southeast Asia’s importance as a region had grown significantly, but US policy had 
not become correspondingly focused on the region. Despite ongoing challenges 
ranging from human rights to underdevelopment, economic growth among the 
original ASEAN Five (of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand), Southeast Asia’s centrality in addressing challenges from maritime 
security to China’s rise, and ASEAN’s transformation from an anti- communist 
bloc to a forum for major powers to engage made the region’s importance clear. 
Yet US attention tended to be in reaction to particular crises rather than a focus 
on the region for its own sake, be it the Asian financial crisis of 1997 or the war 
on terrorism in the early 2000s. Though this pattern had long been evident, it 
also prevented the rise of a more strategic, region- wide, and balanced approach to 
Southeast Asia.
Despite the traditional interpretation of being consumed by distractions in the 
Middle East and sceptical about multilateralism, the George W. Bush years actually 
saw some movement in the direction of more robust engagement with Southeast 
Asia. Some of this was evident in the usual building block work that tends to 
make up the continuity between administrations, be it expanding the scope of 
security cooperation with partners or contributing to the development of multi-
lateral institutions in the ASEAN- led diplomatic framework.4 But there were also 
initiatives that were to serve as precursors to some of the Obama administration’s 
priorities, including the appointment in 2008 of the first resident US ambassador 
to ASEAN,5 and joining the Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP, then known as the 
Trans- Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership).6 Yet, at the same time, it was not 
until the Obama administration that we saw the true development of a clear and 
comprehensive approach to engaging Southeast Asia more specifically articulated.
Obama’s approach to ASEAN and Southeast Asia
From the outset, the Obama administration made clear that the basis for its 
approach to engagement with Southeast Asia and ASEAN was that it saw a greater 
investment in the region as being a vital part of preserving what it had referred 
to as the rules- based international order. As a result, it is no surprise that his 
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undertook a series of initiatives to try to make that happen across the economic, 
security, and people- to- people realms of the relationship.
The Obama administration saw Southeast Asia and ASEAN as key to the 
preservation of the rules- based international order, which was emphasised as an 
enduring US national interest from the outset.7 From the administration’s per-
spective, if Washington wanted to preserve the post- Second World War US- led 
international order that would promote peace and prosperity, engaging emer-
ging regions and regional institutions would be critical to solving collective 
action problems.8 Southeast Asia and ASEAN served as a good example in this 
respect:  the region, for all its limitations, and in contrast to other parts of the 
world, had emerged as peaceful and prosperous since ASEAN’s founding in 1967 
despite its tremendous diversity.9
The administration’s thinking reflected the realities it faced in Asia as well. 
Within the Asia Pacific, Washington’s attempts to preserve a rules- based inter-
national order – from advancing freedom of navigation to promoting economic 
openness and competitiveness to advancing the rule of law, good governance, and 
human rights and democracy – would largely play out in Southeast Asia.10 The 
region was the hub of multilateralism in the Asia Pacific, comprising a diverse 
array of states at various levels of political and economic development, and was 
at the centre of Chinese attempts to undermine aspects of the rules- based inter-
national order.11 As Obama himself put it during his last year of office, ‘engagement 
with Southeast Asia and ASEAN … is central to the region’s peace and prosperity, 
and to our shared goal of building a regional order where all nations play by the 
same rules’.12
Therefore, it is no surprise that Southeast Asia and ASEAN was a centrepiece 
of the Rebalance to the Asia Pacific. Even in early articulations of the Rebalance, 
administration officials admitted privately that arguably the most significant part 
of the administration’s Rebalance was the greater share of attention devoted to 
Southeast Asia as a region and ASEAN as a multilateral grouping within US Asia 
policy, the so- called “Rebalance within the Rebalance”. Officials also referred to 
ASEAN as a fulcrum of the region’s emerging architecture, reflecting what Hillary 
Clinton during her time as secretary of state referred to as the grouping’s ‘indis-
pensable’ role on a host of political, economic and strategic issues.13
The administration’s approach to Southeast Asia and ASEAN itself was centred 
on four aspects:  strengthening security alliances and partnerships; investing in 
multilateral institutions; advancing economic engagement; and promoting dem-
ocracy and human rights. Though these general objectives were of course not new 
to US Asia policy, there were distinguishing features in each of these that were 
reflective of the Obama administration’s approach.
First, the Obama administration focused on strengthening alliances and 
partnerships. While this had long been a key part of advancing US policy, the 
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on treaty allies such as Thailand and the Philippines, but inking a series of stra-
tegic and comprehensive partnerships with key Southeast Asian states such as 
Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia and opening up new partnerships with coun-
tries like Myanmar.14 The content of these partnerships was significant too in that 
they reflected the administration’s comprehensive approach – security realms of 
these alliances and partnerships, for example, were focused not just on terrorism 
or maritime security, but more broadly on humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief, as well as climate change.
Second, the administration invested significantly in multilateral institutions 
in addition to bilateral partnerships. This was evident in a series of steps under-
taken during its tenure, including ratifying the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation; 
becoming the first non- ASEAN country to appoint a resident ambassador to 
ASEAN in 2011; joining the East Asia Summit (EAS); institutionalising annual US– 
ASEAN summits, inking a strategic partnership with ASEAN; and even holding 
the first ever US– ASEAN summit on US soil at Sunnylands. Taken together, this 
investment in multilateralism was particularly notable for a US Asia bureaucracy 
that had long been largely dominated by North East Asian concerns. These were 
also steps that the Bush administration did not take during its time in office.
Third, the Obama administration sought to boost US economic engagement in 
the region. This occurred for example through US- led efforts such as the Lower 
Mekong Initiative (LMI) and ones in partnership with regional states like Singapore 
such as the Third Country Training Program, whereby the Obama administration 
demonstrated a commitment to building the capacity of lesser developed regional 
states.15 The administration also rolled out the region- wide US– ASEAN Connect 
Initiative which sought to better coordinate existing US government programmes 
in the region around business, energy, innovation and policy.16 And while not 
a solely Southeast Asia- based initiative, the TPP comprised four ASEAN coun-
tries  – Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. With several other Southeast 
Asian countries that had considered joining as well, the TPP was pitched by the 
administration as representative of the kind of rules that Southeast Asian states 
should aspire to.17
Fourth and lastly, the administration sought to advance democracy and 
human rights. Part of this was accomplished indirectly through attempts to 
address rule of law challenges in Southeast Asian states, through such efforts as 
the Open Government Partnership to promote good governance and transpar-
ency, and democracy programmes in individual Southeast Asian states such as 
the Philippines and Myanmar.18 An important element of this strategy was invest-
ment in the young people of Southeast Asia, which Obama himself saw as part of 
the growth and dynamism in Southeast Asia and a source of change in the future. 
The signature investment in this realm was in the Young Southeast Asian Leaders 
Initiative (YSEALI), launched in 2013, to strengthen partnerships with emerging 
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Assessing Obama’s approach
An evaluation of the Obama administration’s approach suggests that the legacy is 
in fact quite a mixed one. On some counts, the administration’s approach was a 
success. First and most clearly, the Obama administration raised, sustained and 
institutionalised a high level of attention to Southeast Asia after years of ambiva-
lence.20 Following decades of ebbs and flows in US attention to Southeast Asia, 
the Obama years saw a sustained effort to increase the focus on the region across 
countries and realms, led not only by bureaucracies or high- level officials but by 
Obama himself, who visited Southeast Asia eight times during his time in office – 
more than two times the number of any sitting US president – and held the first 
US– ASEAN Summit on US soil.
As it intensified the focus on Southeast Asia, and mindful of the episodic 
attention it had previously been afforded in Washington, the Obama administration 
worked assiduously to institutionalise the growing momentum with the region. In 
the administration’s view this would help ensure lock- in that would be difficult to 
reverse by any subsequent administrations.21 In that sense, though often a lot of the 
media attention was placed on flashier initiatives like the Sunnylands Summit, it was 
measures such as the formulation of new strategic and comprehensive partnerships 
or the establishment of a new Office of Multilateral Affairs at the State Department’s 
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, that were the more significant initiatives 
because they helped produce the lock- in effect that the administration sought.
Second, the Obama administration firmly committed the United States to the 
ASEAN multilateral framework and clearly articulated the bipartisan case for 
US investment in the regional grouping. While US ambivalence to multilateral 
institutions in Asia had long been evident, the George W. Bush years had seen a 
clear trend where Washington’s lukewarm attitude stood in marked contrast to 
ASEAN’s enhanced role in the regional order and the attention it received from 
other powers. As ASEAN’s role in the regional security architecture had increased 
significantly with the emergence of forums such as the EAS in 2005 and the 
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus, major powers in the Asia Pacific such as 
China, Japan and India had moved to solidify their ties with the regional grouping 
even as the United States remained ambivalent about its own commitment for 
various reasons.22 By firmly committing the United States to the ASEAN multi-
lateral framework, the Obama administration effectively resolved a long debate 
about the extent to which the region should commit to the multilateral framework.
As it went forward with that commitment, the Obama administration also 
clearly articulated why investing in ASEAN was directly related to US national 
interests. Previous administrations had advanced various reasons why Washington 
ought to be indirectly engaged in the ASEAN multilateral framework, whether to 
back an anti- communist bloc against the Cold War Soviet Union or support Asian 
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administration specifically tied ASEAN to the fate of the rules- based order and the 
US role in preserving and shaping that order in Asia. As Michael Fuchs, Obama’s 
former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, has put 
it, the administration’s commitment to ASEAN was rooted not only in recognising 
the grouping’s centrality, but its commitment to the norms of the liberal inter-
national order and ensuring that Washington would be at the table in discussions 
where the future shape of those norms would be debated in the region.23
Third, the Obama years saw an improvement in perceptions of the United 
States among Southeast Asia’s population. Though opinion polls tend to be quite 
fickle and cannot tell the whole story, and while the trend was less evident during 
Obama’s second term, polls revealed a clear increase in positive views of the 
United States even in countries where levels of anti- Americanism had previously 
been quite high, such as Indonesia and Malaysia.24 While some of this is owed 
to positive perceptions of Obama himself, the administration’s policies as well as 
initiatives such as YSEALI no doubt also contributed to more benign perceptions 
of the United States. This was particularly notable relative to the initial years of the 
Bush administration, where issues such as US foreign policy in the Middle East 
and an overemphasis on the terrorism threat had led to initial negative perceptions 
in some regional states.
Administration officials, including Obama himself, repeatedly and publicly 
emphasised the importance of improving America’s image among Southeast Asia’s 
populations as a key part of its engagement with the region. Part of this rested in 
the oft- cited fact that this represented a long- term investment, since the younger 
generation would become the region’s future leaders. But the additional reality 
that the Obama administration understood was that in order for Southeast Asian 
governments to have the right environment to expand ties with Washington, they 
needed the support of their populations. Some of these governments still recall 
periods where negative perceptions of US foreign policy had led to diminished 
popular support for the United States, restricting the ability for policy makers to 
publicly support Washington’s initiatives.
But the Obama administration’s approach also confronted several major 
challenges. The first and clearest was managing relations with a rising China, whose 
influence was increasing in Southeast Asia and becoming manifested in ways detri-
mental to US interests and those of some regional states. Despite being cognizant of 
this trend and its manifestations, the administration’s desire to ease Beijing’s inse-
curities and collaborate on issues, ranging from addressing global climate change 
to managing the Iran nuclear issue, repeatedly trumped the necessity to confront 
China on aspects of its assertive behaviour, leading to greater anxieties in the region 
as well as on the broader question of the reliability of the United States.25
There are several cases that illustrate this point, but nowhere was this clearer 
than in the South China Sea. Though the South China Sea disputes themselves are 
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Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei – the issue had nonetheless come to 
be viewed as a test of US and Chinese resolve; Beijing’s assertive and at times 
unlawful moves, including seizing geographical features, harassing vessels, and 
constructing artificial islands directly threatened the rules- based order the Obama 
administration sought to defend.26 Yet while the administration continued to rhet-
orically emphasise the importance of the South China Sea in this context and 
tried to ward off more aggressive forms of Chinese behaviour, it did not take the 
more forward- leaning measures that would have clearly deterred Beijing. ‘The net 
result’, concludes one regional observer, ‘is a sense of a shifting power balance in 
Southeast Asia and a feeling of a China on the march forward as the US has looked 
weak and was in disarray, whatever the objective economic and military facts of 
the region may be.’27
Second, and turning to the economic realm, the Obama administration ultim-
ately failed to engage the region in a manner which accommodated the diversity 
of Southeast Asian economies. The elephant in the room here is the fact that the 
TPP, repeatedly framed by Obama administration officials and observers as not just 
having economic benefits but able to catalyse a “race to the top” among Southeast 
Asian states, via the provision of common, high- level standards, was left unratified.28 
Though there were several reasons behind this, including legislative opposition and 
popular discontent, the administration shares the blame for not spending more of 
its political capital sooner to overcome the obstacles to see it through.
Beyond the TPP, other initiatives were articulated but not adequately resourced 
or sufficiently fleshed out before the administration’s end in early 2017. Capacity- 
building efforts like the LMI continued, but faced immense resourcing difficul-
ties even as new initiatives from China such as the Lancang- Mekong Cooperation 
developed later but gained steam more quickly.29 Other initiatives were considered 
and had begun to be articulated in areas like infrastructure, innovation and entre-
preneurship, but were not advanced by the end of Obama’s second term. Even 
though officials had indicated that concerns behind some of these initiatives, like 
inadequate staffing and resources, may have been addressed had there been more 
continuity within administrations, the underdevelopment of initiatives during 
Obama’s time in office means that even a generous grading of his legacy would 
register as an incomplete.30
Third and finally, the administration failed to articulate a clear and com-
prehensive vision for democracy and human rights in the region even as it saw 
growing challenges on this front. Officials were correct when they argued that 
US policy had to depart from the lecturing of Southeast Asian states seen in the 
past, including during the Clinton and Bush years, and that such an approach 
may be less effective relative to privately conveying concerns to individual coun-
tries. But despite repeated requests and complaints by rights groups and critics, 
the administration did not present a coherent policy for balancing interests and 
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each country on a case- by- case basis and making distinctions accordingly, such as 
between democracy and good governance or private and public forms of concern.
The restrictions brought by the lack of a clear vision in this area were illustrated 
when democratic backsliding in the region began to take hold during the Obama 
administration’s later years, particularly with the military coup in Thailand in 
2014 and the election of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte in 2016. Though 
the administration dealt with the issues on a case- by- case basis and continued to 
advance other elements of its people- to- people engagement, like YSEALI, the lack 
of a comprehensive approach in this realm gave way to the perception that this was 
not a major priority relative to other US interests.
What Trump means for Obama’s legacy in Southeast Asia
It is important to emphasise that, irrespective of who was to take office after Obama, 
questions surrounded the durability of his legacy in Southeast Asia even before he 
departed.32 Part of that rested on the uniqueness of Obama’s personal commitment 
to Southeast Asia and ASEAN, including his experience of living in Indonesia. 
Indeed, with the exception of Hillary Clinton – the first secretary of state to visit 
all ten ASEAN countries – there was no guarantee that any of the other American 
presidential candidates would demonstrate the same regard for the region. On top 
of that, there was a sense that with the next US president having to face a divided 
country at home and a more tumultuous and fractured world, there was a risk 
that Washington may have much less patience for multilateralism and may engage 
selectively with individual ASEAN states rather than the region as a whole.
After two years in office by early 2019, the US administration of President Donald 
Trump had not clearly articulated a discernible approach towards Southeast Asia. 
This is not uncommon to see, even in more conventional administrations:  for 
instance, it took the Obama administration more than two years to begin to pub-
licly and actively roll out its Rebalance policy for the Asia Pacific.33 Nonetheless, 
the general tendencies evident so far under Trump suggest a mix of continuity 
from elements of Obama’s legacy, and change that may either tackle issues that 
went unaddressed or undermine progress already made.
The elements of continuity are most evident in the organising principle the 
Trump administration articulated for the region, as well as in the security and 
diplomatic realms of its engagement. Thus for example, though the Trump admin-
istration has been reluctant to employ the Obama administration’s “Rebalance” 
term, which is fairly common for new administrations to do, administration 
officials have nonetheless referred to the rules- based order and similar notions 
with different concepts, most prominently the ‘free and open Indo- Pacific’.34 Such 
visions are rooted in essentially the same organising principle, dating back to the 
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end of the Second World War with allies and partners to advance peace, pros-
perity and freedom and looking ahead to how Washington can work to address 
the current strains in that order.35
In the realm of security, continuity can be seen in the vision mentioned by 
Defense Secretary James Mattis and others. The insistence that the United States, 
together with allies and partners, will focus not only on individual threats like 
terrorism and North Korea, but also the broader challenge that authoritarian 
states, chiefly China, pose to the rules- based international order such as in the 
South China Sea, sounds much like the ‘principled security network’ that Mattis’ 
predecessor Ash Carter had indicated previously.36 Further, the Trump adminis-
tration to date has either continued or reinforced existing attempts over multiple 
administrations to solidify defence ties with Southeast Asian allies and partners 
like Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.
Of course, there appear to be limits to that continuity in other related areas. 
There is a harder edge to the administration’s line on China’s role in the regional 
security environment at the outset relative to the Obama years. And while this may 
change further down the line, the early perception among Southeast Asian states 
has been of the Trump administration attempting to address a narrower list of 
security concerns, such as North Korea and counterterrorism rather than taking a 
broader and more comprehensive approach as the Obama administration did. On 
the more positive side of the ledger, the Trump administration’s commitment to 
raise defence spending has been welcomed in Southeast Asian capitals as evidence 
that Washington is overcoming budgetary challenges that dogged the Obama era, 
even as concerns remain about how that military power will be deployed.
Some continuity is also evident on the diplomatic side. Though the new US 
administration has not been as embracing in its rhetoric about multilateralism 
compared to its predecessor, Trump did show that he is personally willing to 
attend Asian summitry by showing up at his first round in the Philippines, 
even though he did depart early from the EAS. While it is unclear how Trump’s 
attendance record will play out for the remainder of his term, the openness to 
attending the meetings, which was announced well in advance of the trip itself and 
largely followed through on despite other priorities, was nonetheless clear. Beyond 
that episode itself, the characterisation of Trump’s attendance as a ‘test’ for US 
commitment is itself testament to the importance of the Obama administration’s 
institutionalising of presidential- level travel to Southeast Asia and the enduring 
power of these binding commitments.37
The major discontinuities lie in the economic, rights, and people- to- people 
dimensions of US engagement with the region. On economics, though the Obama 
administration had its own issues with realising new economic opportunities for 
US policy towards the region, the Trump administration compounded Southeast 
Asian anxieties by taking a strong protectionist and transactional stance in his 
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by Southeast Asian member states as being not just a missed opportunity for US 
leadership on trade, but a reflection of trends that could take years to reverse.38 
Though the administration could reverse or at least moderate its course later on, 
the discontinuity was quite clear at the outset.
On the human rights front, the Trump administration itself has so far evinced 
little interest in the advancement of American ideals and instead appears focused 
more on advancing narrow US interests in a transactional way. The Obama admin-
istration was similarly focused more on interests rather than values, and other 
institutions like the State Department and Congress continue to exercise their role 
on issues such as the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar. Trump has been less averse to 
working with Asian strongmen than Obama, as evidenced by the White House visits 
granted to Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and Thai Prime Minister Prayut 
Chan- o- cha during his first year in office. And as the scholar Thomas Carothers 
has noted, Trump’s personal record on rights has also complicated things, from his 
mocking of the United States as a democratic exemplar, to engaging in the tactics 
of strongmen leaders such as personally attacking journalists.39
Discontinuity is evident in the people- to- people realm as well. There have 
been basic elements of continuity, such as in the bureaucratic work of running 
important outreach initiatives that tends to continue across administrations, 
to Trump’s commitment thus far to preserve some Obama- era initiatives like 
the YSEALI programme. But other developments suggest that change or even 
reversal is underway. On public opinion for instance, there is early evidence of 
Southeast Asian discontent with the image of the United States in the world, the 
extent of American commitment to the region, and with some of the Trump 
administration’s “America First” policies.40 This was matched by realities on the 
ground in some Southeast Asian countries, where policies ranging from the travel 
ban to the decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem sparked anti- American 
sentiment and protest.
Conclusions
As this chapter has shown, the Obama administration’s legacy in Southeast Asia 
is a mixed one. The administration achieved some notable successes, including 
increasing and institutionalising a higher level of attention to Southeast Asia, 
committing Washington to Asia’s multilateral diplomatic framework, and 
improving relations with Southeast Asia’s people. But on the other hand, it also 
failed to manage some challenges that continue to bedevil the Trump administra-
tion, most notably confronting the reality of China’s growing influence in Southeast 
Asia, crafting an economic approach for the subregion, and articulating a clear and 
comprehensive approach to dealing with democracy and human rights questions.
Though this mixed record is far from surprising, it nonetheless speaks to the 
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policy towards the region. Indeed, perhaps the most sobering lesson of Obama’s 
legacy in Southeast Asia and ASEAN is the fact that even with such a high level 
of presidential commitment and sustained attention by the administration, over-
coming some of the key challenges that have long dogged US policy towards the 
region proved extremely difficult. Those which remain for Washington include 
fashioning an economic agenda for such a diverse array of states despite resource 
constraints, and maintaining a regional focus amidst wider threats and challenges 
in other parts of Asia and the wider world.
At a more granular level, Obama’s record also speaks to the question of rela-
tive durability of policy. Though Obama’s engagement with Southeast Asia’s young 
people was the element of his legacy which attracted most headlines, popular 
perception is also among the least durable aspects of US policy relative to more 
underappreciated parts of his legacy such as the institutionalisation of meetings 
or binding Washington to Southeast Asia’s multilateral diplomatic framework. 
Relatedly, Trump’s time in office to early 2019 further underlined the fact that 
the durability of a president’s legacy can be shaped to a significant degree by not 
just his own record, but that of his successor as well. While Obama’s failure to 
finalise the TPP during his time in office was viewed as a failure as he left, Trump’s 
withdrawal from the agreement and subsequent approach to economic policy 
has made Obama’s record on this count seem much more favourable relatively 
speaking. And depending on how Trump’s tougher approach to China plays out, 
it could either expose the folly of the overly cautious approach to China during 
the Obama years, or in fact reinforce the necessity of that more careful orientation 
towards Beijing.
Finally, it speaks to the importance of recalling the interactive nature of the 
relationship between Southeast Asia and the United States. Though the Obama 
administration crafted its own approach to Southeast Asia, as might be expected, 
the success or failure of that policy was contingent not just on what the United 
States did or how other major powers reacted, but also on how the region’s elites 
and people responded and on the other regional developments simultaneously 
occurring. American presidents and US administrations are often remembered 
not so much for their early or instinctive approach, but for how they respond to 
the events they encounter during their watch. Obama’s legacy in Southeast Asia 
and ASEAN will not be an exception to that, and nor will Trump’s.
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The Obama administration was the first to put ASEAN at the centre of its Asia 
diplomacy. Gaining membership to the ASEAN- created and ASEAN- led East 
Asia Summit (EAS), achieved in 2011, was deemed a particularly important mile-
stone. It is quite possible that the Obama administration may well become the only 
American administration to prioritise the EAS to such an extent. Up until the time 
of writing in early 2019, the Trump administration from 2017 reverted to a more 
typical US approach to Asia focused on Northeast Asia, bilateral relations and 
American unilateralism.
The contrast between the initial engagements of the first Obama administration 
in particular and those evident across the two years of the Trump administration 
both with ASEAN and the EAS provides strong support for the above conclusion. 
When Barack Obama became president in January 2009, the United States was not 
a member of the EAS, the most important ASEAN- led regional forum. However, 
his incoming administration was strongly committed to US membership. In his 
first year in office Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed the ASEAN Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation. This was the only prerequisite for an ASEAN invitation 
to the EAS that the United States did not fulfil in 2005, when the Summit was 
established.
When Donald Trump became president in January 2017, the United States was 
already a well- established EAS participant. However, the Trump administration’s 
commitment to the institution, the only ASEAN- led leaders- level mechanism that 
includes the United States, has so far remained unclear. When Vice President Mike 
Pence made his first visit to Asia in April 2017, it included a brief visit to the 
ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. There, he announced that in November President 
Trump would attend the APEC Summit in Hanoi, as well as the fifth ASEAN– US 
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APEC), as a sign of continued, if not enhanced, American commitment. Pence 
was the first US Vice President and the most senior US political leader ever to visit 
the Secretariat.
Three weeks before the November US– ASEAN Summit, however, the Trump 
White House indicated that he would skip the EAS which was scheduled to be the 
last event on his long inaugural trip to Asia. Trump did not attend the Summit and 
sent his Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in his place instead. The Trump White 
House claimed that the President did attend the EAS on 14 November 2017.1 
However, this is a case of stretching, if not breaking, the diplomatic truth. President 
Trump only attended the lunch organised by the ASEAN chair President Duterte 
of the Philippines, prior to the delayed EAS plenary session itself. This working 
lunch also included leaders from countries and groupings not in the EAS. The 
official Summit group photo features a smiling Rex Tillerson; President Trump 
was already on his plane home.2 Trump was once again absent from the Summit in 
November 2018, this time sending Vice President Mike Pence in his place.
These two different approaches to the EAS and their inferred, if not implied, 
messages about US presidential commitment to ASEAN, provided early insights 
into the contrasting approaches to Southeast Asia of the Obama administration of 
2009– 17 and the Trump administration during its first two years in Washington.
On the American side, the first Obama administration came to power with a 
clear strategy for enhanced US engagement in Asia, in which ASEAN and the EAS 
had a clear and central role which endured throughout both of Obama’s terms in 
office. The Trump administration did not. On the ASEAN side, the EAS so far 
has failed to live up to the expectations of the Obama administration. It still fails 
to occupy a clear or leading role in the ASEAN- led regional architecture. Efforts 
to strengthen the institution and focus its attention on issues of primary US con-
cern have been constrained due to disagreements over its future among ASEAN 
member states, and among the eight ASEAN dialogue partners currently invited 
to the EAS by ASEAN.
By themselves, these ASEAN- based constraints on the development and cen-
trality of the Summit likely would have moderated any post- Obama commitment 
in Washington to the EAS. The contrasting approach to Southeast Asia in par-
ticular, and to diplomacy in general, of the Trump administration suggest a 
decline of interest from Washington. The Obama administration will likely come 
to represent an exceptional high- water mark in relation to US engagement with 
ASEAN and the EAS, and not the beginning of a sustained bipartisan period of 
commitment.
This chapter begins by setting out the Obama administration’s reasons for a 
strong commitment to ASEAN and the EAS, and what they hoped they would 
gain from participation. The second part looks at the constraints to the develop-
ment of the EAS along the lines desired by the Obama administration. The third 
section looks at the differences in engagement with ASEAN and the EAS in the 
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first two years of the Trump administration, and why they suggest that the Obama 
years should be considered exceptional rather than transformative when it comes 
to US engagement with ASEAN.
The ASEAN Rebalance
In 2009, the Obama administration came into office with the outlines of a new 
strategy for American engagement in Asia that were quickly acted upon. This new 
strategy, labelled the “Pivot” then the “Rebalance” to Asia, had one major political 
goal and one major strategic goal. The political goal was to sharply, at least rhet-
orically, differentiate the new Democratic Obama administration from the prior 
Republican George W. Bush administration of 2001– 09. The widespread criticism 
of the Bush government and its approach to Asia from US Asia watchers (and 
from many in Asia as well) made such a differentiation both more important and 
more beneficial. Many ASEAN and Southeast Asian officials were particularly crit-
ical of the Bush administration for its lack of adequate commitment to ASEAN. 
In 2005, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice skipped the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), the only ASEAN- led wider regional grouping that included the 
United States, becoming the first Secretary of State to do so since its formation 
in 1994.3 In 2007, Rice again chose to not attend the Forum, despite the storm of 
protest her 2005 absence had fomented.
The grand strategic goal of Obama’s Rebalance was to maintain the United 
States’ leading position in East Asia in the face of growing Chinese power, wealth 
and assertion. This reassurance effort aimed to assuage concerns from worried 
Asian allies and partners about the willingness and capability of Washington to 
maintain its traditionally hegemonic position in East Asia in ways they supported.
The diplomatic pillar of the Rebalance was the only one which brought a 
marked contrast between the Obama administration and that of George W. Bush. 
Southeast Asia was the geographical focus of this differentiation and ASEAN the 
institutional one. The list of diplomatic firsts for the United States in relation to 
ASEAN under the Obama administration is impressive, both in number and as a 
cumulative sign of sustained commitment:
• In February 2009 (less than a month after taking office), Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton became the first person in her role to visit the ASEAN 
Secretariat in Jakarta.
• On that same trip, Secretary Clinton expressed for the first time official US 
plans to sign the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.
• On 22 July 2009, in Thailand, the United States signed the ASEAN Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation, becoming the fifteenth non- ASEAN member and 
the eighth ASEAN dialogue partner to do so.
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• In November 2009, the first US– ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting was held in 
Singapore.
• In October 2010, Secretary of State Clinton became the first US senior official 
invited (as a guest of the host, Vietnam) to the lunch before the EAS.
• In October 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates attended the inaugural 
ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+). The sitting Secretary of 
Defense has attended every ADMM+ Meeting since.
• In September 2010, the United States became the first ASEAN dialogue partner 
to appoint a resident ambassador to ASEAN. Ambassador David Carden 
presented his credentials to the ASEAN Secretary- General on 26 April 2011. 
Now, all ten ASEAN dialogue partners have appointed resident ambassadors 
to ASEAN.
• In November 2011, Obama became the first US president to attend the EAS. 
He only missed one Summit gathering in 2013 due to a domestic govern-
ment shutdown. Secretary of State John Kelly represented the United States 
that year.
• In 2012, Obama became the first US president to visit Cambodia. He went to 
Phnom Penh to attend the EAS and the US– ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting.
• In 2013, the annual US– ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting was elevated to an annual 
US– ASEAN Leaders’ Summit.
• In 2015, the US– ASEAN relationship was elevated to a Strategic Partnership.
• In February 2016, Obama hosted the first US– ASEAN Leaders’ Summit to be 
held in the United States at Sunnylands, California.
• In September 2016, Obama became the first US president to visit Laos. He 
went to Vientiane to attend the EAS and ASEAN– US Leaders’ Summit.
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s November 2011 Foreign Policy art-
icle entitled ‘America’s Pacific Century’ provides an extensive elaboration of the 
Asia Rebalance policy. After listing planned enhancements in all the key bilateral 
relations in the region, Clinton states that:
Even as we strengthen these bilateral relationships, we have emphasized the 
importance of multilateral cooperation, for we believe that addressing com-
plex transnational challenges of the sort now faced by Asia requires a set of 
institutions capable of mustering collective action. And a more robust and 
coherent regional architecture in Asia would reinforce the system of rules and 
responsibilities, from protecting intellectual property to ensuring freedom of 
navigation, that form the basis of an effective international order.4
ASEAN and greater US engagement with ASEAN is deemed critical to this 
‘more robust and coherent regional architecture’, with Clinton justifying the 
intended focus on the regional grouping:
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That is why President Obama will participate in the East Asia Summit for the 
first time in November. To pave the way, the United States has opened a new US 
Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta and signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
with ASEAN. Our focus on developing a more results- oriented agenda has been 
instrumental in efforts to address disputes in the South China Sea … [o] ver the 
past year, we have made strides in protecting our vital interests in stability and 
freedom of navigation and have paved the way for sustained multilateral dip-
lomacy among the many parties with claims in the South China Sea, seeking 
to ensure disputes are settled peacefully and in accordance with established 
principles of international law.5
The Obama White House repeated the same themes and hopes for the EAS. Its 
‘Fact Sheet on Unprecedented US- ASEAN Relations’, released in February 2016, 
states:
In 2009, the United States became a party to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
in Southeast Asia – the bedrock diplomatic document of ASEAN – opening the 
door for the United States to join the East Asia Summit (EAS). President Obama 
participated in the EAS for the first time in 2011 and has attended three of the 
four Summits since. With strong U.S.  support, the EAS has become the Asia 
Pacific’s premier leaders- level forum on political and security issues, helping 
to advance a rules- based order and spur cooperation on pressing challenges, 
including maritime security, countering violent extremism, and transnational 
cyber cooperation.6
This presidential support for a strong, more ‘results- oriented’ EAS focused on 
security issues also featured in Washington’s bilateral diplomacy in Asia throughout 
the duration of the Obama administration. A US– Japan joint statement from 2014 
stated that ‘the two countries view the East Asia Summit as the premier political 
and security forum in the region’.7 A joint statement from the United States and 
India in 2015 went further, asserting that ‘we commit to strengthening the East 
Asia Summit … to promote regional dialogue on key political and security issues, 
and to work harder to strengthen it’.8
The Obama administration’s interest and subsequent commitment to the 
EAS and the ADMM+ process went beyond simply joining and showing up. 
The ADMM+ process was established in 2010 as a wider regional extension of 
the ASEAN Defence Ministers (ADMM) process. The ADMM was founded in 
2006 as ‘the highest ministerial defence and security consultative and cooperative 
mechanism among ASEAN defence establishments’.9 The ADMM+ process brings 
together the ministers of defence of ASEAN member states with those of the eight 
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with Japan and Australia, saw closer engagement with ASEAN and membership 
in the EAS and the ADMM+ process as a means to strengthen regional security 
cooperation.
These shared ASEAN interests among the United States and its two most 
important Asia Pacific allies manifested themselves in three key institutional 
preferences. The first was to bolster the ADMM+ process which, when it was 
announced in 2010, was to meet only once every three years. Washington, Tokyo 
and Canberra supported more frequent meetings, and in 2013 it was decided that 
the ADMM+ process would meet every two years. In 2017, it was decided that the 
ADMM+ should henceforth become an annual event.
The second institutional preference was for the EAS to focus predominantly on 
political and security issues, including contentious ones like the maritime rights 
disputes in the South China Sea. APEC, along with the Trans- Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), was seen as the key regional forum for economic diplomacy. This second 
preference has had more mixed results. The founding document for the EAS, 
The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit, released after the inaug-
ural meeting in December 2005, states that ‘we have established the East Asia 
Summit as a forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues 
of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and 
economic prosperity in East Asia’.10 The identification of EAS priority areas, as 
well as the contents of the Chairman Statements released at the end of each annual 
Summit meeting, have stayed true to this broad, inclusive beginning.
By the end of Obama’s first term in office in 2013, six priority cooperation 
areas had been agreed to for the EAS: energy; education; finance; global health 
including pandemics; environment and disaster management; and ASEAN con-
nectivity. This list is far from being perfectly aligned with the notion of the Summit 
as that ‘premier political and security forum in the region’.11 The first components 
overlap significantly with the agenda of APEC as the Asia Pacific’s primary forum 
for the promotion of economic cooperation and free trade. The final component is 
focused on public infrastructure development in Southeast Asia, where Japan and 
China have long represented the major external partners. The breadth and diver-
sity of these priority areas, as well as the lack of a traditional security focus, reflects 
how the EAS is an ASEAN- led consensus- based body. A  such, it always had a 
limited ability to fulfil the Obama administration’s stated goal to ‘advance a rules- 
based order and spur cooperation on pressing challenges, including maritime 
security, countering violent extremism, and transnational cyber cooperation’.12
The third preference also led to mixed and uncertain results. Under the Obama 
administration, Washington wanted ASEAN- led forums which accommodated 
the United States to focus on maritime security. In 2010, Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton used her presence at the ARF to repeat, to the great chagrin of Beijing, 
the US national interest in the South China Sea disputes.13 In 2015, ASEAN’s 
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to nothing from a Chinese insistence that no mention be made of the South China 
Sea disputes.14 The US goal for the EAS was to have maritime security identified 
as one of the priority areas of cooperation. The 2015 EAS Statement on Enhancing 
Regional Maritime Cooperation noted that ‘maritime cooperation has increasingly 
featured in East Asia Summit discussions, its inclusion as a priority area of cooper-
ation merits further consideration’.15 In 2017, “maritime cooperation” – a softer 
and broader term than “security” – was added as a ‘new area of cooperation’.16
EAS constraints
There are three main constraints to the EAS achieving the United States’ goal – at 
least as it was outlined under the Obama administration – of becoming the fore-
most political and security forum in the region,17 and in particular to becoming 
equipped to exert a positive influence on maritime security challenges like those 
found in the territorial disputes of the South China Sea. These three constraints 
cannot be moderated by the United States and are behind the relatively limited 
achievements of the Obama administration in relation to the Summit addressed 
already.
The first is that the EAS, even after the United States and Russia were invited 
to join in 2011, is not the most important and best attended leaders’ meeting in 
the region. The APEC Leaders’ Meeting (an annual event initiated by the Clinton 
administration in 1993)  includes both the Chinese and Russian Presidents. The 
EAS, despite claims of ASEAN centrality, makes do with the Chinese premier 
and either the Russian prime minister or foreign affairs minister. Xi Jinping has 
never attended the EAS. With the personalisation of political power in the hands 
of both Putin and Xi, their continued absence from the EAS is a growing problem. 
This problem is only partly offset by the participation of the current Indian prime 
minister Narendra Modi, and the leaders of Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. The 
Summit may have a more suitable collection of participating states to discuss pol-
itical and security issues in the Indo- Pacific than APEC, but it does not have a 
more suitable collection of state leaders at the table.
Second, the EAS is an ASEAN- led and ASEAN- controlled grouping. ASEAN 
member states determined the criteria by which non- ASEAN states are invited 
to the Summit, as exemplified by the United States’ absence from 2005 to 2010. 
The United States is invited to the EAS along with the other seven non- ASEAN 
participants in their capacities as dialogue partners. The prerequisite of signing 
the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation for EAS participation is the clearest 
example of this institutional power imbalance.
ASEAN’s agenda- setting predominance in the EAS, along with its commitment 
to using the Summit to support ASEAN initiatives, is clearly reflected in the 2011 
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driving force working in partnership with the other participants of the East Asia 
Summit’. In 2011, ASEAN connectivity – a major focus of Indonesia’s chairman-
ship of the institution that year – was adopted ‘as an additional area of cooperation 
in the EAS, together with the existing five priority areas of cooperation’.18 ASEAN 
connectivity is of direct interest to all ASEAN member states, but certainly not all 
EAS participants.
ASEAN’s status as the EAS’ foundation and driving force means that any change 
in the Summit’s focus or function requires prior ASEAN agreement. In 2015, on its 
tenth anniversary, Malaysia as Chair launched a review of the EAS with the idea of 
strengthening its institutional basis within ASEAN, clarifying the Summit’s pos-
ition within the growing suite of ASEAN- led and controlled regional institutions 
involving dialogue partners, and reviewing the EAS’ increasingly diffuse agenda. 
With Malaysia as a claimant state in the South China Sea and a strong supporter of 
ASEAN centrality, hopes were raised that the Summit may move in the direction 
desired by the Obama administration. A Malaysian “non- paper” on EAS reform 
was circulated to members.
However, no consensus among ASEAN member states was reached, no major 
EAS reforms were introduced, and the issue of Summit reform was not an ASEAN 
Chair priority in 2016, 2017 or 2018. Issues of particular debate within ASEAN in 
relation to the EAS include whether Canada and the European Union, as the two 
ASEAN dialogue partners not included as participants, should be asked to join (as 
the two have in fact requested), and whether the Summit should remain a broadly- 
based functional body or a more narrowly- focused strategic one.
ASEAN’s strong commitment to maintaining its driving force status in the EAS 
means that Southeast Asian states do not welcome dialogue partner suggestions 
on how the Summit might be reformed or become more “results- oriented” as the 
Obama administration in particular suggested. In 2014, Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe gave the keynote speech at the Shangri- La Dialogue in Singapore. 
Abe proposed the creation of ‘a permanent committee comprised of permanent 
representatives to ASEAN … and then prepare a road map to bring renewed 
vitality to the Summit itself, while also making the Summit along with the ARF 
and the ADMM+ function in a multi- layered fashion’.19 These ideas are very much 
in line with the Obama administrations’ EAS goals. While there is now an ad hoc 
committee of representatives to ASEAN in Jakarta, there is still no roadmap for 
renewed vitality and better coordination among ASEAN- led institutions.
The third EAS constraint is its nature as an inclusive, consensus- based body 
reflecting the so- called ASEAN Way in a broader ASEAN- led institutional con-
text. In reality, this means that even if ASEAN consensus can be reached on 
reforming the EAS, consensus among the dialogue partners invited to the Summit 
also is required. Not surprisingly, China’s interests in the EAS are not the same as 
those of the United States, Japan or Australia. China prefers a functionally- focused 
institution with a broad mandate, rather than a strategic and political forum 
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focused on maritime security issues. China’s stance in the ADMM+ process on the 
South China Sea, which led to the failed joint statement in 2015, is consistent with 
Beijing’s approach to the Summit. China also has close and asymmetric diplo-
matic relations with some ASEAN member states that influence their positions on 
issues of concern to China, like the South China Sea maritime rights disputes and 
the nature and focus of the EAS. The broad scope of the Summit’s priority areas 
and their focus on economic and non- traditional security issues suited China’s 
interests within the institution better than those of the Obama administrations.
The contrast between US and ASEAN diplomacy towards the 2016 ruling 
against China’s land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, from the case 
filed by the Philippines under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, revealed the significant disconnect between the two parties on this core 
maritime security issue. The unanimous ruling, which Beijing rejected (and still 
rejects), deemed that China had interfered with the Philippines’ sovereign rights 
in the area and invalidated its own regional nine- dash line claims. Washington 
coordinated with Canberra and Tokyo, with each issuing statements in support 
of the decision. Facing pressure from Beijing, ASEAN statements have remained 
silent on the landmark ruling. In the end, Washington’s alliance system in East 
Asia proved more useful than ASEAN and the EAS for this issue.
The Trump administration
One of President Trump’s first executive actions in January 2017 was to with-
draw the United States from the TPP. This gave a clear and early indication that 
Washington’s policy to Asia under Trump would at least in part bring a break 
from the Obama era. Yet no overarching blueprint for American policy in Asia 
was offered until October 2017, when Secretary of State Tillerson announced the 
new ‘free and open Indo- Pacific’ framework in a speech in Washington, DC on 
US– India relations. The lack of clarity over what this concept means in policy 
terms, and the absence of nominees and appointments to key Asia positions in 
the administration, made it difficult up until the time of writing in early 2019 
to divine a clear approach to Asia by the Trump administration. At this time the 
most senior appointment in the US Mission to ASEAN for example was a Chargé 
d’affaires appointed during Obama’s term in office. There were similarly no full US 
ambassadors to Thailand or Singapore, with the posts being vacant since January 
2017, and despite the latter being Washington’s most important economic, diplo-
matic and security partner in Southeast Asia. Australia only received a US ambas-
sador in March 2019.
The first three months of the Trump administration aggravated Southeast 
Asian and ASEAN concerns about reduced US commitment. According to White 
House public records, neither the ASEAN Secretary- General nor any Southeast 
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Asian leader were among either the first fifty telephone calls or fifteen meetings 
between President Trump and foreign leaders.20 From April 2017 onwards, how-
ever, the Trump administration began paying more attention to Southeast Asia. 
Vice President Pence’s one- day visit to Jakarta and to the ASEAN Secretariat on 
20 April that year, along with Secretary of State Tillerson’s meeting with the for-
eign ministers of the ten ASEAN members in Washington, DC on 4 May, helped 
assuage Southeast Asian fears of abandonment. Tillerson attended the ARF and 
the EAS Ministerial Meeting in early August 2017 in the Philippines. On the side- 
lines, the foreign ministers of the United States, Australia and Japan held the first 
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue since Donald Trump took office. The joint statement 
issued after this gathering addressed one ASEAN- related maritime security issue 
in particular:
The ministers urged ASEAN member states and China to fully and effectively 
implement the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China 
Sea (DOC). The ministers acknowledged the announced consensus on a frame-
work for the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea (COC). The ministers 
further urged ASEAN member states and China to ensure that the COC be 
finalized in a timely manner, and that it be legally binding, meaningful, effective, 
and consistent with international law.21
Secretary of Defense James Mattis attended the ADMM+ meeting in the 
Philippines in late October 2017, where he proposed a US– ASEAN maritime 
exercise that would be the first of its kind.22 (The first China– ASEAN maritime 
exercise took place in October 2018.23) At the 2017 EAS meeting which President 
Trump missed, a Leaders’ Statement on chemical weapons (not a major issue in 
Southeast Asia) co- sponsored by the United States and Singapore was issued.24 The 
Joint Statement released for the fifth ASEAN– US Summit is a boilerplate docu-
ment with no new initiatives announced.25
The degree of American commitment to ASEAN and ASEAN- led processes 
across the first two years of the Trump administration suggests no precipitate drop- 
off in American engagement with the key institutions of Southeast Asia in the post- 
Obama era, notwithstanding the personal absence of President Trump from the 
East Asia Summits of both 2017 and 2018. In both these years Washington officials 
attended the expected meetings, proposed new initiatives, and coordinated with 
close partners including Japan and Australia on ASEAN- related issues. Maritime 
security in general, and the maritime rights disputes in the South China Sea in 
particular, remain a focus of US engagement with ASEAN as well.
Yet, the overall approach of the Trump administration to foreign policy, the 
‘free and open Indo- Pacific’ framework for US Asia policy, and the priority 
issue of US engagement with Southeast Asia since 2017, collectively suggest a 
very different Asia policy than that of the Obama administrations’ Rebalance in 
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Recent developments in the US administration’s emerging approach to foreign 
policy appear to run counter to closer engagement with ASEAN and the EAS. 
President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the TPP and the 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change, along with his criticisms of NATO, are indi-
cative of his defensive, “America First” view of multilateral institutions. (The same 
can be said of his last- minute withdrawal from participating in the Summit of the 
Americas sponsored by the Organization of American States, as Trump is the first 
US president to have done so.) As discussed above, the United States, as an invited 
ASEAN dialogue partner, is far from first among equals in the ASEAN- led EAS.
The 2017 US National Security Strategy adopts a much stronger and hawkish 
view of the challenge posed by China and Russia to global and regional American 
leadership, security and prosperity. In it, the Trump administration contends that 
‘we will compete and lead in multilateral organizations so that American interests 
and principles are protected’.26 As the EAS is a consensus- based body that includes 
both Russia and China as invited ASEAN dialogue partners, the United States 
cannot lead the Summit and attempts by Washington to compete with Beijing and 
Moscow inside it would paralyse the institution. American attempts to “compete 
and lead” in the Summit would also be counterproductive to engagement with 
ASEAN; member states have long guarded against their institution becoming a 
platform for extra- regional major power rivalry and against having to choose 
between the United States and China. If the Trump administration tries to “com-
pete and lead” in the EAS, it will aggravate both of these existential fears.
Rex Tillerson’s October 2017 speech at CSIS is seen as the most exten-
sive explanation by a senior US official of the new ‘free and open Indo- Pacific’ 
framework for US Asia policy under the Trump administration.27 This speech, 
entitled Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century, in fact makes 
no mention of ASEAN or the EAS. At the APEC CEO Summit in Vietnam in 
November 2017, President Trump gave his first speech on this new framework. 
He again made no mention of ASEAN or the EAS.28 The most developed policy 
coordination mechanisms for this new regional framework are the revived quad-
rilateral meetings between the United States, Japan, India and Australia and the 
existing trilateral arrangements between the United States, Japan and Australia, 
and the United States, Japan and India. No Southeast Asian state is included in 
these minilateral mechanisms that are in many ways the institutional opposite to 
ASEAN- led institutions. Brad Glosserman is correct that, ‘while there are repeated 
references to an “Indo- Pacific strategy”, there is little more than a set of ideas and 
nostrums’.29 These ideas and nostrums will also be very difficult to integrate with 
the existing suite of inclusive ASEAN- led institutions and the concept of ASEAN 
centrality.
Across the first two years of the Trump administration, the nuclear and missile 
threat emanating from North Korea, along with Washington’s trade disputes with 
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chose to adopt a “maximum pressure” approach against Pyongyang to try to change 
its threatening behaviour. Gaining active ASEAN support for this strategy was an 
aim of American officials with Southeast Asian counterparts at meetings in both 
2017 and 2018.30 Yet, individual Southeast Asian states such as Cambodia, Laos 
and Myanmar have long- established ties with North Korea, restricting both their 
own and ASEAN’s ability to adopt a maximum pressure strategy. North Korea 
signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation before the United States, 
and is one of twenty- seven states and regional groupings participating in the ARF. 
It is reported that US efforts to have North Korea excluded from the 2017 ARF 
attended by Tillerson did not succeed.31
Conclusions
If the broad focus and frameworks of US foreign policy in Asia of the Trump admin-
istration, up until early 2019, persist, then the level of commitment to ASEAN and 
the EAS demonstrated by the Obama administration will likely not be maintained. 
Clear indications of this were found in Trump’s absences from the East Asia Summits 
of 2017 and 2018. The Obama administration of 2009– 17 pursued greater engage-
ment with both of Southeast Asia’s key institutions, with ASEAN reciprocating by 
inviting the United States to participate and adopt a more influential role. The Trump 
administration seems willing to participate in ASEAN- led institutions, of which the 
United States is now an established member, but seeks new substantive forms of 
policy coordination outside of inclusive institutions led by others. This means that 
while Obama represents an exception within the roll call of American presidents, by 
the degree to which he intensified Washington’s commitments to the EAS, he failed 
to set a sufficient precedent which would make it impossible for the administration 
of his successor to ignore. Of course, it can also be argued that Trump – as uniquely 
inexperienced and unorthodox within the pantheon of American leaders  – is 
in fact the exception whose natural tendencies towards unilateralism mean that 
the lessons of the Obama administration were always to some extent destined to 
be rejected.
The legacy Obama leaves in US engagement with the East Asia Summit, then, 
is one of exception rather than transformation. Washington’s participation within 
ASEAN and the EAS will certainly not disappear, and they remain tied in ways 
closer than before Obama took office in 2009. Yet the high- water mark of the 
Obama administration has at least for the moment, in early 2019, begun to recede. 
The Trump administration’s escalation of trade disputes with China in 2018 
brought the potential for negative economic consequences for Southeast Asian 
economies, via impacts on tightly interconnected regional production chains. The 
prospect of instability and even conflict in East Asia also became less unthink-
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Korean regime over nuclear and missile technology development the same year.32 
Whether through economic or security fallout, then, or the possibility of neglect 
as other policy issues are seen to consume Trump’s attention, many in the region 
throughout the first two years of his administration saw evidence of the United 
States’ commitment to both ASEAN and the EAS to be waning.
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As both candidate and throughout his first two years as president to early 2019, 
Donald Trump employed unilateral actions and flamboyant posturing in upending 
the strong commitment to positive diplomacy and political engagement of 
regional governments and organisations of the previous administrations of Barack 
Obama. Two years into his presidential term, Trump remained avowedly unpre-
dictable as he junked related policy transparency, carefully measured responses, 
and avoidance of dramatic action, linkage or spill- over among competing interests 
that characterised Obama government diplomacy.
On the one hand, his approach had the advantage of keeping opponents (like 
China) as well as allies and partners on the defensive in dealing with the new 
President. Trump came to see the wisdom of abandoning his earlier cavalier 
treatment of allies Japan, South Korea and Australia. He built cordial personal ties 
with most important regional leaders. On the other hand, American engagement 
in the region remained episodic, featuring intense pressure beginning in 2017 to 
prevent North Korea’s nuclear weapons development and strong actions in 2018 
on trade disputes with China that widely impacted other states. Drift characterised 
his dealing with most other issues. That the President used the pressure to con-
clude deals with opponents advantageous to the United States seemed to explain 
his abrupt acceptance of a summit meeting with North Korea’s leader and the 
Trump government’s ongoing negotiations with China as it applied tariffs and 
investment restrictions punishing Beijing.1
The administration laid out a dark view of the world in authoritative documents 
calling for a well- integrated strategy that saw economic, diplomatic and other 
international strengths as important to overall American national security. China 
and Russia were the leading opponents. The Trump government followed through 
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from predatory trade and investment from China. The administration’s remark-
able pragmatism on human rights issues showed that the American leadership 
would not allow these issues to complicate the pursuit of broadly defined elements 
of American national strategy. Remaining unpredictable, President Trump rarely 
used the language of the published strategies and continued cordial interchange 
with the Russian and Chinese leaders.
Trump versus Obama: Diplomacy in Asia
Soon after taking power in January 2017, the Trump administration unceremo-
niously announced the end of the Obama administration’s signature “Rebalance” 
policy in Asia.2 Launched in 2011, that multifaceted policy was widely welcomed 
in Asia except notably by China, which took assertive and expansive actions in 
response that the Obama government was less than successful in countering.
The Rebalance policy accompanied US military pullbacks from Iraq and 
Afghanistan, with greater attention to a broad range of countries in Asia from India 
in the west, to Japan in the northeast, to the Pacific Island states in the southeast. 
US diplomatic activism increased; existing, substantial military deployments were 
maintained and strengthened in some areas; and trade and investment remained 
open and were poised to increase, notably via the Trans- Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), a twelve- nation Asia Pacific economic pact that represented the centre-
piece of the economic dimension of the Obama administration’s Rebalance policy 
in Asia.3
After assuming leadership in 2012, President Xi Jinping showed a much 
bolder and more assertive posture than previous Chinese leaders in pursuing its 
interests in Asia and elsewhere at odds with American interests. Xi used economic 
enticements on the one hand and coercive and intimidating means short of direct 
military force on the other hand, to compel neighbours to accept Chinese claims 
to disputed territories and to side with Beijing against American foreign policy 
initiatives.
President Obama and his administration representatives maintained that their 
carefully measured, transparent and moderate responses to China’s challenges 
throughout their time in office led to successful outcomes that reflected well on 
their historical legacy. They were particularly pleased with US– China agreements 
on such important global issues as climate change. In contrast, a hardening of 
opinion about China’s growing challenges among mainstream US foreign policy 
elites showed in the 2016 election campaigns, and across a variety of think tank 
studies and media commentary. Obama’s approach appeared too reactive and 
solicitous towards China. It was viewed to allow Beijing to repeatedly advance 
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Indeed, President Obama’s frustrations grew with China’s expansionism and 
“bullying” in disputed maritime areas such as the South China Sea; cyber theft of 
US economic and industrial property and other grossly unfair economic practices; 
continued support for North Korea as it flagrantly violated international sanctions 
and endangered South Korea and neighbouring states; and other matters. Obama 
broke with his practice of avoiding negative public comments about China in the 
first six years of his administration, and in 2014 began to more frequently com-
plain about Beijing’s infractions.
Xi Jinping largely ignored the complaints. After many strident warnings, the 
Obama government eventually took some actions, notably on cyber theft and 
Chinese bullying and expansionism in the South China Sea. But they were each 
treated in transparent and measured ways that signalled to Beijing US intent to 
avoid broader negative consequences for China or US– China relations. The results 
were mixed; widely publicised offensive Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea 
and other egregious challenges appeared to meet with an ineffective US response, 
which American and regional critics saw weakening the US position in the region.4
The complaints against the Obama government’s ineffectiveness against Chinese 
challenges fed into a much broader American debate on foreign policy leading up 
to the 2016 presidential election campaign. Republican leaders in Congress and 
supporting think tanks and interest groups joined media and other commentators 
in depicting major shortcomings in the Obama government’s policies in Europe, 
the Middle East and Asia. One target was the so- called Obama Doctrine laid out in 
the President’s speech to graduating West Point cadets in 2014 that showed greater 
administration wariness regarding security engagements abroad.5
In Asia, congressional and other American critics of Obama’s Rebalance claimed 
that Washington was not resolute enough in defending the United States’ regional 
role as security guarantor, and not active enough in promoting greater American 
trade, investment and diplomatic engagement in competition with China’s state- 
directed efforts. The Republican- leaning Heritage Foundation summed up the 
critics’ concerns by offering far- reaching political- security recommendations for 
Asia. They included more robust military spending to allow for a long- term goal 
of 350 naval ships (there are now about 280 ships in the Navy); increased support 
for allies and partners; expanded involvement with the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional groups; and greater firmness in 
dealing with Chinese challenges to regional and American interests.6
Asia, candidate Trump, and 2016 election debates
Most of the 2016 US presidential candidates talked about eroding or challenged 
US international power and influence, and the need to reaffirm America’s role 
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and Donald Trump in varying ways favoured strengthening American power 
and leadership. Bernie Sanders favoured less muscular approaches than the other 
candidates, emphasising negotiations over military means and pressure. Most 
advocated strengthened relations with allies, without much emphasis on greater 
reciprocity on their part.
On specific issues involving US leadership, John Kasich joined free trade 
advocates in Congress like House Speaker Paul Ryan to support the TPP. Clinton, 
Cruz, Sanders and Trump voiced varying opposition to the trade pact, but Trump 
was alone in insisting that allies do more to offset American costs in maintaining 
their security and overall regional stability or face American withdrawal. He also 
accepted the possibility that, without support from Washington, allies like Japan 
and South Korea might be compelled to develop nuclear weapons to protect them-
selves. All the candidates agreed with overwhelming majorities in Congress that 
pressure should be applied, including on Beijing, to see a denuclearised North 
Korea. Yet Trump was alone in also calling for direct talks with North Korea’s Kim 
Jong- un.
China remained the main country of concern regarding challenging US lead-
ership in Asia. Relevant election discourse focused on how China was an unfair 
partner, and how the United States needed to counter negative features of its 
rise. Clinton, Rubio and Cruz argued for greater firmness against Beijing, with 
Clinton and Rubio advocating tougher specific policies, and Cruz favouring a 
more robust overall approach. In contrast, Sanders urged negotiations. So did 
Trump, though he also favoured military build- up and large trade sanctions if 
needed.7
Concern with China remained active throughout the campaigns, but sec-
ondary within the rhetoric about Asia. China as an issue was overshadowed by 
strong debate on international trade and the proposed TPP, and on Trump’s con-
troversial proposals on allied burden sharing, nuclear weapons proliferation and 
North Korea. Trump’s strong opposition to the TPP and other US trade efforts was 
at odds with the free trade policies favoured by Republican congressional leaders, 
but his position had strong appeal among both Republican and Democratic voters. 
He and Sanders reinforced each other’s arguments, and both rode the surprise 
wave of populist discontent over globalisation to unexpected success in the pri-
maries. Clinton, Cruz and others reversed or modified their positions to accord 
with the changed politics surrounding the TPP.
Candidate Trump’s unique emphasis on getting Japan, South Korea and other 
allies to compensate the United States for its role as regional security guarantor 
prompted serious negative reactions that promised significant complications for 
US alliance relations in the event of his election as president. His calls for Japan 
and South Korea to compensate the United States for security support it provided 
were at odds with proposals by Speaker Ryan, Senator John McCain and other 
Republican congressional leaders, as well as many Republican- leaning think 
 
Obama, Trump and US politics and diplomacy 147
147
tanks and media. Some of these congressional Republicans vocally opposed such 
policies.
Trump’s acceptance of Japan or South Korea developing nuclear weapons for 
self- defence, following a US pullback, was a major departure from long- standing 
policies of Republican and Democratic governments, and one widely seen to 
add to the danger of war in Northeast Asia. His abrupt announcement that he 
would seek direct talks with North Korea’s leader undermined existing American, 
South Korean and Japanese policy. It also deviated sharply from the tough pos-
ture favoured by the Obama government and by Republican and Democratic con-
gressional leaders and rank and file.8 Ultimately, these three sets of controversial 
proposals by Trump garnered little support in the United States and prompted 
opposition, including from prominent congressional Republicans.
Meanwhile, candidate Trump’s flamboyant and often vulgar campaign attacks 
were widely seen as diminishing American authority abroad, prompting con-
cern from foreign policy specialists within the United States. His populist appeal 
came from a style of campaigning that featured repeated personal attacks, gross 
language, and salacious accusations which degraded America’s image, providing 
fodder for Chinese and other opinion stressing the weaknesses of US democracy.9
On policy issues, the success of the Sanders and Trump campaign attacks on 
the TPP surprised congressional leaders, along with most American and Asian 
commentators. Their success underlined seemingly weak popular support for this 
important component of US policy in the region, which Ryan, McCain and other 
Republican congressional leaders continued to back. The fact that the Republican 
Party – widely seen in the region as strongly committed to US defence ties with 
Asia – selected Trump despite his controversial views on military disengagement 
from Asia and Europe, and his acceptance of nuclear proliferation, raised serious 
doubts about America’s future regional role.
Among Asian countries dependent on military support from the United States, 
non- governmental Japanese commentators seemed the most concerned. On the 
other side of the spectrum, Chinese commentators saw opportunities for leader-
ship gains in competition with the United States in Asia, following the election’s 
negative impact on the credibility of regional American commitment. This devel-
opment reinforced the determination of Senator McCain and a large bipartisan 
group of colleagues to travel to the region prior to the election to reassure allies 
and partners of continued US support.10
President Trump’s policies and practices in Asia
President Trump in 2017 came to see the need for altering his policies towards 
allies and joining congressional and other leaders in pressuring North Korea on 
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international diplomacy  – what New  York City police detectives would call his 
mode of operation – continued to feature dramatic and often crude initiatives that 
were hard to predict and that raised international tensions, with himself at the 
centre of attention. The United States is a superpower with many powerful levers 
of possible use in seeking international advantage. Across his first two years in 
office it became clear that Trump was much more likely than the more measured 
and predictable Obama to use those levers in surprising ways, notably by linking 
issues, and using one source of power in one issue area to gain advantages in 
another area of policy concern. Whereas the Obama government seemed to pri-
oritise carefully managing differences and resulting tensions, President Trump 
sought advantage in stoking tensions and exacerbating differences in diplomacy in 
Asia and beyond. Such behaviour mimicked the controversial and unconventional 
behaviour of his remarkable and unexpected presidential election victory against 
more experienced “Establishment” political candidates.
Early Trump administration initiatives upset regional stability, complicating 
the foreign policies of Asian partners and opponents alike, including China. 
Subsequent pragmatic summitry eased regional anxiety and clarified the new 
government’s security and political objectives. An effective American strategy 
remained elusive, especially because of deep divisions in the American adminis-
tration on trade and economic policy. In 2018, tariffs and restrictions on Chinese 
investments showed a harder line compatible with an overall toughening of dip-
lomacy, consistent with the administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and 
National Defense Strategy (NDS).11 However, they were implemented along with 
concurrent high- level negotiations with China to reach a compromise over trade 
and other economic differences.12
There was considerable domestic support, notably in Congress, for the new 
President’s security plans which were generally in line with the priorities of 
Republican congressional leaders stressing the need to reinforce the American 
military presence in the region. The omnibus spending bill signed by the President 
in March 2018 included the first instalment of a planned increase of US$160 billion 
in defence spending over two years, to improve US military readiness and advance 
its capabilities in the Asia Pacific and other key theatres of operations.13
The President’s personal engagement with Chinese and other Asian leaders 
between 2017 and 2019 detailed below was generally supported in Congress. As 
discussed shortly, few public complaints were seen in Congress, albeit more in 
the media and among concerned interest groups, about the new US government’s 
reduced emphasis on human rights and good governance in high- level meetings 
with Asian leaders. Congress generally supported the efforts by Republican con-
gressional leader, and later Vice President, Mike Pence and other administration 
leaders including Defense Secretary James Mattis, National Security Advisor 
H. R. McMaster, and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to steer President Trump 
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and others, which had been seriously questioned by Trump when presidential can-
didate. The turnover in senior administration leaders, with Tillerson, McMaster 
and Mattis leaving in 2018 and being replaced by proponents of a harder line in 
US foreign policy, notably Mike Pompeo and John Bolton, raised congressional 
concern about the absence of senior administration leaders prepared to moderate 
Trump’s inclinations for more aggressive American diplomacy.
Congress remained overwhelmingly supportive of greater US pressure on 
North Korea, including on China to help manipulate the policies of Pyongyang. 
Thus, there was little objection to the high priority the President and his staff gave 
to responding to North Korean weapons tests. North Korean missile launches 
increased in frequency in 2017, before slowing dramatically in late 2018, and in 
that time showed recently unprecedented demonstrations of military power and 
resolve. The tension featured strident rhetoric from the President that caused a few 
congressional leaders to register concerns about a possible impulsive move from 
the White House that could start a nuclear war.14 Caveats in this tough US posture 
included President Trump’s avowed unpredictability in the newly fluid situation 
on the Korean Peninsula in 2018, which led to his remarkable acceptance of a 
summit meeting with North Korea’s leader in Singapore in June 2018 and another 
in Hanoi in February 2019.15
Regarding US diplomacy and interchange with foreign governments on eco-
nomic issues – notably the massive American trade deficit with Asia and particu-
larly China  – congressional Republican leaders continued to favour free trade. 
Congressional Democrats, meanwhile, often were associated with proposed gov-
ernment efforts to do more to protect the United States from unfair trade practices 
of China, as well as some other countries. The Trump government had a hard time 
formulating a coherent diplomatic approach with Asian governments regarding 
sensitive economic disputes; administration leaders articulated widely different 
perspectives, with some favouring a traditional Republican free trade approach 
and others favouring the approach advocated by candidate Trump of protecting 
American jobs from China’s improper practices.
Where President Trump would come down on this important matter was not 
clarified by his friendly visit to China in November 2017, followed by a strong 
declaration against unfair trade during a speech at the APEC Summit attended 
by the Chinese leader in Hanoi.16 The administration’s diplomatic line on these 
issues became more consistent and harder in 2018, and was accompanied by sub-
stantial tariffs and investment restrictions which specifically targeted Beijing. 
Nevertheless, the administration continued negotiations with China, presumably 
seeking a deal advantageous for the United States.
Disagreements within the administration on economic policy delayed a clear 
US government strategy towards China and the broader Asia Pacific region. 
Adding to that problem was the fact that the administration was slow in filling 
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in the Defense and State departments. The difficulty in selecting qualified staff 
came in part from the surprising populist upsurge against globalisation and for-
eign engagement during the 2016 presidential election campaign. This side- lined 
Republican and Democratic Party elites who supported continued constructive 
American engagement with the Asia Pacific, rather than the President’s emphasis 
on “America First”. Trump’s unpredictability in foreign affairs, his demands for 
intense personal loyalty, and his repeated, public use of vulgar and personal 
attacks seemed to appeal to his populist base, but most experienced Republican 
Asian specialists were alienated from the new President.17
The Defense Department eventually filled its Asia policy positions, but the 
departure of Secretary of State Tillerson in March 2018 meant his selected candi-
date for Asian Assistant Secretary was put aside. The absence of a strong cohort of 
political appointees in Washington agencies and ambassadors abroad did not pre-
vent Donald Trump from interacting effectively with a wide range of Asian leaders 
and multilateral inter- governmental groups during his summitry in Washington 
and his extended trip to Asia in late 2017. And the administration was successful 
in crafting a coordinated and coherent NSS and NDS. Nonetheless, the absence of 
diplomatic expertise on North Korea seemed to be a significant weakness as the 
Trump government prepared for previously unexpected talks with North Korea’s 
leader without the benefit of experienced officials in key positions. It took until July 
2018 for the appointments of Trump’s ambassador to South Korea and an acting 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Trump’s US Special 
Representative for North Korean Policy was appointed the following month.
In general, congressional or other American concern about the absence of a 
coherent administration policy towards Asia remained the focus of foreign policy 
specialists concerned with Asian affairs. The crisis over nuclear weapons develop-
ment in North Korea, beginning in 2017, and tensions caused by tough US tariffs 
and other economic measures against China in 2018, were high priority issues for 
the administration, the Congress, the media and non- government organisations 
dealing with American policy. But they competed for attention with pressing 
domestic issues including health care reform; tax reform; disaster relief; control 
of immigration; the role of Russia in influencing US domestic politics and the 
investigation into possible collusion with the Trump campaign during the 2016 
election; and such international issues as the wars in Syria and Afghanistan and 
the challenges posed by Russian and Iranian assertiveness and expansionism in 
Europe and the Middle East.
The Trump administration’s NSS and NDS provided a well- integrated message 
for American diplomacy in Asia and the rest of the world. While focused on 
threats from North Korea, terrorism and Iran, the approach zeroed- in on China 
and Russia. It employed strong language not seen in authoritative US government 
commentary on China since before the Nixon administration’s opening to China of 
the early 1970s, to warn in no uncertain terms of China’s ambitions to undermine 
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US economic, security and political interests and displace the United States and 
its leadership in the Asia Pacific. It clearly sided with those in the administration 
seeking a much tougher policy towards China on economic issues.
As already noted, the administration followed through with diplomacy 
highlighting defence build- ups and economic actions in support of the American 
strategy. The diplomacy generally meshed with congressional concerns regarding 
North Korea and China. The United States also began closer collaboration in dip-
lomatic negotiations with Japan, India and Australia to foster military cooperation 
to secure interests challenged by China in the broader Indo- Pacific region. How 
far the United States would go in countering perceived adverse Chinese actions 
throughout the first two years of the Trump administration was determined in 
part by the region’s uncertain priority in the very full international White House 
agenda. On a personal level, President Trump carried out cordial interchange with 
Chinese leaders seemingly at odds with the harder approach of his administration’s 
avowed strategy.
Early diplomatic successes
President Trump’s unconventional personal style in foreign affairs added to uncer-
tainty in US relations with China and the broader Asia Pacific region. He strongly 
opposed President Obama’s predictable, transparent and carefully measured 
policy- making that had been broadly welcomed in the region. The new President 
favoured unpredictability; he sought advantage in employing dramatic gestures 
and rhetoric along with military and economic leverage to benefit from resulting 
tensions, just as he did at the expense of more conventional candidates in his 
election campaign. Notably, Trump repeatedly inserted himself into the policy 
process through bluntly worded tweets and other initiatives that exacerbated 
frictions over important issues both at home and abroad in ways that appealed to 
his populist constituency, but which upset foreign partners and opponents.18
In January 2017, President Trump quickly followed through on his campaign 
pledge to withdraw from the twelve- nation TPP. Then came the announcement 
that the Obama government’s overall Asian engagement policy known as the 
Rebalance policy was ended, with little indication of the Trump administration’s 
regional approach.19 Both moves reinforced anxiety and dismay among regional 
allies and partners over the direction of American policy.
The new President’s national security leaders, along with Vice President 
Pence, however, led the administration’s reversal of candidate Trump’s low regard 
for American alliances, notably those with Japan, South Korea and Australia. 
Their travels to the region reassured allies and partners of Washington’s security 
commitments. In June, Secretary Mattis pointedly reassured allies and partners in 
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commitments in Asia at the annual defence ministers meeting at the Shangri- La 
Forum in Singapore.20 Economic relations remain in question as President Trump 
continued his complaints about US trade agreements with South Korea and its 
trade deficits with China and other Asian countries.21
North Korea crises and China policy
North Korea’s threatening rhetoric, repeated ballistic missile launches, and nuclear 
weapons testing saw the early Trump government adopt a more assertive diplo-
matic approach framed by far more tension than Obama’s more moderate and 
reactive policy of “strategic patience”. President Trump and senior administration 
officials repeatedly warned of unspecified US military options to unilaterally deal 
with the North Korean threat, while increasing public pressure on China to use 
its influence to get Pyongyang to halt its nuclear weapons programme. Trump’s 
remarks on China’s willingness and ability to get North Korea to stop varied from 
optimism, to warnings that the United States was prepared to take unilateral mili-
tary actions.22
The crisis over North Korea saw Washington devote careful handling to 
relations with Beijing. During the campaign, Chinese specialists judged that 
Trump was a pragmatic businessman who could be “shaped” to align with Chinese 
interests and would be easier to deal with than Hillary Clinton, had she won the 
2016 election.23 President- elect Trump up- ended these sanguine views when he 
accepted a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing- wen in 
December 2016. When Beijing complained, Trump criticised Chinese economic 
policies and military advances in disputed islands in the South China Sea, and 
questioned why the United States should retain support for the One China policy 
and avoid improved contacts with Taiwan. Trump was eventually persuaded to 
endorse – at least in general terms – the American view of the One China policy. 
His informal summit meeting with President Xi Jinping in Florida in early April 
2017 went well. The two leaders met again on the side- lines of the G- 20 summit in 
July that year and held repeated phone conversations over North Korea and other 
issues before Trump’s visit to Beijing in November. Despite serious differences 
between the two countries, both leaders seemed to value their personal rapport, 
with Xi promising Trump a ‘wonderful’ visit in China; that remarkable visit 
prompted the US President’s personal gratitude and appreciation.24
After the Florida summit, the Trump government kept strong political pressure 
on China to use its leverage to halt North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. 
Planned arms sales to Taiwan, freedom of navigation exercises in the South China 
Sea and other US initiatives that might complicate America’s search for leverage to 
stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons development were temporarily put on hold. 
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further bilateral economic cooperation prior to the first US– China Comprehensive 
Economic Dialogue, set for July 2017.25
The conditionality of Trump’s positive stance towards Xi showed when he 
registered dissatisfaction with China’s efforts on North Korea in June. This was 
followed by the announcement of arms sales to Taiwan. Freedom of navigation 
exercises in the South China Sea also went ahead. China responded with routine 
complaints, and July’s economic dialogue produced no agreement on actionable 
steps to reduce the US trade deficit with China, ending in failure with a cancelled 
press conference and no joint statement.
Washington opted against harsh economic measures in the lead- up to, and 
during, the President’s trip to China in November 2017. However, Secretary of State 
Tillerson and Secretary of Defense James Mattis registered the administration’s 
first criticism of China’s widely publicised Belt and Road Initiative. The admin-
istration also objected to the World Bank’s continuing practice of providing a 
couple of billion dollars a year in development loans to China, and it joined the 
EU in opposing China’s market economy status at the World Trade Organization.26 
China’s uncertainty over the American President also partly explained why, at least 
temporarily, it avoided controversial expansion in the disputed South China Sea. 
Beijing also avoided controversial expansions in South China Sea areas claimed 
by the Philippines because it was seeking to court Philippines President Rodrigo 
Duterte away from the United States.27
Building close ties with Asian leaders
In the first twelve months of his presidency, Trump made progress in advancing 
diplomatic, security and economic relations with other important Asian countries. 
The approach featured summit meetings, even with leaders previously shunned 
by the United States because of concerns over democracy (e.g. Thailand), human 
rights (e.g. the Philippines) and corruption (e.g. Malaysia). By and large, these 
leaders responded positively to the high- level attention by the new American 
President, which many of them actively sought; they reciprocated with economic 
concessions and positive treatment of Trump.
Japan’s long- serving Prime Minister Shinzo Abe sought a position as the 
President’s closest regional partner. He arranged and attended a remarkable 
meeting in New  York in November 2016 with President- elect Trump. This was 
followed by a summit in Washington in February 2017 that included a full weekend 
at the President’s Mar- a- Lago resort. The two leaders remained on the same page 
throughout the tensions over North Korea, though Japan worried about the nega-
tive consequences of Trump’s abrupt shift towards summitry with North Korea.28
On a trip to Indonesia in April 2017, Vice President Pence told officials that 
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Asian summits in the Philippines in November. The White House announced the 
long trip in October that year. Pence’s stop to Australia in April 2017 helped to set 
the stage for a cordial May meeting in New York between Trump and Australian 
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. The two leaders put aside an earlier heated 
telephone argument regarding the United States accepting over 1,000 refugees in 
Australian custody.29
In late April 2017, Trump called the leaders of Singapore, the Philippines 
and Thailand, inviting them to visit the White House. The invitations to the 
latter two, along with a separate invitation to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, 
represented a break from the Obama government’s arm’s- length treatment of 
these governments, because of concerns over human rights and corruption. The 
invitations built personal ties with all three leaders that helped to establish top- 
level US connections, allowing for President Trump’s successful visit to the region 
and interchange at regional leadership meetings in November 2017.30
Vietnam carried out previously agreed visits to the United States of its senior 
leaders  – the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Deputy Defense 
Minister. Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc was the first Southeast Asian head 
of government to meet with President Trump in late May. The Vietnamese pre-
mier seemed successful in forging a personal relationship with President Trump.31 
Newly- inaugurated South Korean President Moon Jae- in travelled to a summit 
with Trump in late June. He gave top priority to allied cooperation in dealing with 
the North Korean threat. The South Korean government also followed through 
with the deployment of Washington’s THAAD anti- missile system in South Korea, 
despite vocal objection from China.32
In late June 2017, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was warmly welcomed 
at the White House. India’s importance in neighbouring Afghanistan grew with 
Trump’s decision in August to add 4,000 American troops to the 8,000 stationed in 
Afghanistan, endeavouring to counter Taliban combatants seeking to overthrow 
the US- backed Afghan government. Defense Secretary Mattis made his first visit 
to India in September, with the Pentagon stressing ‘US appreciation of India’s 
important contributions toward Afghanistan’s democracy, stability, prosperity and 
security’.33
By mid- 2017 Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak had become mired in a 
major corruption scandal involving billions of dollars in investment funds that 
came under investigation by the US Justice Department. Nevertheless, Najib 
found Washington fully welcoming during a cordial meeting with Trump in 
September that year. The Trump administration refused to comment on the gov-
ernment investigation. The Malaysian government said it would buy US$10 billion 
in US commercial aircraft over five years, and invest close to US$4 billion in the 
American economy.34
The leader of Thailand’s 2014 military coup, and resulting Prime Minister 
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This marked the first such visit by a Thai leader since 2005.35 Singaporean Prime 
Minister Lee Hsien Loong also made a six- day trip to Washington in late October, 
just prior to Trump’s inaugural visit to the region. He promised large purchases 
of US commercial airplanes and offered advice on China following the Singapore 
leader’s recent talks with Xi Jinping.36
Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte’s Draconian crackdown on drug 
traffickers, beginning almost immediately from when he entered office in mid- 
2016, resulted in thousands of extra- legal killings that were strongly criticised by 
the Obama government and others. The White House put aside such concerns 
when, in April 2017, Trump invited Duterte to meet in Washington. Duterte 
demurred but by late September was publicly conciliatory towards the United 
States before welcoming Trump to the Philippines for talks on bilateral relations 
and ASEAN related meetings, in his role as chairman of the institution in 2017.37
Overall, capping American diplomatic efforts in 2017, the results of the Trump 
visit to Asia appeared successful. Familiar with Trump because of earlier cordial 
meetings in the United States, important Asian leaders were attentive and solici-
tous, seeking improved relations. The American President’s concerns about the 
threat from North Korea, US trade imbalances, and other economic complaints 
were evident throughout. While Trump continued to reject multilateral eco-
nomic agreements, he participated fully in the APEC and US– ASEAN summit.38 
The President’s attentiveness throughout his remarkably long and demanding 
schedule in the region signalled strong top- level US commitment of continued 
active engagement in regional affairs. There was little in the trip for administration 
critics in the United States or elsewhere to complain about.39
Recent developments, uncertain strategy
President Trump’s 2017 activism in Asia was not repeated in 2018. North Korea 
and China got high- level attention, but other regional priorities received more 
episodic treatment. Developments showed some clear and consistent elements 
of American strategy, notably on defence and in a diminished American profile 
on human rights, democracy and promotion of good governance.40 Trump’s dra-
matic move towards summitry with North Korea came in close consultations with 
leaders of South Korea and Japan. South Korean President Moon Jae- in played an 
instrumental mediating role between Trump and Kim Jong- un before the Trump– 
Kim summit in Singapore on 12 June, and in managing US– North Korean disputes 
that followed. President Trump also praised China’s role in facilitating the summit.
Apart from the Singapore trip in June, however, Trump did not travel to Asia; 
and he avoided the diplomatic bonhomie that characterised his 2017 trip to 
the region and his meetings with Asian leaders in Washington and Florida. He 
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tariffs and political pressure on various Asian and other partners, to compel 
changes in economic relations advantageous to the United States. South Korea 
agreed to a revised free trade agreement with the United States, and Japan agreed 
to talks on a bilateral trade accord. These came in tandem with US pressure on 
trade with Mexico and Canada, leading to the conclusion of a new trade agreement 
to replace NAFTA, which Trump had long criticised.
China received the lion’s share of administration pressure on trade and it 
responded in kind. The trade war was accompanied by the Trump government 
targeting Chinese policies and practices on a wide range of economic, polit-
ical and security issues, bringing relations to their lowest point in decades. The 
US hardening on China was in line with the administration’s declared national 
security strategy.
In Asia, administration officials began to flesh out the contents of their avowed 
Indo- Pacific strategy which showed a clear focus on China as the prime US 
concern. In June 2018, Secretary of Defense James Mattis described the Trump 
administration’s emerging Indo- Pacific strategy as deepening alliances and 
partnerships, stressing that ASEAN remained central to regional stability, and 
affirming openness to cooperation with China ‘wherever possible’.41 In August, 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced nearly US$300  million in new US 
funding to strengthen maritime security, develop humanitarian assistance and 
peacekeeping capabilities, and enhance programmes that counter transnational 
threats.
Trump also highlighted a US$113  million fund that will promote public– 
private partnerships as a down payment on a larger project to reorganise and 
rationalise the US development aid bureaucracy to be better able to mobilise 
and guide private- sector capital. This project, manifest in the Better Utilization 
of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act, passed by Congress and 
signed by the President in October, more than doubled the US government’s 
development- finance capacity, to US$60 billion, in order to support US private 
investment in strategic opportunities abroad. These measures complemented 
efforts by Japan, Australia and India, often in cooperation with the United States, 
to provide funding for infrastructure and investment needed in the Indo- Pacific 
in competition with China’s expansive international infrastructure, lending and 
investment in the so- called Belt and Road Initiative.
Despite such measures, regional officials looked in vain for a coherent American 
strategy. Indeed, in March 2019 the US Government Accountability Office released 
a report which pointed to staff shortages in key positions of the foreign services. 
While comparable to shortages of previous years, it noted that the highest propor-
tion of vacancies were for posts related to South Asia. Staff in East and South Asia 
reported ‘that vacancies in these sections had limited their capacity to engage with 
host government officials on important, strategic issues’.42
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Unlike the discipline that characterised the carefully crafted discourse and pru-
dent behaviour of the Obama government in support of its Rebalance policy in 
Asia, the Trump administration’s initiatives have, to date, been replete with uncer-
tainties and ambiguities. Notably, the avowed tougher US government approach 
to China contained caveats including ongoing negotiations with China, Trump’s 
positive personal relationship with his Chinese counterpart, and his avoidance of 
the type of tough rhetoric against China seen in the National Security Strategy. 
Perhaps of most importance has been Trump’s avowed unpredictability, which led 
to his two summit meetings with North Korea’s Kim Jong- un in 2018 and 2019 
and which could allow for top- level deal making over key differences with China 
that would belie the stated administration strategy.
In sum, the deliberative and moderate approach of Barack Obama’s Rebalance 
policy has, in the first two years of the Trump administration, been put aside in 
favour of a still ill- defined approach of the much more flamboyant and unpredict-
able Donald Trump. The Trump government shows in spades its willingness to 
apply power against those it opposes – a perceived weakness in Obama’s approach to 
China. It has used the wide range of economic, diplomatic and military power avail-
able to the American superpower. The consequences of the policy shift are wearing 
on American allies and partners. Evaluating their overall impact will need to take 
account of the results of the policy shift, which are only vaguely evident at present 
and subject to be overtaken by unexpected moves by the US President or others.
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Security policy in Asia from Obama 
to Trump: Autopilot, neglect or worse?
Nick Bisley
Introduction
Donald Trump’s 2016 election threatened a revolution in US Asia policy. Since the 
early years of the Cold War, the United States has been a constant presence in the 
region’s security setting.1 American military power has been the pre- eminent force 
in the region, organised through a series of bilateral alliances and quasi- alliance 
guarantees. This presence was part of the larger US Cold War grand strategy in 
which Washington sought to ensure a favourable strategic balance in Western 
Europe, the Middle East and East Asia.2 Although the Obama administration put 
considerable public emphasis on its “Pivot”, or “Rebalance”, to Asia, and there were 
key differences between Obama and Bush’s approaches to the region, in its major 
elements, the approach of the forty- fourth president towards Asia was very much 
in keeping with longer- run US strategic policy. Given what Trump said during 
the election campaign, and his activity during the transition and in the early days 
of the presidency, a fundamental break with the past looked entirely possible. As 
candidate he had demeaned alliances; during the campaign he showed a worrying 
lack of concern about nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia and promised a trade 
war with the world’s second largest economy. As President, Trump looked like he 
might govern US foreign policy in the same norm- busting manner in which he 
had campaigned, with dramatic consequences for regional security.
But after two years in office, those hoping for radical change in US security 
policy towards the region have been disappointed. Much in the way that Obama’s 
Pivot was more about the presentation of US strategic policy and involved much 
less substantive change, Trump has not yet instigated any significant shifts. Indeed, 
the level of continuity with his predecessor’s policy is striking, particularly given 
his instinct to reject almost anything to do with the Obama presidency. Alliances 
have been reaffirmed, as has the One China policy. Indeed, much to the surprise 
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China’s President Xi Jinping, engaged with regional multilateralism and even 
participated in the Asia summit season in November 2017, albeit in a slightly cha-
otic fashion by opting out of the East Asia Summit at the last minute. His admin-
istration has so far been more explicit in seeing China as a long- term geopolitical 
rival but has not yet made substantive changes to US security policy to match this 
shift in declaratory tone.
In this chapter I argue that US security policy in Asia is stuck somewhere between 
inertia and neglect. The continuity is not the result of a carefully considered policy 
choice; rather it is in the main due to the heavy inertial qualities of a strategic 
policy that has been in place for many decades. And when the Trump administra-
tion has focused on regional security rather than taking its cues from a larger stra-
tegic plan, it views things through the narrow prism of bilateral ties, with a heavy 
emphasis on a mercantilist view of economic relations, and crisis management. 
It is also constrained by a lack of adequate resources with many key bureaucratic 
posts still vacant. The consequence of this negligent and a- strategic approach has 
been to strengthen China’s relative position in the region. This approach is also 
prompting friends and allies to accelerate their planning for a region in which the 
United States plays a more diminished role.
The chapter is in four parts. The first will discuss the Asia policy that Trump 
inherited from Obama. It will draw attention to the longer- term trends in US 
policy and the subtle differences introduced into that policy by Obama’s team. The 
second will sketch out the range of possibilities that Trump’s Asia policy promised. 
Here a composite picture will be drawn up based both on campaign promises and 
action during the transition. This is necessary because as candidate there was no 
clear and systematic articulation of how he would approach Asia’s many signifi-
cant security challenges with most of his regionally oriented pronouncements 
focused on China and trade. The third will explain why US security policy can be 
described as continuity by neglect. The chapter will conclude with an assessment 
of the consequences of this policy and how it is accelerating a significant trans-
formation of Asia’s regional order. Ultimately, Obama sought to sustain long- term 
US security policy in the face of a changing region, but failed to recognise the 
scale of the changes it faced; the Trump administration’s careless approach to 
the region throughout its first two years has hastened a significant shift in Asia’s 
security setting.
Obama’s Asia legacy
Unsurprisingly for a president who came to national prominence because of his 
objection to the Iraq War, foreign policy was a significant focus of the Obama 
administration. And of the many achievements which the administration claimed, 
such as the Iran nuclear deal, the rapprochement with Cuba and the Paris climate 
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change accord, their most significant long- term strategic effort was the emphasis 
put on Asia.3 Indeed the attempt to put the region at the centre of US international 
policy is described by many in the administration as their most significant long- 
term contribution.4
Obama’s electoral victory in 2008 was interpreted by the incoming administra-
tion as a mandate to end the war in Iraq and to focus in the first instance on the 
conflict in Afghanistan. The new government’s aim was not only to make good on 
its commitment to extricate the United States from Iraq and to resolve the security 
problems of radical Islam in Afghanistan, but also to reorient US policy so as to 
better focus on the big trends in world politics. Obama’s senior officials perceived 
that the major conflicts in the Middle East had not only sapped blood and treasure 
to no obvious strategic advantage, they had also warped the government’s prior-
ities and taken its focus off the major forces that were shaping America’s global 
interests. In particular, so claimed the administration, Bush’s focus on Iraq and 
Afghanistan had come at the cost of America’s position in Asia, the region that was 
fast becoming the world’s most important.
The response to this perceived neglect of the Bush administration, as well as 
the realisation of Asia’s growing significance to US interests and the world, was to 
craft what was first described as the Pivot to Asia but which was soon rebranded 
as the “Rebalance” to the region.5 Outlined in a number of speeches, most notably 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s speech to the East- West Center, Honolulu,6 and 
the President’s address to the Australian parliament in 2011,7 “rebalancing” US 
policy towards Asia had a number of key aims. First, it was intended to realign 
US strategic policy to America’s primary long- term interests, moving away from 
the disproportionate emphasis that had been placed on Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Too much time, money and bureaucratic resources had been tied up in parts of 
the world that were out of proportion to their long- term strategic significance. 
Second, the administration wanted to signal internationally as well as domestic-
ally the priority of the Asian region to its strategic policy. Allies and partners in 
Asia who were concerned that the US focus on the Middle East had opened the 
door to Chinese influence were to be reassured, and Beijing was to be reminded of 
America’s emphasis on the region. As Obama said to the Australian parliament: ‘in 
the Asia Pacific in the twenty- first century, the United States of America is all in’.8 
The desire to retain its strategic preponderance was made very clear. It was also 
intended to send signals within the bureaucracy about how resources should be 
allocated. More was to be invested so public servants would be incentivised to 
focus on the region.
America’s long- term strategic policy is to remain the dominant power in 
Western Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. The Pivot to Asia, sold publicly 
as an emphasis on the most important region in the world, was ultimately about 
ensuring that long- term goal in the face of transformations caused by the rapid 
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not one agreed with the Obama critique that Bush had neglected the region – and 
many did not9 – the underlying imperative for US security policy was that China’s 
dramatic growth was fundamentally changing the region. Even though the United 
States wanted to retain the basic pattern of Asia’s strategic balance, it realised that 
it would have to adjust its policy to reflect the realities of a shifting distribution 
of power. To do so it would take a number of steps. The most obvious was to 
devote more military assets to the region. Prominently announced at the Shangri- 
La Dialogue in 2012, the United States committed to devoting 60 per cent of its 
naval assets to the Pacific theatre.10 More broadly, it signalled that Washington 
intended to remain the pre- eminent regional military power in both conventional 
and nuclear terms.
Washington also indicated that it wanted to distribute that military force more 
broadly, signing agreements with Australia and Singapore, as China’s rise and its 
expanding capacities meant that the Cold War emphasis on Northeast Asia would 
no longer suffice. Equally, Obama wanted US allies to do more, both individually and 
collectively. If the US approach to the region in the past had been a “hub and spoke” 
model, in which the United States was the hub and its bilateral links to allies and part-
ners the spokes, under the Rebalance, Washington wanted allies to do more to sustain 
the existing security order. This was in part about sharing the burden of security order 
provision, but was also about making it more flexible and nimble, allowing it a wider 
geographic expanse in which to be effective. It was also about broadening the polit-
ical base for the US regional role. A more integrated security order in which allies like 
Japan and Australia work together as well as with the United States looks a lot less like 
hegemonism than the asymmetries of the past.
Critics of Obama might suggest that there was nothing especially new here. 
Bush had been keen on allies doing more, individually and collectively. But in 
other respects the Rebalance was rather more novel. The United States had long 
been ambivalent about regional multilateralism. While not outright opposed to 
the various multilateral institutions and structures that had been created in the 
1990s and early 2000s, it had shown neither significant leadership in any initiative 
nor any particular enthusiasm beyond a Clinton- era focus on APEC.11 The criti-
cism that the Bush administration had neglected the region was most on the mark 
in relation to regional institutions with summits regularly skipped, most notably 
the ASEAN Regional Forum.12 Commitment to and participation in multilat-
eralism was a key third dimension of Obama’s Asia policy.13 The United States 
joined the East Asia Summit, notably acceding to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (albeit with some opt- out clauses), and joined the efforts to make it a 
“peak” regional institution. Equally, the United States ensured high level and con-
sistent participation across the board such as Hillary Clinton’s 100 per cent record 
attending ARF meetings. Also, Obama hosted the first US– ASEAN Leaders’ 
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There were a number of reasons for putting such an emphasis on multilateral 
engagement. Most immediately, commitment to these bodies signalled very directly 
Asia’s importance to the United States. The conventional wisdom in Washington is 
that one can measure the significance of an issue by the amount of time the senior 
leaders, and in particular the President, spends on it. By committing not only to 
make up for the Bush administration’s perceived neglect of regional institutions, 
but to make ASEAN engagement a high- profile commitment, Obama could in very 
visible ways communicate his priority on the region. And while Asian multilateral 
institutions have been criticised for being little more than exercises in political 
theatre,14 there was an intent to the US emphasis as well. In the first instance, the 
United States saw these bodies as having good potential to broaden the support for 
maintaining the US role in a changing region. Through regular engagement with 
institutions in which it is one amongst equals, Washington felt it could strengthen 
the political consensus around its regional role. Relatedly, the political intent was 
also about buttressing the underlying status quo. Whether they were right to make 
this judgement is a separate issue but the White House saw in regional bodies 
like the EAS and APEC, and ASEAN in particular, an existing set of institutional 
means to strengthen the existing regional order in the face of disruptions caused 
by China’s rise and its growing power and ambition.
In the past, US policy had benefited from the alignment between the economic 
and security interests of most regional states; the United States was the most 
important market and source of foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as the 
predominant military power. This made the pursuit of its strategic interests much 
more straightforward. The Obama administration realised that China’s centrality 
in regional production chains and the growing asymmetric economic relationship 
with virtually every regional economy, meant that this could no longer be relied 
upon. The United States would need to actively pursue an economic strategy in 
the region to support its security policy, and saw in the Trans- Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) a means through which it could yoke economic and strategic interests. The 
United States had not initially launched the TPP, but once it became the centre-
piece of the economic side of US Asia policy it became the most important player, 
not surprising given that the United States remains the world’s biggest developed 
market. And in trying to sell the agreement to a sceptical and increasingly mer-
cantilist minded Congress, Obama made clear the true geoeconomic intent of the 
TPP. That is, to ensure the trading interests of Asian countries are in line with 
America’s vision for the region, for it was those interests that appeared to be the 
most immediate risk to the status quo.15
Even though Obama had emphasised Asia and the distinctiveness of his 
Rebalance to the region, his approach represented more in the way of continu-
ation than change in US regional policy. The emphases on multilateralism and 
geoeconomics were novel. Yet they were in the service of a status quo security 
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policy. With the surprising election of Donald J. Trump on 8 November 2016, that 
all looked set to change.
Expectations of President Trump’s Asia policy
The results of the US election began to come through to East Asia in the late 
morning of 9 November 2016. As his victory went from unlikely to certain, policy 
makers, analysts and scholars tried to figure out what Trump might mean for the 
region. Virtually all had assumed Hillary Clinton would win and that her policy 
would be a continuation of Obama’s Pivot, perhaps with a few sharper edges.16 But 
Trump’s campaign had not really focused on foreign policy, beyond trade, and had 
made almost no mention of the region as a whole. The only regional issue that had 
had any prominence was his threat to ditch the TPP and start what would effect-
ively be a trade war with China. In an interview with the New York Times during 
the campaign, he claimed that allies in the region were getting a free ride and 
would have to pay for their security guarantees or have them withdrawn. When his 
interlocutors pointed out that that might cause Japan and South Korea to acquire 
their own nuclear weapons, he evinced virtually no concern.17
Trump’s unorthodoxy as a candidate and his lack of political experience meant 
that, prior to taking office, no one could say with any confidence whether or not 
these threats would be carried out. Would alliances be trashed in favour of a 
nativist approach to America’s global role? Would the world’s two biggest econ-
omies really engage in trade warfare? Or was it all campaign bluster? No one could 
say with any degree of certainty. As a result, analysts began to examine public 
comments and publications produced by figures who were going into the admin-
istration. Significant emphasis was put on a piece by Peter Navarro and Alexander 
Gray. Navarro was to be part of a newly created National Trade Council and who 
was purported to have particular sway over China policy. The piece intimated 
that Trump’s approach to Asia would follow what was purported to be the 
Reagan approach to the Soviet Union of pursuing peace from a position of mili-
tary strength.18 This promised a massive ramping up of military expenditure with 
the intent of staring down all challengers. A trade war and an arms race looked 
like they might be in the offing, fundamentally changing US security policy in 
the region.
As the days and weeks of the transition unfolded, more disconcerting signals 
were sent about what Trump might mean for the region. Perhaps none more so 
was the telephone conversation with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing- wen. Since 
the cessation of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, no president or president- 
elect has communicated directly with the leader of the Republic of China. The 
call was carefully planned and communicated effusively.19 But quite what it meant 
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the anchor of its regional engagement since the 1970s? Or was this a first step in 
some grand bargain with the PRC in which Taiwan would be offered up as part 
of a neo- Kissingerian deal to carve Asia up into security spheres of influence? 
With the wilfully unpredictable former TV star turned president no one could 
say. And when Rex Tillerson said that China should be barred from access to the 
disputed islands in the South China Sea during his Senate confirmation hearings, 
the administration looked as though it were on a collision course with the region’s 
most important resident power.20
President- elect Trump appeared to promise an almost complete repudiation 
of the Obama legacy. Certainly, in many areas of government policy he appeared 
to take instinctively anti- Obama positions. Signature Obama policies, like health 
care and immigration reform, were a particular focus of ire. As Thomas Wright of 
Brookings pointed out, Trump was a politician of few hard convictions, but trade 
policy was one exception. He has been consistently mercantilist since the 1980s 
and seemed particularly put out by large- scale multilateral agreements.21 Trump’s 
“America First” rhetoric of the campaign promised that a wounded nationalism 
would lead to a narrow transactionalism, and zero- sum thinking would replace 
the liberal internationalism that had driven Washington’s global role. Asia policy 
seemed set for a radical transformation.
Trump’s Asia policy: Continuity and neglect
After two years in office, the most striking feature of the US approach to regional 
security under President Trump is the extent to which it retains most of the key 
features of Obama’s approach. There are some notable exceptions, most obviously 
the ramping up of rhetorical pressure on North Korea and a shift in tone towards 
China, but there is far more continuity than change between Obama and Trump. 
In many respects, Trumpian policy is effectively Obama policy with the added 
dimension of bellicose rhetoric and without the overarching strategic vision of his 
predecessor.
US security policy in Asia had been predicated on the perpetuation of military 
primacy and a “congagement” approach to China which attempted to bind the 
PRC’s interests to the prevailing security order. Trump entered office evidently 
looking to use the former to overturn the latter. Yet in spite of flirting with Taiwan 
and hard- line rhetoric on the PRC, security relations with China are striking for 
their broad continuity.22 Trump formally honoured the One China policy early 
on in his presidency,23 and focused on building a good personal rapport with Xi 
Jinping in the early months of his presidency. At the Mar- a- Lago meeting in April 
2017 they agreed to establish a formal process for managing inter- governmental 
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Strategic policy has taken a more stern declaratory policy – with the PRC figuring 
more explicitly as a geopolitical rivalry – and there has been an increase in the tempo 
of freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea,25 a militarised contest-
ation has not materialised and indeed Washington looks as though it has found a 
way to live with what Beijing has done in Southeast Asia’s contested waters. And 
the one security domain in which Trump has made change – in relation to North 
Korea – requires the cultivation of Beijing. Put simply, the state of Sino- American 
security relations stands some way from the revolution threatened in late 2016.
Equally, allies who were concerned that Trump may be prepared to make them 
pay for protection were particularly worried by a difficult first phone call between 
Trump and the Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull.26 If an ally as close 
as Australia could be treated as badly as Turnbull had been, and so publicly, then 
what lay in store for the others? Yet within weeks of the inauguration, key senior 
figures in the administration were sent on a series of “reassurance tours”.27 Vice 
President Mike Pence, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and then Secretary of State 
Rex Tillerson, were dispatched to the region to reassure allies and partners that the 
underlying purpose, structure and funding of US regional strategy were going to 
remain as they had been in the past.
Yet even though the initial fears that the United States was going to undercut its 
alliances or radically transform the financial arrangements of security guarantees 
have been assuaged, South Korea, Australia, Japan and others remain unsettled 
by Trump. During the campaign Trump indicated he wanted allies to do more 
for themselves, although perhaps the message was communicated in a somewhat 
rough fashion. The fact of his election and the uncertainties that it has prompted 
has led many in the region to begin to do just that. Although there has been no 
major change to US strategy, in form or function, as yet, Trump has still had a 
noticeable impact upon the region’s security arrangements as Asian states begin to 
take steps to better look after themselves. After all, an America that elected Trump 
is not the country that allies had come to expect. And the issue of increasing the 
financial contributions of host nations remains a fixation of the administration, 
leaving partners jittery about the longer- term future.
It was on one of those tours that Vice President Pence announced probably 
the greatest surprise of Trump’s Asia policy in its first twelve months:  that the 
President would attend APEC and the gaggle of meetings that comprise the 
region’s multilateral summit season in November 2017.28 Not only was Trump 
cosying up to China that year, he was going to partake in that most quintessen-
tially Obama move: engagement with regional institutions. Typically, it was not all 
smooth sailing. Prior to the trip the White House announced that Trump would 
not ultimately go to the EAS, but at the last minute changed tack again to say 
he was going, only finally skipping out at the last minute. Notwithstanding some 
clumsy handling, Trump did go and comported himself more effectively than 
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North Korea policy has been the most visible facet of US security policy in Asia 
under Trump and arguably where he has most visibly broken with the past. Within 
five months of coming to office the administration announced the era of “strategic 
patience” was over.30 The US policy would now be one of “maximum pressure” in 
which Washington upped the ante of sanctions – pursuing not only a tighter and 
more closely enforced regime but also imposing secondary sanctions as well – and 
adopted a dangerously bellicose public diplomacy. Clearly this was a ratcheting 
up of pressure and a break with Obama’s approach. But it also reflected the reality 
that the DPRK was within touching distance of achieving its long- held nuclear 
ambitions. Trump met with Kim in a visually powerful summit in Singapore in 
June 2018. The meeting delivered little but a break in the tensions that Trump had 
ratcheted up. The North remains a long way from denuclearisation and Trump 
looks increasingly to have been played by Pyongyang. But beyond North Korea 
policy, which in spite of its weighty nuclear dimensions remains a crisis manage-
ment exercise, in its big strategic dimensions, Trump’s policy maintains the direc-
tion of Obama which in turn was largely in keeping with US policy in the region 
over the past decades.
Trump’s approach to Asia is most visibly different from his predecessors in the 
trade sphere. The Obama administration tried to use economic policy to sustain the 
old alignment of economic and security interests that was being disrupted by China’s 
rise. In walking away from trade agreements and adopting a narrowly instrumental 
approach to trade and economic relations, Trump is unwittingly strengthening 
China’s position and undermining US security policy as it is widening the gap 
between regional countries’ economic and security interests. It also risks adding an 
overtly politicised dimension to regional economics. But Trump has brought about 
some important changes to the US approach to the region.
A further change in the US approach to Asia from Obama to Trump is the 
lowering in the importance of values in American priorities. For Obama, US 
policy was about advancing American interests in regional security, prosperity and 
human dignity.31 Each component was given equal weighting and seen as mutu-
ally reinforcing. For the Trump administration the third pillar, relating to human 
rights, democracy and freedom, is of much lesser importance. These ideas barely 
figure in public remarks by the President or senior officials in relation to Asia, nor 
indeed do they seem to be particularly emphasised in any aspect of US foreign 
policy. Where in the past the US vision of the region saw peace, prosperity and the 
advancement of liberal values as mutually reinforcing, the Trump administration 
sees economic and security questions as separate from, and of greater import-
ance than, questions of values and rights. The United States has not completely 
walked away from any commitment to these issues – the theme of Trump’s APEC 
speech was a ‘free and open Indo- Pacific’,32 the rhetoric of which was embellished 
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The Obama administration’s approach to Asia was in keeping with the longer 
run trends in US regional policy. It also reflected the continuing belief that 
China’s economic rise could be compatible with the prevailing regional order and 
America’s place at the centre of that order. Whether informed by the idea that 
an increasingly wealthy China would become more liberal, or just by the notion 
that a China that is prosperous and economically integrated with its neighbours 
has no incentive to disrupt the region, up until Trump’s election, the view from 
Washington was that China could find wealth and satisfaction in a region in which 
the United States maintained its current position. In 2017 it became clear, due 
both to the actions and activities of the PRC as well as the response of the United 
States, that that view no longer has the grip it once did in Washington. Indeed, 
Trump’s administration seems to have believed that long- term geopolitical com-
petition amongst great powers is the central feature of world politics.33 If Obama’s 
policy represented a broadly liberal internationalist outlook on the region and its 
dynamics, Trump’s approach has so far been informed by a strong dose of real-
politik. This was perhaps most clearly articulated in the National Security Strategy 
released late in 2017 which states:
These [great power] competitions require the United States to rethink the pol-
icies of the past two decades – policies based on the assumption that engage-
ment with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global 
commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. For 
the most part, this premise turned out to be false.34
If these ideas are acted upon then Trump’s approach to trade and his approach to 
the broader dynamics of security would mark the end of a broadly liberal American 
foreign policy and the start of a more realist and nationalist outlook in US policy.
It is tempting to see in the mercantilism of Trump’s trade policy and the realism 
of his security strategy a coherent worldview and a decisive break with the past 
based on that philosophy. Notwithstanding the changes outlined above, the puzzle 
of Trump’s Asia policy to date is that even though he seems to evince an out-
look at odds with what has come before him, US Asia policy has not substantially 
changed.
The continuity with Obama policy alongside the absence of what can be 
described as joined- up thinking has led some to describe US policy as being on 
autopilot. As Aaron Connelly observes, in spite of the odd tweet and snarling 
press conference, US regional policy ‘is charting a pre- programmed course, much 
of it last mapped during the Obama administration’.35 To date there has been 
little evidence of an “America First” agenda in US security policy. The most not-
able feature of Trump’s approach to the region is a strong emphasis on bilateral 
relationships. That is, rather than think about US security interests in the region as 
a whole, whether conceived as East Asia, Asia Pacific or Indo- Pacific, US interests 
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narrow, instrumental and largely driven by crisis. There is no evidence of a big 
picture vision of America’s regional ambitions and consequently little attempt to 
match statecraft and resources to drive those ambitions. Instead policy is highly 
reactive, driven by instincts and concerns about optics. Crucially, it is poorly 
resourced.
At the time of writing in early 2019, crucial posts in the machinery of US 
Asia policy remain unfilled. The Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, Susan 
Thornton, remains in an acting capacity as the White House refuses to endorse her 
in a permanent capacity. The equivalent post in the Defense Department, Randall 
Schriver, was appointed on 8 January 2018. The Asia section of the National 
Security Council, a vital coordinating body for regional policy, remains badly 
understaffed. Meanwhile, ambassadorial posts to South Korea, Australia and 
Singapore were vacant for most of the first two years. Given the importance of the 
region to US security interests and to the broader international system, why has 
US policy been one of autopilot, at best, if not downright neglect at worst?
Even those who expected Trump to bring about significant changes to US 
international policy, whether in Asia or elsewhere, did not expect revolution to 
be achieved immediately. The US government is vast and its inertial qualities are 
tremendous. US policy in Asia has pursued the aims of regional primacy and the 
means of bilateral alliance relationships and open markets for decades. To change 
either the ends or the means of the country’s Asia policy would take significant 
effort, and time. The question thus is whether Trump has a different set of policy 
ends in mind. Is he prepared to expend the energy to change that policy, and over 
what time might one reasonably expect to see change?
Since Trump’s inauguration, there has been a major cleavage within the West 
Wing between what is effectively an orthodox Republican foreign policy posture 
and the nativist “America First” outlook of Peter Navarro, Steven Miller and (the 
now ousted) Steve Bannon, amongst others. This division and the efforts of the 
two sides to capture what both seem to think is the open market of the President’s 
attention is one factor in the slow- moving nature of US Asia policy. To date, the 
lack of significant shifts away from the underlying pattern set by Obama and his 
predecessors seems to indicate that Trump’s Asia policy represents the victory of 
the orthodox wing of the administration. What is less clear is whether the pattern 
so far, of US security policy as largely a continuation of the Obama period, will 
persist or whether this is a temporary state of affairs with more significant changes 
yet to come.
The other important reason for the continuity of US security policy in 
Asia – albeit in a somewhat bureaucratically anaemic state – is the absence of 
serious alternatives. While Trump’s campaign was filled with overheated rhet-
oric and ideas at some remove from US government business as usual, as the 
presidency has progressed it has become increasingly clear that much of the 
bombast was little  more than rhetoric. Trump and his team do not appear to 
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have a well- developed view of America’s global role, whether “America First”, 
Kissingerian realpolitik, or any other. To shift US policy in the region requires 
a well thought through alternative and not only does none currently exist, there 
is little evidence that any effort is being put into new policy development. All 
signs thus far indicate that US policy in Asia is likely to continue to be broadly 
in keeping with the past, but that it will be shaped by a reactive administration 
fond of theatrics and bluster. Relations with China may become more fraught, 
particularly if trade tensions spike or if the United States decides to push back on 
Chinese maritime activity.
The ability of the radicals to shift policy will depend on their ability not only to 
generate compelling new policies in the face of well- marshalled orthodox oppos-
ition, but also to capture the imagination of the President. Trump appears to like 
muscularity in foreign policy and regional security policy is premised on US pri-
macy. One of the problems US policy faces is that while Trump is clearly nativist 
on trade policy, he has been fairly orthodox in terms of strategic policy. This 
means that the current settings are likely to remain as they are, with a significant 
line of tension between a strategic status quo and a revisionism on trade policy. 
Ultimately, it seems that US Asia policy to 2020 will look much as it did between 
2016 and 2018.
Conclusion
Over the past half- decade or so, Asia’s security landscape has shifted decisively. 
From the late 1970s until around 2010 the region was notable for its geopolit-
ical stability and its remarkable growth in economic prosperity. That has begun to 
change. The region’s key powers all feel unsettled by the shifting power dynamics 
with a more prosperous and powerful China prompting increased uncertainty. 
The election of Donald Trump in 2016 seemed to underline a second long- term 
source of that shift in the region’s security setting. Since 2008 the United States 
had cut a more cautious figure in the region. Obama’s Rebalance sought to recali-
brate US policy to sustain its long- term primacy in the face of a rising China while 
reducing its risk profile. This led to a decline in American strategic credibility as its 
dependability was being openly questioned.
Trump has exacerbated that trend. The United States is seen not only as in 
long- term relative decline in influence, but its political leadership has turned 
inward. Prior to 2016 few would have deemed credible that a candidate as nativist 
as Donald Trump would win the nomination of a major party, let alone capture 
the White House. And it is this double movement – China’s growing power and 
assertiveness, and uncertainty about American influence and purpose  – which 
has unsettled the region’s security environment most of all. Trump’s election has 
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opened a door for China to increase its influence in the region, which it is plainly 
trying to do. Equally, US allies and partners are beginning to explore ways by 
which they can become less dependent on Washington.
Since the Sino- American rapprochement, the United States has sought to 
retain its position as the pre- eminent power in the region. After a brief period 
in the mid- 1990s in which it looked as though it might retreat, the United States 
has committed to retaining its posture. In the past this kept the region stable 
because at the time the United States was, in the words of the late Singaporean 
statesman Lee Kuan Yew, the region’s ‘least distrusted power’. Yet as China has 
become more confident and capable, the likely implications of the United States 
seeking to retain its military position are growing rivalry and contestation. 
The problem the region faces is that in pursuing essentially the same strategic 
policy nearly two decades into the twenty- first century as it did in the late 1990s, 
Washington is now contributing to regional instability and not assuaging it. One 
of the possibilities that Trump held out in the transition period, of a grand stra-
tegic bargain with China, offered a break from this. However, as the prospects of 
that occurring seem to have dissipated, US policy has reverted to its long- term 
pattern; scholars and analysts should recognise that maintaining the same policy 
now has a different set of strategic implications than it did at the turn of the 
millennium.
The Obama legacy in Asia is something of a paradox. On the one hand his 
strong emphasis on the region indicated that this part of the world would be 
the top priority for the world’s most important economic and military power. 
On the other, the vision for the United States in the region was one of reduced 
capacity and leadership. Informed by the somewhat naïve view that China and 
indeed all regional countries could prosper and find satisfaction in a part of 
the world in which the United States forever remained the dominant power, 
Washington acted as if nothing really had changed. Some adjustments in the 
disposition of its forces might be necessary; some broadening of the polit-
ical base of US policy would help. Yet the underlying view was that the basic 
settings were fine.
Xi Jinping’s China has shown us that this was a misplaced view. China sees 
the US role in the region – at least as it has been over the past few decades – as 
ultimately incompatible with it achieving its long- term interests. It has begun to 
take steps to provide alternative leadership, to secure its interests and to create a 
different international environment from that which has prevailed. Across its first 
two years in office, the Trump administration apparently failed to realise the scale 
of the challenge China presents, and until it can develop a larger- scale strategic 
outlook and grapple with China’s ambition, then the US position in the region will 
continue the erosion that began under George W. Bush, and that was increased by 
Obama. Trump’s Asia policy, in contrast to the surface appearances, is entirely in 
keeping with long- term trends.
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A grand strategic transition? Obama, Trump 
and the Asia Pacific political economy
Michael Mastanduno
Introduction
Hegemony and balancing are alternative foreign policy strategies available to 
powerful states in the international system. A state pursuing a hegemonic strategy 
seeks to create and preserve an order, regionally or globally, that reflects and 
reinforces its values and interests.1 It strives to provide sufficient benefits so that 
other states prove willing to support that hegemonic order and the special role of 
the hegemonic state within it.2 Alternatively, a state that adopts a balancing strategy 
acknowledges the existence of “peer competitors” with their own conceptions of 
regional or global order. It may compete or at times cooperate with those states but 
does not expect to incorporate them into its own order.
Balance of power or hegemony? For roughly seventy years, the United States 
has resolved this fundamental grand strategic question. During the Cold War, 
successive US administrations pursued a global balancing strategy against the 
Soviet Union but embedded within it regional hegemonic strategies in Western 
Europe and East Asia. The latter included the creation of durable alliances and 
the re- orienting of former adversaries – Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia – 
into partners supportive of US- inspired economic and security orders. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, post- war administrations sought to broaden and 
deepen the US hegemonic order. The United States cast itself as indispensable to 
global order and as the self- appointed regional stabiliser in Europe, Asia and the 
Middle East. It sought to entice Russia and China, despite not being US security 
allies, to follow the post- war German and Japanese examples and partner with 
Washington in support of an international order informed by US values and 
interests.3
The Trump administration is the first in the post- war era to question expli-
citly the desirability of America’s hegemonic aspiration and the durability of its 
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to depart from order maintenance in favour of the more transactional politics of 
the balance of power. Its National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2017 explicitly casts 
China and Russia as competitors, rather than as potential partners in the US hege-
monic project.
Strategic transitions are neither simple nor straightforward, and in its first two 
years the Trump administration struggled to articulate and carry out a coherent 
grand strategy. Whether it can develop and implement an alternative to hegemony 
remains to be seen. But it has taken the initial steps to reframe the US stra-
tegic debate from its post- Cold War emphasis on means  – how best to pursue 
hegemony – to ends – whether to pursue hegemony at all.
This chapter focuses on the transition from Presidents Obama to Trump with 
emphasis on the political economy of the Asia Pacific. Throughout the post- war 
era, US foreign economic policies have been shaped significantly by broader geo-
political and security strategies. This is true for both Obama and Trump. For 
Obama, the pursuit of hegemony using more limited means dictated a regional 
shift to the Asia Pacific. His administration devised an economic strategy that 
complemented this geopolitical approach and simultaneously reaffirmed America’s 
traditional role as leader of a liberalising world economy. For Trump, the overall 
rejection of America’s hegemonic project has been accompanied by a departure 
from America’s traditional leadership role in the world economy in favour of a 
more nationalist and transactional approach to foreign economic relations.
The next section reviews the Obama administration’s Asia Pacific economic 
strategy in the context of its larger geopolitical strategy. The following sections link 
Trump’s worldview, its implications for grand strategy, and the administration’s 
initial approach to the Asia Pacific. A  concluding section considers Trump’s 
departure from Obama’s policies and how US strategy in the Asia Pacific from 
early 2019 might evolve over the remainder of Trump’s tenure.
The Obama administration: Hegemony’s last gasp?
The 1990s were the golden age of American hegemony. George H.  W. Bush 
ended the Cold War peacefully on Western terms, and his Defense Department 
outlined a strategy such that no peer competitor might challenge America’s new- 
found pre- eminent position.4 The Clinton administration moved the hegemonic 
project forward by reaffirming the US presence in the Asia Pacific and Europe 
through a strategy of deep engagement. Under the “Washington Consensus”, US 
officials celebrated open trade and financial markets and the American model of 
deregulated capitalism.
The tragedy of 11 September 2001 shifted the means to assert US hegemony 
rather than the goal itself. George W. Bush’s National Security Strategy of 2002 
proclaimed the end of great power rivalry and that all major states stood with the 
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United States against global terrorism.5 Bush turned his attention from traditional 
great power politics to the periphery of the international system. In the face of a 
new threat he overcame America’s Vietnam era- inspired reluctance to intervene 
and engaged US forces directly in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Barack Obama embraced the hegemonic responsibility he inherited yet faced 
a more constrained domestic and international setting. Whereas Bush enjoyed 
the domestic discretion to start two conflicts, Obama faced an American public 
weary of what had become long, costly and inconclusive wars in the Middle East. 
The global financial crisis of 2007/ 8 and subsequent deep recession compounded 
the problem and reinforced Obama’s instinct that US hegemonic strategy would 
have to make do with limited means.6 The United States could no longer, as John 
F.  Kennedy once proclaimed it could, ‘pay any price and bear any burden’ to 
achieve its foreign policy objectives. In Obama’s own words, ‘I refuse to set goals 
that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests.’7 Choices would 
have to be made.
The logic of Obama’s signature geopolitical move, the so- called “Pivot”, was 
simple.8 US hegemony after the Cold War centred on engagement in three key 
regions, Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. After 9/ 11, the United States had 
overinvested attention and resources in one region. It needed to shift attention 
(“Rebalance”) to the Asia Pacific, which had become both the core of the global 
economy and the setting for the possible emergence of a peer competitor, China.
The intended central messages of the Pivot were clear and consistent with the 
US hegemonic project. One message was designed for friends and allies in the 
region, who understandably questioned America’s staying power in the Asia Pacific 
considering its preoccupation and (over)commitment for a decade in the Middle 
East. The Pivot meant to convey that the United States, as a “resident power” in 
East Asia, had every intention of remaining in the neighbourhood to pursue its 
economic and security interests while also serving as a regional stabiliser, whether 
on the Korean Peninsula, in the South China Sea, or elsewhere.9
The second message, intended for China, was more nuanced. On one hand, 
and as Chinese leaders suspected, the Pivot suggested a US willingness to contain 
China, should that become necessary. The United States planned to strengthen its 
existing alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia and increase its regional 
military presence. Obama’s team resisted China’s provocations in the South China 
Sea and emphasised freedom of navigation, or the enforcement of rules that 
favoured superior US naval power. As the two countries jockeyed for position in 
East Asia, it is not surprising that a so- called trust deficit emerged in the bilateral 
relationship.10
On the other hand, the operational vagueness of Obama’s Pivot opened space 
for an alternative message, namely that the United States preferred, as it had for the 
past two decades, to continue cooperation and engagement with China. The world’s 
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across trade, finance and investment. Particularly during the financial crisis, the 
Obama team encouraged the idea of joint US– China leadership in the world 
economy. America’s market was most significant for Chinese exports, and China’s 
willingness to purchase and hold US Treasury bonds reinforced for the United 
States the hegemonic privilege of enjoying low inflation and stable growth without 
having to raise taxes or sacrifice consumption or military spending.
The Bush administration had proposed the term “responsible stakeholder” to 
convey that China had benefited greatly from its integration into the American- 
led world economy, and in return needed to do its part to ensure global stability, 
defined in terms of the priorities of the US foreign policy agenda.11 Obama’s team 
embraced China’s promise as a responsible stakeholder. The President frequently 
stated that the United States ‘welcomed the rise of China’ and characterised US– 
China relations as the most important bilateral relationship of our time.12 The 
administration took opportunities to deepen bilateral cooperation (e.g. the US– 
China Economic and Strategic Dialogue) and to celebrate initiatives in which 
China demonstrated responsibility, such as in the Paris climate change negoti-
ations. Although to some Obama’s willingness to steer between engagement and 
containment seemed indecisive, to others the Pivot offered an appropriate com-
bination of incentives and threats in the face of uncertain Chinese foreign policy 
intentions. “Congagement” – an awkward term coined at the end of the 1990s – 
captured the spirit of Obama’s strategy.13
The economic dimension of Obama’s hegemonic strategy
The Pivot was Obama’s key strategic initiative and participation in the TPP (Trans- 
Pacific Partnership) was its main supporting economic component. At one level 
the TPP was simply a regional trade agreement, albeit a vast one involving twelve 
countries whose economies collectively accounted for 37 per cent of global GDP.14 
But for the Obama administration the TPP had intrinsic strategic significance, 
as a tangible sign of both US commitment to the Asia Pacific and US leadership 
in developing the rules of the global economy. Hegemonic states view them-
selves as establishing and exercising rule- making authority. President Obama was 
unusually explicit on this, stating in an official press release that ‘we can’t let coun-
tries like China write the rules of the global economy’.15 His Trade Representative 
echoed this sentiment, calling the TPP an ‘unprecedented opportunity to update 
the rules of the road’.16 Although it was unusual for a Defense Secretary to weigh 
in on a trade agreement, Ashton Carter noted publicly that ‘passing the TPP is as 
important to me as another aircraft carrier’.17
The rules put forth by the TPP reflected both US economic interests and 
America’s preferred approach to trade liberalisation. Since the formation of the 
WTO in the early 1990s, the United States has pushed for “behind the border” 
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political economies including in the areas of services, intellectual property, invest-
ment, rules of origin, state- owned enterprises, and government procurement. The 
TPP, as a “high standard” trade agreement, also established strong labour and 
environmental regulations.18
As the United States turned the TPP into a strategic and economic priority, 
the stakes increased for others. Japan had initially been reluctant to participate 
but came on board under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who proved willing to 
defy Japan’s powerful agricultural lobby to support the strategic initiative of his 
country’s most important security ally. As a technologically- advanced economy, 
Japan also stood to benefit from stronger behind- the- border rules.19 Australia 
envisioned an expansion of its agricultural exports, and Singapore anticipated 
gains in trans- Pacific shipping services. For Vietnam, the TPP promised market 
access for its exports, international pressure (that Vietnam welcomed) to accel-
erate its domestic economic reforms, and the opportunity to forge closer strategic 
ties with Washington in the face of rising China.20
The geopolitical stakes were highest for China. From the perspective of the 
United States, the purpose of the TPP was not to exclude China but to force it into 
a difficult choice. In an echo of early post- war US offers to the Soviet Union to join 
the Bretton Woods system, the Obama administration signalled that it welcomed 
China’s participation, but on American terms. China’s dilemma was obvious. On 
the one hand, it did not want to sit on the side- lines if the TPP ultimately defined 
the economic architecture of the Asia Pacific. On the other, it could not easily 
sign on to rules promoted by the United States and embedded within the TPP. 
Those rules posed a direct challenge to China’s model of state capitalism, including 
its support for state- owned enterprises, its penchant for industrial policy, and its 
laissez-faire approach to intellectual property protection.
Not surprisingly, an increasingly powerful China sought to play its own role 
in regional rule- making. As an alternative to the TPP it embraced the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a “low standard” initiative that 
focused at the border rather than behind it and excluded the United States. China’s 
President Xi Jinping also implemented the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative to 
develop the infrastructure of regional neighbours and to provide an outlet for 
China’s excess capacity in construction materials.21 By the end of Obama’s term, 
a rule- making competition emerged, with China promoting a Eurasian highway 
friendly to state- led capitalism, and the United States pushing for behind- the- 
border, market- led agreements, the TPP and TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership), at either end of it.
By embracing the TPP, the Obama administration assured that its regional 
economic strategy complemented its overall geopolitical one. Just as contain-
ment of the Soviet Union had been accompanied by an economic embargo, and 
US alliances with Western Europe and Japan were cemented by interdependent 
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preserve hegemony with more limited means. It signalled to traditional US allies 
like Japan, the Philippines and Australia, as well as to China, that America intended 
to reassert its familiar hegemonic position at the centre of global economic man-
agement and to drive forward international economic rules that reflected US ideo-
logical preferences and economic interests.
Support for the TPP was also consistent with America’s preference ordering for 
types of international trade agreements. Global, multilateral agreements were the 
best option whenever possible. Regional agreements were a respectable second- 
best when multilateral efforts faltered. This logic led the United States to promote 
NAFTA in the early 1990s when the Uruguay Round stalled, and to push the TPP 
and TTIP when the Doha Round faltered. Bilateralism was the relatively least- 
favoured option, a last resort to maintain forward momentum while multilateral 
or regional agendas played out. Reflecting the close connection between security 
and economic policies, US officials often negotiated bilateral trade agreements 
to strengthen security ties with key US allies such as Israel, Jordan, Bahrain and 
South Korea.
Obama’s promotion of the TPP was also in keeping with the traditional role 
post- war American presidents played at the intersection of domestic and inter-
national political economies. Protectionist pressures typically emanate from 
import- sensitive societal interests and are given political voice by members 
of Congress. The presidential task has been to buy off protectionist interests 
selectively, but more importantly to deflect broader protectionist sentiment by 
mobilising export interests (e.g. large transnational firms), and promising to open 
markets abroad.22 Market access abroad was the hegemonic response to protec-
tionist pressure at home. The TPP, by offering to US multinationals the promise 
of state- of- the- art liberalisation in the global economy’s most dynamic region, did 
just that.
Trump: From hegemony to balancing?
Any analysis that extrapolates enduring foreign policy patterns from the early 
experience of a new administration must proceed with caution. In the case of 
President Trump, additional caveats are in order. The range of policy uncertainty 
is much greater since Trump is an inexperienced president with limited know-
ledge of foreign affairs, is prone to make and retreat from provocative threats, and 
is inclined to say (or tweet) one thing today and its opposite tomorrow.23 Across 
the first two years of his time in office, Trump has consistently conflated his 
personal interests and the national interest, as suggested by his unwillingness to 
acknowledge Russian interference in the election he won and his efforts to derail 
official investigations that might implicate him or his family members. Finally, 
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Every administration experiences some divisions between the president, polit-
ical appointees and the permanent government. In Trump’s first two years, those 
divisions were profound.24 Nevertheless, since the president is America’s top deci-
sion maker, it is important to analyse Trump’s international perspective even 
though it may be neither fully shared by other high officials nor consistently 
translated into policy.
Trump’s worldview
US presidents typically disavow the policies of their opposing party predecessors, 
and Trump is no exception. But he is an exception in disavowing central tenets of 
post- war America’s overall approach to foreign policy. Three related departures 
stand out. First, Trump is an unapologetic nationalist who perceives a stark 
dichotomy between America’s national interest and international commitments. 
Post- war American presidents, whether Republicans or Democrats, have typically 
viewed national interest and international commitments as complements rather 
than substitutes. For Trump it is one or the other; when he announced his inten-
tion to withdraw the United States from the Paris Climate agreement in June 2017, 
he stated that ‘I was elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris.’25
Second, Trump emphasises transactions rather than relationships. Post- war 
US foreign policy has been built on enduring relationships including long- term 
commitments to allies, confrontational approaches to perceived adversaries, 
and sustained engagement with states (e.g. China) that might be coaxed into 
becoming US supporters. Trump views international relations as more episodic. 
Foreign policy is a sequence of deals, some good (“America wins”) and some bad 
(“foreigners win”). Bad deals, such as the US– South Korea trade agreement or 
the Iranian nuclear agreement, need to be abandoned or renegotiated. Trump’s 
criticisms of Japan, South Korea and NATO allies for not paying a fair share of 
alliance costs reframed what American policy makers have normally depicted as 
long- standing commitments of mutual benefit into an undesirable situation in 
which one side was winning economically at the expense of the other.
Third, instead of viewing America, in the words of former Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright, as the “indispensable nation” with obligations and 
commitments to sustain a liberal international order, Trump depicts his country as 
an aggrieved nation over which other states routinely take advantage. Trump does 
not reference American leadership, the international community, the liberal inter-
national order, or the rule of law – common phrases that high officials have long 
used to signal America’s enduring global role and commitments.26 His insistence 
on putting America first suggests that by maintaining international commitments, 
the United States is placing a lower priority on its own interests.
Although Trump is an outlier among post- war US presidents, some have aptly 





The USA in Asia and the Pacific under Trump184
184
Trump projects himself as a populist, giving voice to groups that have been for-
gotten and pledging to “drain the swamp” of Washington elites. Jacksonians are 
tribal, distinguishing insiders from outsiders and promising to lash out dispro-
portionately at those who would dare to provoke an America that would prefer 
to be left alone.27 Trump embraces this tribal perspective at home and abroad. He 
views his domestic support base as left behind by globalisation and besieged by 
foreigners and immigrants. He views the American national tribe as victimised 
by non- state actors and countries, including supposed friends, who have taken 
advantage of America’s generosity and negotiating naïvety.
Trump and grand strategy
To what extent does Trump’s worldview translate into a coherent grand strategy? 
His rhetoric and initial foreign policy suggest some preliminary conclusions. The 
most obvious is the rejection of America’s post- Cold War hegemonic strategy. 
Trump’s team is not inclined to remake the world in America’s image politically 
or economically. Democratisation and human rights have moved to the back of 
the foreign policy agenda, and the President frequently takes the opposite tack 
and praises authoritarian leaders. He views the idea of America as principal pro-
vider of international public goods, whether in trade, the environment, or regional 
security, with suspicion or hostility. Despite Trump’s personal admiration for 
Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, his administration approaches Russia and China as 
geopolitical competitors rather than possible supporters of America’s hegemonic 
project.
The grand strategy most consistent with Trump’s worldview is offshore balan-
cing which, considering America’s current extensive global commitments, would 
involve some degree of retrenchment. The administration’s 2017 National Security 
Strategy posits that the highest priority is to ‘protect the American people, the 
homeland, and the American way of life’.28 The need to rejuvenate the domestic 
economy, strike more advantageous trade deals, and achieve energy ‘dominance’ 
and independence are also cited. These objectives, coupled with the President’s 
beliefs that international commitments and global engagement generate more 
costs than benefits, and that America’s post- war allies are now wealthy enough 
to stand on their own, suggest the strategic desirability of pullback. The Trump 
administration’s early foreign policy, however, neither indicates nor foreshadows 
significant retrenchment.29 Under Trump, the United States has strengthened its 
commitment to NATO, proved unwilling to withdraw from the Middle East (des-
pite the President’s eagerness to do so), and continued engagement as a resident 
power in the Asia Pacific.
If neither hegemony nor retrenchment, then what? The NSS suggests a third 
alternative  – a muscular activism that informs a strategy of onshore balancing, 
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target in the Middle East; Trump officials abandoned the Iranian nuclear deal, re- 
imposed sanctions, and tried to organise a de facto coalition against it to include 
Israel and America’s traditional Sunni allies. In Europe, Russia is the target. The 
Trump administration rotated troops and equipment to Poland and the Baltics, 
provided arms to Ukraine, and increased sanctions in response to Russia’s use of 
force and violation of arms control commitments. In the Asia Pacific, the target is 
China. The Pentagon’s 2017 National Defense Strategy called out China as a revi-
sionist power that had failed as a responsible stakeholder, and the Trump team 
responded by confronting China strategically and economically.30
Trump and the Asia Pacific: Economics and security
Three initiatives stand out in Trump’s opening approach to the Asia Pacific, and 
each represents a departure from the Obama administration. The first is a shift 
in political economy from regionalism and economic liberalism to bilateralism 
and economic nationalism. Second, Trump shifted tactically from confronta-
tion to personal engagement in dealing with North Korea. Third, the administra-
tion clarified China’s role as a great power competitor and lined up US economic 
strategy to support this new strategic direction.
Bilateralism and economic nationalism
The Trump administration’s explicit rejection of the TPP, after a decade of negoti-
ations produced a final agreement, has been the most striking regional step taken 
thus far. Most analysts have pointed to the high costs of US withdrawal, including 
the missed opportunity to shape commercial rules in the world’s most dynamic 
region, the diplomatic uncertainty created for America’s regional partners, and the 
ceding of initiative to China. These costs are highest in the context of an American 
hegemonic strategy. But Trump abandoned that strategy, and thus it was plaus-
ible for him to downplay the costs of withdrawal and emphasise the narrative, 
popular with his political base, that multilateral trade agreements harm the eco-
nomic prospects of ordinary Americans.
Abandoning the TPP created space for bilateralism, Trump’s preferred alterna-
tive to regional or multilateral trade negotiations. During the 2017 APEC Summit 
in Vietnam, Trump offered to ‘make bilateral trade agreements with any Indo- 
Pacific nation that wants to be our partner and that will abide by the principles 
of fair and reciprocal trade’. He also promised that ‘we will no longer enter into 
large agreements that tie our hands, surrender our sovereignty, and make mean-
ingful enforcement practically impossible’.31 Not surprisingly, Trump’s offer fell on 
deaf ears. Asia Pacific countries, including America’s closet regional ally, Japan, 
preferred to move forward with the TPP without the United States rather than 
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negotiations with them. As the remaining eleven nations announced in January 
2018 that they would move forward with the TPP, the Trump administration 
announced restrictions on Asian imports of solar panels and washing machines.32 
In March, Trump shocked the world trading system by using the dubious pre-
text of national security to impose tariffs on international steel and aluminium 
imports.
The administration’s attraction to bilateralism and economic nationalism 
reflects Trump’s mercantilist understanding of the economics of trade. He prefers 
a weaker to a stronger dollar since the former advantages US exporters. He views 
trade as zero- sum rather than positive- sum and understands that it is easier to 
identify winners and losers in bilateral rather than regional or global negotiations. 
Bilateral deficit reduction, rather than the more traditional US objective of market 
access, is the administration’s preferred metric to determine the success of trade 
negotiations and relationships. The administration created new offices, a National 
Trade Council and Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, which quickly 
prioritised bilateral deficit reduction negotiations with states that run trade 
surpluses with the United States, including Japan, Mexico, Germany, South Korea 
and China. Although the administration granted initial exceptions (to Mexico and 
Canada, because they agreed to renegotiate NAFTA) to the steel and aluminium 
tariffs, it waited until late in 2018 to exempt Japanese companies, once it became 
clear that the Japanese government would (reluctantly) engage in bilateral negoti-
ations with the United States.
The shift to economic nationalism and bilateralism complements Trump’s 
rejection of America’s geopolitical and economic strategy of hegemony. Post- 
war American administrations typically espoused the aspiration of international 
economic leadership even if they could not always deliver. The Trump team has 
discarded that role so explicitly that China’s Xi Jinping, notwithstanding his lack 
of fitness for the task, offered to step into the breach and serve as champion of free 
trade and globalisation. Trump has also abandoned the traditional presidential 
gatekeeping role; rather than deflect and turn outward protectionist pressures, his 
administration’s initial inclination has been to encourage protectionist sentiment 
and initiate market restrictions itself.
Dealing with North Korea and China
In its initial two years, the Trump administration treated North Korea as an imme-
diate strategic concern and China as a more profound long- term challenge. In each 
case economic strategy has lined up behind and reinforced the administration’s 
strategic calculations.
Although by 2017 North Korea was already a nascent nuclear power, Trump, 
like Clinton, Bush and Obama before him, treated North Korea as a proliferation 
problem to be resolved rather than as a hostile nuclear power to be deterred. 
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Denuclearisation, however improbable, was the administration’s strategic goal. 
Trump’s departure from past administrations has been tactical, and his diplomatic 
approach has swung wildly. In his first year, he belittled Kim Jong- un personally 
and appeared willing to escalate the conflict to the brink of nuclear war. He subse-
quently reversed course and, in defiance of American diplomatic norm, took the 
unprecedented step of meeting personally with Kim in Singapore in June 2018 and 
Vietnam in February 2019.
Trump’s personal diplomacy failed to generate meaningful progress towards 
denuclearisation. The first summit produced vague commitments and in the 
second Trump walked away without an agreement. Although clearly eager to reach 
one, he proved unwilling to sacrifice the considerable economic leverage the US 
enjoyed without a substantial North Korean commitment to denuclearisation. The 
long- standing US approach – maintaining punishing economic sanctions against 
North Korea until it capitulated on the nuclear issue – remained in place notwith-
standing Trump’s personal rapport with Kim.
On China, Trump’s departure from Obama has been more significant. First, as 
noted above, Trump’s administration gave up hope – however slim it was – that 
China would become America’s responsible stakeholder and made clear that China 
instead is a strategic competitor that must be confronted. An important symbolic 
component of this approach is the Trump administration’s relabelling of the Asia 
Pacific as the Indo- Pacific and its embrace of a Japan- led initiative – the ‘free and 
open Indo- Pacific’.33 To Trump officials, “free and open” means “not dominated by 
China”. Vice President Pence and Secretary of State Pompeo asserted in 2018 that 
the United States would resist China’s assertion of political and military influence 
in the region.34 The Indo- Pacific, in other words, was not large enough to accom-
modate two dominant powers.
The “Indo” part refers to India as much as the Indian Ocean. By embracing 
the term Indo- Pacific, the Trump administration conveyed that America has 
regional options beyond its long- standing allies. It can draw closer to Vietnam, 
a former adversary. It could cultivate a special relationship with India, a rising 
regional power that is also a democracy and a naval power. Though at its early 
stages, the message to China is clear – China may have an ambitious Eurasian land 
strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative, but the “Quad” powers – the United States, 
Japan, Australia and India – are a coalition of maritime powers that could bottle 
up China at sea.
Second, and in a more profound departure from Obama policy, the Trump 
administration has pursued economic containment against China. Prior to Trump, 
American officials hoped that, even if US– China security competition increased, 
economic interdependence and cooperation would be an emergency brake that 
softened and held back bilateral conflict. The Trump team has released that emer-
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Not surprisingly, given the President’s commitment to it, most public attention 
has focused on the US– China tariff war. Trump has referred to himself as a “Tariff 
Man” who believes America can win a trade war because China starts with a size-
able bilateral surplus. During 2018, citing China’s theft of intellectual property and 
other unfair trade practices, Trump introduced $250 billion in tariff increases on 
trade with China – a 25 per cent tariff on US$50 billion of Chinese goods and a 
10 per cent tariff on US$200 billion of Chinese goods. He proposed to increase 
the latter tariffs to 25 per cent unless significant progress was made in ongoing 
US– China trade negotiations.
But there are two deeper US– China economic issues that are likely to persist 
even in the event of a tariff war truce. One is technological rivalry. As Japan learned 
during the 1980s, the United States does not take well to challenges at the techno-
logical frontier. Since China is a security competitor, not a security ally, the United 
States will be even more determined to slow China down. China is determined 
to do the opposite – Xi’s Made in China 2025 project is designed to get China to 
the technological frontier by whatever means necessary – including borrowing or 
stealing advanced technology and pressuring foreign firms to share it as the price 
for access to China’s market and labour force. The Trump administration responded 
by targeting China’s model of state- led capitalism, discouraging American firms 
from cooperating with their Chinese counterparts – most dramatically, the Chinese 
technology giant Huawei – and pressuring its allies to do the same.36
The second deeper issue involves “decoupling”. Over the last twenty- five years, 
US administrations encouraged the US and Chinese economies to become closely 
intertwined. More interdependence was better – the United States celebrated the 
idea of a “G- 2”, or “Chimerica”. To the Trump administration, economic inter-
dependence looks more dangerous than beneficial. It has enabled the Chinese 
challenge that worries American defence officials and has encouraged the 
unfair practices that worry US trade officials. Trump’s Office of the US Trade 
Representative stated that China failed to live up to its reform promises made 
when it joined the WTO in 2001, and suggested that in retrospect, encouraging 
China to join was a strategic mistake.37 Although a complete economic rupture 
with China is obviously impractical, the Trump team wishes to loosen bilateral 
economic ties to make America less dependent and less vulnerable.38 It seeks to 
discourage Chinese investment in the United States, and it would rather American 
businesses invest at home rather than in China.
Obama’s legacy and Trump’s transformation
A central theme of this volume concerns the Obama administration’s foreign policy 
legacy and the durability of its policy initiatives in the Asia (and wider Indo- ) 
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continuity, both in grand strategy and in specific regional initiatives. Its most striking 
departure has been from the strategy and obligations of hegemony, which successive 
US administrations after the Cold War viewed as essential both to US interests and 
global order. Even Obama, who might be described as a reluctant or constrained 
hegemonic actor, was supportive of the overall strategy. While the Trump adminis-
tration has maintained US international activism, it has abandoned both the rhetoric 
and policies of hegemony in favour of “America First” nationalism and a strategy 
of balancing against regional threats. Trump’s international economic strategy, both 
generally and regionally, similarly reflects a sharp discontinuity relative to Obama. 
The Trump team has rejected both America’s multilateral aspirations and its pursuit 
of ambitious, second- best regional economic agreements in favour of bilateralism, 
with a myopic focus on merchandise trade deficits and the routine resort to tariff 
increases rather than market- opening initiatives designed to inhibit behind- the- 
border protectionism.
Trump’s North Korea policy, while certainly dramatic, reflects discontinuity in 
means rather than ends. His administration has embraced Obama’s denuclear-
isation goal while experimenting, sometimes radically, with means to achieve it 
short of war. America’s economic approach to North Korea has continued to rely 
on maintaining multilateral support for comprehensive economic sanctions, while 
pressuring China and others to comply more faithfully. The Trump administration’s 
changes to China policy, however, have been more profound. The hopeful ambi-
guity of Obama’s Pivot has given way to strategic competition. More strikingly, and 
consistent with its combative approach to international economic relations, the 
Trump administration has turned from economic engagement and cooperation, 
designed to turn China in a more accommodating direction, to economic conflict 
and confrontation, designed to hobble what it perceives as China’s inevitable rise 
and challenge.
Which of the foreign policy changes introduced in Trump’s first two years 
are likely to endure? This question must be approached with caution given the 
unpredictability of this president and the overall uncertainty over the extent to 
which his policies have altered fundamentally the character of US global engage-
ment. Given the strength of his personal belief system and of his commitment 
to a narrow domestic political coalition, however, it seems plausible to infer that 
for as long as Trump remains President the United States will not reverse course 
and head back in the direction of hegemonic commitments and global leadership 
obligations. Similarly, America’s China policy had been evolving from cooperation 
to competition before Trump; his policies, particularly on the economic side, have 
perhaps accelerated what many in the foreign policy establishment now view as an 
inevitable trend. That America’s direction seems clear will make diplomacy more 
difficult for others in the region, including US allies, who prefer to cooperate with 
both China (in economics) and the United States (in security) rather than lining 
up on one side or the other.
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Finally, Trump’s strategy towards North Korea could plausibly change. The temp-
tation for Trump (perhaps with the hope of a Nobel Peace Prize) to strike a dramatic 
deal – the easing of economic sanctions in exchange for North Korean commitments 
to meaningfully curtain weapons and missile testing – is a powerful one. The tacit 
acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power would meet strong resistance within 
the US foreign policy establishment. But it would at least be viewed as preferable to a 
return to the escalating confrontation that marked Trump’s first year.
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From Obama to Trump, and 
beyond: Washington’s painful search  
for a credible China policy
BÖrje Ljunggren
Introduction
In 2018, one- time members of the Obama administration – Assistant Secretary 
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell, and former Deputy 
National Security Advisor to Vice President Joe Biden, Ely Ratner – noted that, 
since the end of the Second World War ‘[t] he United States has always had an out-
sized sense of its ability to determine China’s course. Again and again, its ambitions 
have come up short.’ Today, they argued, ‘the starting point for a better approach 
is a new degree of humility about the United States’ ability to change China … 
Basing policy on a more realistic set of assumptions … would better advance US 
interests and put the bilateral relationship on a more realistic footing.’1
At the same time, The Economist featured a story on ‘How the West Got China 
Wrong’. It had, it said, ‘lost its bet on China, just when its own democracies are 
suffering from a crisis of confidence’. China behaved as a ‘regional superpower 
bent on driving America out of East Asia’.2 Minxin Pei, a China commentator, 
declared that ‘[e] ngaging China may have been a noble experiment, but now is 
the time to go for realpolitik’.3 Finally, and in testimony to the US Congress in 
February 2018, long- term neorealist critic of US China policy Aaron L. Friedberg 
argued that Washington’s two- pronged strategy of preserving stability ‘while 
waiting for engagement to “tame” and ultimately to transform China’ had failed 
in its intended result.4
These four analyses differ significantly in a number of respects, but all ultim-
ately agree that Washington’s engagement and balancing policy towards China of 
the last few decades has fallen short of its objectives. The election of Donald Trump 
as president of the United States in late 2016 brought something of a sea change to 
US foreign policy. Yet it remains true that Washington needs to develop a viable 
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From a Western perspective, it can, naturally, be tempting to dream of travel-
ling back in time to an era when China was catching up rather than constituting an 
economic, military, political and even systems challenge. There have been critical 
moments. Notably, China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 provided an added boost 
to its rapid economic growth. Today, China is the largest economy in the world in 
terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), by far the world’s largest trading nation 
in goods, and a potential world leader in key future technologies such as artificial 
intelligence (AI).
In terms of alliances China may be “a lonely power”, but it is pursuing an 
increasingly pro- active role, taking advantage of strategic opportunities and 
launching initiatives of its own. These include the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the role as the world’s second 
largest (on par with Japan) and most strategic direct foreign investor. Indeed, 
authoritarian China is, ironically enough, globalisation’s greatest winner, with jus-
tifiably mounting US and EU demands for reciprocity. In the zero- sum worldview 
of President Donald Trump and his administration, China’s rise, and even the 
United States’ relationships with some of its closest Asian partners, has been at 
America’s expense.
In his report to the nineteenth party congress, Chinese President Xi Jinping 
declared that ‘China already stood tall in the East’, and that now it is time for the 
nation ‘to take center stage in the world and to make a greater contribution to 
humankind’. China’s road to modernisation, he said, was ‘offering a new option 
for other countries’.5 In an amendment to the party constitution, it was stated that 
the Chinese Communist Party should ‘uphold its absolute leadership over the 
People’s Liberation Army’ and ‘implement Xi Jinping’s thinking on strengthening 
the military’.6 By the mid- twenty- first century, China’s people’s armed forces would 
be ‘fully transformed into world class forces’, built to fight.7 China, to date, is still a 
Leninist party- state that is far from tamed. Rather than undermining the govern-
ment, the Internet has become an indispensable tool of Beijing’s “controlocracy”.8 
China’s violations of human rights have grown more brazen and the surveillance 
state is thriving.
Was John J. Mearsheimer, the most consistent critic of US policy of engage-
ment, then right in saying that letting China into the WTO was a fatal mistake? 
Mearsheimer argues that the future Chinese threat ‘might be far more powerful and 
dangerous than any of the potential hegemons that the United States confronted in 
the twentieth century’, and that the United States ‘has a profound interest in seeing 
Chinese economic growth slow considerably’. A wealthy China, he argues, would 
not be a status quo power, but ‘an aggressive state determined to achieve regional 
hegemony’.9
How should former US President Barack Obama’s China policy, and ultimately 
legacy, be assessed in this light? Was his sincere ambition to engage and balance 
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what Obama tried to achieve, and their worldviews could hardly be more different. 
As president, Obama had to cope with the ongoing, seemingly inescapable US– 
Chinese power shift. Across the first two years of the Trump administration, to 
early 2019, the relationship developed more in the direction of a global rivalry, 
with the potential to define both his and future presidencies.
Obama’s Asia Pacific vision: Engagement and Pivot
Cooperation amidst global challenges: Obama’s early ambitions
Less than a year after assuming office in January 2009, Obama made a state visit 
to Beijing to meet China’s President Hu Jintao. At the time I was in the capital, 
attending an EU– China conference. Rarely has Washington prepared a state visit 
with more care. Obama had the ambition to develop a comprehensive US China 
policy, based on an internationalist worldview which made it natural to aim for 
deeper cooperation. Still, I witnessed what would turn out to be a failed visit. The 
Chinese, uncertain about both how to manage their own growing role and how 
to assess and relate to Obama, treated him to a “state visit minus”. This could later 
be contrasted to the boundlessly lavish “state visit plus” Trump was offered eight 
years later in 2017.
Still, 2009 was at a time of huge global challenges which would test the limits 
of the US– Chinese relationship. The visit happened in the midst of the financial 
crisis and just a month before the Copenhagen meeting on the global environ-
ment. The United States and China needed to cooperate to address the world’s 
economic and financial problems, climate change, and other great challenges 
which demanded multilateral efforts. Pax Americana was not the answer. 
Obama inherently understood the importance and vast potential of the Asia 
Pacific broadly, and China more specifically. It was clear that he had come to 
Beijing with the intention of building trust and deepening the relationship.10 He 
clearly wanted to create a more sustainable foundation for US– Chinese relations, 
channelling China’s rise in as non- confrontational a direction as possible.
A very elaborate joint declaration, with a number of new concrete areas of 
cooperation, was adopted at the summit. To the surprise of many, Washington 
accepted a paragraph saying that the two countries had agreed to respect each 
other’s “core interests”. From the Chinese perspective that meant Tibet, Xinjiang, 
Taiwan and even the South China Sea, and suggested that Obama might be a weak 
president; maybe even another Jimmy Carter. Indeed, despite Obama’s efforts to 
create a collegial climate, the visit was not a success – not in Beijing, and certainly 
not in Washington. Obama was only allowed to address a select public gathering 
in Shanghai and at home Obama was not seen to be standing up for his country’s 
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Soon afterwards, US China policy became more assertive. Adding to the shift 
was the distrust that emerged between Obama and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao 
shortly after the climate change summit. China’s quiet response to the North 
Korean navy sinking of a South Korean navy ship in March 2010 contributed to 
the tensions, along with more forward- leaning Chinese surveillance of US activ-
ities in the South China Sea. American concerns were raised that China had begun 
to challenge the prevailing regional order.
The Pivot and renewed American assertion
At the beginning of 2011 the chief architects of Obama’s original China policy, 
Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and Senior Director for Asian Affairs 
on the US National Security Council Jeffrey Bader, left office. The centre of 
gravity shifted to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her Asia manager, Kurt 
Campbell. From then on, the US Pivot towards Asia – by which the United States 
planned to devote more strategic attention and resources to the Asia Pacific  – 
came to the fore.
A critical moment was the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Hanoi 
in July 2010. In her speech to the Forum, Secretary Clinton – urged by a number 
of ASEAN countries – stressed that the United States remained neutral on which 
regional countries had stronger territorial claims to disputed islands in the South 
China Sea. Yet, she explained, Washington had an interest in preserving free 
shipping in the area and would facilitate talks on the issue.
Though presented as an offer to help ease tensions, the stance amounted to 
a sharp rebuke of Beijing. Claiming ownership of all islands within its so- called 
Nine Dash Line, China insisted that any disputes should be resolved bilaterally 
between itself and ASEAN claimants. In March 2010, senior Chinese officials had 
pointedly warned their American counterparts that they would brook no inter-
ference in the South China Sea, which they called part of the “core interest” of 
Chinese sovereignty.11
Washington’s position was in clear alignment with implicated ASEAN 
members, and marked the first time it had taken sides on the dispute. China 
and the wider region noticed. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, lost his 
temper, reminding his Singaporean colleague that ‘China is a big country and 
other countries are small countries and that is just a fact.’12 In late 2011, Secretary 
Clinton stated that just as the United States once played a central role in shaping 
the architecture across the Atlantic, it was now doing the same across the Pacific. 
The twenty- first century will be America’s ‘Pacific Century’, she insisted.13
At around the same time, President Obama delivered a speech to the Australian 
parliament in which he spoke about a broad shift in US policy to the Asia  Pacific, 
including sending US marines to Darwin.14 An underlying assumption, that 
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disengagement in the Middle East. Inherited wars in that region, however, along 
with their consequences, never ceased to demand huge resources.
The Pivot was, first and foremost, a matter of reconfirming commitment to 
American allies and crucial forward defence lines in the Pacific. A  primary 
objective, however, was also to enhance the United States’ economic presence 
in the region. Initially, Obama was less committed to free trade than his imme-
diate predecessors; George W. Bush had in 2008 begun negotiating a Trans- Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), though with a limited number of countries. Yet in December 
2009, after his visit to China, Obama notified Congress that he planned to enter 
into TPP negotiations with Pacific partners. It was not until 2013 that the negoti-
ations gained momentum, though without a crucial Trade Promotion Authority 
mandate from the US Congress. “Everyone but China”, including communist 
Vietnam, was invited. It also represented a new generation of trade agreements, 
with labour rights as a significant new element. When all the other eleven invited 
countries on board stood ready to implement the agreement in 2016, it was clear 
that the US Congress would turn it down.
The tide had turned. In the 2016 presidential election campaign, Hillary 
Clinton, who once called TPP ‘a gold standard trade agreement’,15 was no longer 
ready to defend it. Republican nominee Donald Trump pledged to cancel it on his 
first day in office. When visiting Washington in late 2016, the Prime Minister of 
Singapore called the TPP a ‘litmus test’ of US credibility in Asia, telling Obama 
that Washington had taken them all to the altar, leaving partners waiting for the 
bridegroom, embarrassing themselves and the United States.16
Human rights and a straining relationship
Human rights had a central place in the value system of the Obama administra-
tion. The way the question has evolved in China’s relationship with Brussels and 
Washington is a stark illustration of mounting US– Chinese divergence. During 
my years in Beijing, human rights were a given subject on the agenda of high- 
level EU– China and bilateral meetings. Both the EU and the United States, along 
with a number of other countries, had an established human rights dialogue with 
China. Over time, the Chinese side became increasingly unwilling to accept such 
dialogues and the scrutiny they brought. Today, such dialogues have almost come 
to an end, no longer tolerated by today’s much more assertive and nationalistic 
China. At the same time, China has become more vocal about human rights 
conditions in the United States and other countries. The Chinese Communist 
Party’s (CCP) skin is increasingly thin.
In 1988 China signed two major UN covenants on human rights:  the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. The latter was ratified after 
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universal human rights. In 2013 Beijing issued a central party document in which 
seven perils were enumerated, including Western constitutional democracy, civil 
society, ‘universal values’, and Western- inspired notions of media independ-
ence.17 The document bore the unmistakable imprimatur of Xi Jinping. Further 
deteriorations happened under Obama’s watch. Human rights were kept on the 
bilateral agenda, but not at the expense of the overall relationship.
With an ongoing shift of global power, broadly speaking from West to East, 
the Obama administration injected a degree of stability and predictably into US– 
Chinese relations, even as tensions in the South China Sea and elsewhere grew. 
Successful cooperation on matters of global significance was also achieved. That 
was true with regard to the Paris agreement on climate change, for which Obama 
and Xi in 2014 laid the foundations. Still, the realignment of power continued, 
inevitably deepening strategic competition, and making it even more important to 
develop stable bilateral mechanisms for managing the power rivalry.
Was an opportunity lost, given Obama’s original approach to China? China’s 
rise did indeed amount to a challenge of the predominant role of the United States 
in the Asia Pacific. No American administration could help but focus on the task 
of developing a strategy that would convincingly reconfirm long- term American 
commitment to the region. Such a strategy could, however, have been more or less 
comprehensive. Obama’s first senior advisor in Asia, Jeffrey Bader, stresses that:
at no point has US policy been based on some gauzy conception of a “benign” 
China that would sacrifice its own interests for ours, adopt a political system 
modelled on Western values, or cease to be a difficult competitor. Policy- makers 
have understood that the US- China relationship would be a mixture of cooper-
ation and competition, with the hope of maximizing the former and managing 
the latter so that it did not escalate into conflict.18
In his 2016 book on the US Pivot to Asia, Kurt Campbell’s primary message was 
that it should be made more comprehensive and more consistent in the post- 
Obama era.19 That would have likely materialised if Hillary Clinton had become 
president. The Obama administration had the ambition to develop a more com-
prehensive strategic US response, both to China and the wider Asia Pacific region; 
it was clear by then that engagement would not produce the type of systemic con-
vergence that President Bill Clinton in particular had hoped for when delivering 
China’s entry into the WTO. Yet Obama fell short of striking a new viable balance 
between liberal internationalism and security, by underestimating the magnitude 
of the challenge.
In 2012, in the heat of the final debate of his second campaign for the presi-
dency, Obama did in fact talk about China as an “adversary”. Yet the main ambi-
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with Beijing, through such mechanisms as the annual high level Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue.
The East Asian peace: Long, but fragile
China’s strategic ambitions and the Trump administration
Since the end of the Vietnam War, China and the East Asian region have enjoyed 
what is sometimes referred to as “the long peace”. The East Asian share of global 
battle deaths fell from around 80 per cent in 1946– 79 to just 6 per cent in the 1980s, 
to less than 2 per cent in the 1990s, and to less than 1 per cent today.20 “Economic 
Asia” prevailed, but now “security Asia” is re- emerging. East Asia, indeed, is not 
short of serious unresolved conflicts. Identity, sovereignty and boundaries have 
become key battlegrounds, in at least partial contradiction to the ideal of deeper 
integration. East Asia’s “long peace” is increasingly fragile.
Washington’s forward defence line, manifest in key alliances and a heavy 
regional naval presence, is a central theme in American strategic culture that for 
a long time has applied to the Far East.21 The line runs near China which increas-
ingly sees itself as the natural hegemon in a Sino- centric East Asia. In 2013, Xi 
Jinping suggested that the Pacific was big enough for both the United States and 
China. Core US policy will no doubt be tested in coming years, sharpening the 
focus on military strength.
Throughout his presidency, Obama incrementally reduced the US defence 
budget, which by the time he left office still amounted to close to one third of 
global defence expenditure. During his last years in office, however, additional 
funds were requested for ongoing operations and a military modernisation pro-
gramme. US military engagements in the Middle East remained very costly in 
terms of resources as well as credibility.
Meanwhile, as of early 2019, China maintains its substantial military mod-
ernisation programme. China’s defence budget, the second largest in the world, 
is estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) to 
amount to around US$228 billion.22 According to official Chinese figures, which 
are lower than SIPRI’s estimates, this budget increased by 8.2 per cent in 2018 and 
by 7.5 per cent in 2019, a declining percentage trend but still a huge volume.23 The 
Chinese budget is still just a third of the US budget, and slightly less than 2 per cent 
of GDP. Continued, rapid, modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 
however, remains a key priority.
A salient illustration of China’s vision of its own global role is the military 
strategy released in 2015, which states that ‘the traditional mentality that land 
outweighs sea must be abandoned and great importance must be attached to man-
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600 years have passed since China was a prominent naval power. Today, China is 
becoming a major power in this regard, as symbolised by its ambitious air carrier 
programme and a fleet by some measures outsizing that of the United States.
Partly in response to this expansion of China’s capabilities, after coming to office 
in early 2017, President Donald Trump declared that the United States is ‘going 
to have a military like never before, because we … just about never needed our 
military more than now’. In his budget proposal for 2019, he demanded US$716 
billion – an increase of 6 per cent compared to his first budget.25 Trump’s then 
Defense Secretary James Mattis called both China and Russia ‘revisionist powers’ 
that ‘seek to create a world consistent with their authoritarian models’. He warned 
that the US military advantage over its adversaries had eroded ‘in every domain of 
warfare’, concluding that ‘Great power competition, not terrorism, is now the pri-
mary focus of US national security.’26 The 2017 National Security Strategy echoed 
this view, describing China (and Russia) as a competitor, which is ‘trying to erode 
American security and prosperity’. In this world reduced to a state of ‘great- power 
competition’, countries pursue their national interests without any commitment to 
creating a better world.27
Across its first two years, the strategic response to these challenges by the 
Trump administration has appeared to show little interest in the underpinning 
logic of Obama’s Pivot to the region; to build on his predecessor’s efforts would be 
contrary to Trump’s instincts. For him, the Pivot represented another multilateral 
sell out. The irony now, however, is that the TPP is coming into being, renamed 
the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans- Pacific Partnership 
(CPTPP), and to join later would now mean the United States fitting into a frame-
work led by others.
East and Southeast Asian security challenges
The East Asian region harbours a number of unresolved conflicts which remain 
far from any kind of sustainable solution, and none are completely dislocated from 
the dynamics of US– China relations. Taiwan is the most “existential”. China’s One 
China policy is a non- negotiable feature of its national identity, and Washington’s 
commitment to defend the island should not be underestimated. The Obama 
presidency was an era of relative calm here, but during his campaign for the presi-
dency Donald Trump openly challenged the One China policy by treating Taiwan 
as a bargaining chip and speaking to President Tsai Ing- wen, angering Beijing.28 
For the CCP, the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland is inevitable, and Xi 
Jinping has expressed noticeable impatience.
North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme constitutes the most serious imme-
diate challenge, directly threatening the United States. The Obama administration 
chose a policy of “strategic patience”, unsuccessfully trying to involve Beijing in a 
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Trump quickly made North Korea’s nuclear development a test case of US– Chinese 
relations, in part via the threat of escalating sanctions. Military threats were used 
to coerce Pyongyang, but there is no military solution. For decades the inter-
national community failed to contain this poor, backward and isolated country’s 
nuclear ambitions, allowing the current global security dilemma to emerge.
China’s policy is determined by its own security concerns; Beijing wants a 
nuclear free peninsula, but it has attached even higher priority to stability. In 2003 
China assumed a key role as convener of the Six- Party talks on North Korea’s 
nuclear programme, a process that went on for six years but failed to deliver any 
lasting results. As Head of the Asia Department in the Swedish Foreign Ministry 
I visited North Korea a number of times. In 2001 I accompanied Prime Minister 
Göran Persson, then- chairperson of the European Council, to Pyongyang for an 
EU– North Korean summit with Kim Jong- il.
South Korean President Kim Dae- jung’s Sunshine policy and the Clinton 
administration’s advanced direct talks with Pyongyang had created a conducive 
climate, but when President George W. Bush entered the White House in 2001, 
he launched a policy reversal, choosing to discontinue dialogue and denoun-
cing the “Axis of Evil”, of which North Korea was a central element. The same 
year, it also became clear that North Korea was pursuing its nuclear ambitions. 
China, meanwhile, played a surprisingly small role and focused instead on 
maintaining the status quo. As ambassador to China from 2002 I  observed 
first- hand how Beijing treated North Korea’s nuclear programme as primarily 
an American dilemma. Ultimately, as North Korea became a de facto nuclear 
power, the magnitude of the challenge created a new sense of urgency, with 
Obama advising Trump in his final months in office to regard North Korea as 
an issue of the highest priority.29
Promising from the outset to meet North Korean threats with ‘fire and 
fury’,30 President Trump ventured to pursue instant summit diplomacy. Yet he 
underestimated the magnitude of the task, with complete and verifiable denuclear-
isation remaining a distant goal. East Asian security has at least temporarily been 
enhanced as a result, but only on the provision that the diplomatic process is 
kept alive.
Elsewhere, the South China Sea has also recently become an arena of signifi-
cant US– China tension. In 2010, following a verbal confrontation at the ASEAN 
Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
and her Chinese counterpart Foreign Minister Yang Yiechi, a more assertive 
China stepped forward and expanded its presence in the region. Using gradual 
“salami tactics”, it introduced military installations and air strips, and turned 
shallow reefs into islands. The United States, in response, expanded its naval 
presence. At a White House meeting in 2015, Xi made a commitment not to 
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From the outset, the Trump administration declared that China’s island 
building programme in the South China Sea had to cease. The build- up continued 
nonetheless, with ASEAN countries caught in the middle, forced to hedge against 
territorial encroachments. They did so, and continue to do so in early 2019, while 
uncertain about American staying power as Trump quickly showed less interest in 
ASEAN than Obama after taking office. On the whole, Washington has failed to 
strengthen key regional partnerships in the face of a rising China.
The situation in the East China Sea appears more stable, but Sino- Japanese 
tensions over territory, deeply rooted in history, remain. The Senkaku/ Diaoyu 
Islands, controlled by Japan but claimed by China, are bound to remain a serious 
issue. Beijing will likely never give up its claims, while Tokyo does not accept the 
existence of a territorial issue. The United States has not taken a firm stand on the 
issue as such, but as tensions rose, the Obama administration in 2014 unequivo-
cally included the islands in Washington’s commitment to defend Japan. News 
of accelerated Chinese air and naval excursions in sensitive areas near Japan and 
Taiwan are also becoming increasingly common, causing concern.32 This should 
come as no surprise, especially after the nineteenth party congress when Xi Jinping 
outlined his visions for Chinese sovereignty.33
Coping with strategic distrust: The emerging systems clash
The concern for authors like Graham Allison is that China and the United States are 
‘on a collision course for war— unless both parties take difficult and painful actions 
to avert it’.34 As such, the two risk falling into a so- called “Thucydides Trap” where 
an ascending power challenges an established power with destabilising results. In 
Thucydides’ analysis, it was the fear that this instilled which made war inevitable. 
Particularly worrying to Allison is that ‘many Americans are still in denial about 
what China’s transformation from agrarian backwater to “the biggest player in the 
history of the world” means for the United States’,35 and that Washington lacks a 
coherent strategy for dealing with a rising China. Both are major nuclear powers, 
now responsible for avoiding the “uncontrollable” from happening.
Key elements of a comprehensive US China strategy were developed and 
implemented during Obama’s term in office. A  key element of Obama’s legacy, 
indeed, was reversing a systemic neglect in the White House of China’s rise, which 
had emerged and endured during the years of George W. Bush’s post- 9/ 11 war on 
terror. It was inconceivable when Trump was elected in 2016 that his administration 
could do anything but afford China as much attention as had that of Obama, with 
the Pivot laying the essential foundations for Trump’s ‘free and open Indo- Pacific’ 
strategy.36 Under Obama, alliances were strengthened, the TPP was launched, and 
military shifts were made. The Paris Climate Accord was also proof that successful 
cooperative endeavours were possible. Still, all this was overshadowed by growing 
populism, nationalism, authoritarianism, global realignments of power, and a lib-







From Obama to Trump: Washington’s China policy 205
205
the twenty- first century becoming an “American Pacific century” in fact became 
more remote. By the close of Obama’s tenure, US– Chinese relations seemed to 
have begun a drift towards a systems clash.
In its first two years in office, the Trump administration concentrated on the 
strategic challenges and competition in the US– China relationship, with faint signs 
of interest in deepening cooperation on global challenges. Trump’s engagement 
with Obama’s legacy on China is thus one of evolution rather than revolution; 
the ends of constraining China’s influence remain consistent, while the means of 
multilateralism have been replaced by a preference for unilateralism. The strategy 
does, however, contain elements which are likely to survive the Trump presidency. 
A significant new element may be the idea of an Indo- Pacific strategy, bringing 
together US East Asian allies and India in jointly facing the geopolitical Chinese 
challenge.37 (Modi’s India, however, is likely to hedge its bets, rather than ally itself 
fully with Washington.)
The policies of the early Trump administration amounted to major shifts from 
that of Obama in several respects. For some time, it seemed as if the US alliance 
system in Asia would be an example of significant continuity, but Trump’s uni-
lateral way of handling key alliances created a new sense of unpredictability. 
The most significant differences between Obama and Trump lie in their basic 
attitudes towards international cooperation, multilateralism, and the importance 
of a rule- and community- based international order. Whereas Obama showed 
a strong commitment to global governance, that commitment was immediately 
questioned by Trump who not only lacked interest in strong and effective inter-
national institutions, but even seemed inclined to undermine them.
For its part, Beijing has a great interest in playing a leading role in world gov-
ernance on its own terms, with less dependence on the Western- led systems that 
have long dominated. At the 2017 World Economic Forum in Davos, Xi Jinping 
came out in a rousing defence of globalisation. The contrast to Trump’s strategy of 
“America First” was stark, but it was hardly a confirmation of the liberal economic 
order. Rather, it was a sermon by the prophet of the Chinese Dream of revival. 
China’s ambition has been to continue reaping the benefits of integration into 
the global economy, while minimising the vulnerabilities and potential security 
risks associated with it.38 Trump challenged that strategy, putting trade, intellec-
tual property rights and technology at the forefront of his approach. The style 
is uniquely Trumpian, but deeper American consensus seems to have emerged 
around a more confrontational approach to China’s emergence.
Under Trump, the relationship between China and the wider West is no longer 
predicated on the expectation of convergence, but of rivalry and competition. 
Opportunities for cooperation are not seized, and the future increasingly appears 
to be one of systemic dissonance. China on one side is building a party- state- 
driven economy based on its own distinctive vision for globalisation, while the 





From Obama to Trump in Asia and the Pacific206
206
Trade is at the epicentre of US– Chinese competition. At the beginning of 2018, 
the Trump administration went as far as saying that supporting China’s WTO 
accession was a mistake.40 The pivotal element of Trump’s protectionist confron-
tation with China on trade is, however, not steel or aluminium. It is over intel-
lectual property rights and the “Made in China 2025” strategy in which China 
invests heavily in areas like robotics, new- energy vehicles, biotechnology and, not 
least, artificial intelligence. On that frontier, Trump is taking measures, far beyond 
trade, to contain China. Intensified confrontation around the fourth generation of 
industry will remain a real threat, with potentially profound global consequences.
In his first State of the Union address in January 2018, Trump reiterated his 
image of China as a challenge to American interests, grouping it together with 
‘rogue regimes and terrorist groups’. ‘[R] ivals like China and Russia’, he explained, 
‘challenge our interests, our economy, and our values. In confronting these hor-
rible dangers, we know that weakness is the surest path to conflict, and unmatched 
power is the surest means to our true and great defense.’41
Strategic distrust seems bound to define an increasingly complex US– China 
relationship. At no time therefore has the United States appeared to be in more 
urgent need of a comprehensive and viable China policy, beyond transactional 
improvisations and power projections. It would have been natural for Trump to 
build on Obama’s policy, by broadening and deepening the political- economic- 
security agenda, and strengthening Washington’s institutional capacity to manage 
mounting challenges. Across Trump’s first two years in charge, essentially the 
opposite happened.
There remains ample scope for joint efforts and we can only hope for such an 
era, but the ongoing global power shift will cast an increasingly long shadow, chal-
lenging the status quo. US China policy seems set to progress along a slippery 
slope. Still, containing China is hardly a possibility for the United States. It 
remains, to rephrase Campbell and Ratner, an outsized ambition. The only option 
for Washington remains to develop a more ambitious and long- term policy, where 
engagement and even accommodation, must be central elements.
A major US– China war is hardly inevitable, but confrontations and 
miscalculations are ever- present risks. Confrontations at sea, with assumed 
constraints on escalation, appear alarmingly probable. Institutional mechanisms 
are critical, but so is sufficient trust to enable them to function effectively.42
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and Trump in the Asia Pacific
Ketan Patel and Christian Hansmeyer
Introduction
The United States under Donald Trump has been charting a radically new course 
in Asia, a region that has long relied on America for stability and maintaining the 
balance of power. In the first half of his presidential term of 2017– 21, the forty- 
fifth president reversed or sought to reverse many of the long- standing policies 
and initiatives pursued by Barack Obama and his predecessors, with potential 
long- term implications. A multilateral and multifaceted engagement strategy in 
the region is being replaced by a transactional approach to security, trade and 
governance that seeks to maximise gains while shifting risk to counterparties, and 
thereby risking eroding a strategic leadership position that has been decades in 
the making. Donald Trump’s “America First” potentially represents an abandon-
ment of leadership in the setting of international norms for trade, investment and 
security in favour of “big wins”. However, it is worth noting that big wins, if they 
are big enough, can be game changing and provide the basis of a renewal of power 
and influence too. This chapter, in part, examines the potential risks and rewards 
inherent in such an approach.
While American abandonment of multilateralism may allow striking favour-
able new bilateral deals in the region – China, North Korea and Japan seem to 
be high on the list – the riskiness of the approach poses potentially catastrophic 
risk for Asia as a whole, if not the world. Win or lose, it risks changing for the 
worse the perceived character of the United States in the eyes of its allies and 
confirms the claims of its enemies and adversaries that America is a predatory 
force. This approach – coming at a time and in a region which hosts two emerging 
superpowers – has the potential to mark the turning point of America’s own tra-
jectory as a superpower. China has long pursued a “China First” policy of its own, 
and more recently begun to transition from a rule- taker to a rule- maker in the 
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and Road Initiative (BRI), to pull countries formerly tied to America more closely 
into its orbit. Asia’s other rising power, and the fastest growing major economy 
in the world, India, will need to reassess its strategic options in the face of US 
repositioning and China’s increasing economic, political and military activity (as 
indeed will other countries in the region).
What makes this current transition particularly risky is what can be called 
an overt “Extreme Asymmetric Risk” approach, which passes economic and 
security risks to America’s counterparties and allies while capturing dispropor-
tionate benefits for incurring neutral to low risk to the US homeland. Of course, 
maximising benefits and minimising risk is the goal of nearly every sensible for-
eign policy, it is the one- sidedness of their distribution and how they are applied 
that makes it significant for the region and the world at large. The extreme asym-
metric nature of risk distribution creates win- lose outcomes on a scale unprece-
dented in modern times. The current pattern of engagement suggests that this is 
the cornerstone of Trump’s approach to engagement.
The transition from Obama to Trump
Over recent decades Asia has become an increasingly important region for 
American foreign policy, and the United States has become an ally (or partner) 
of the majority of countries in Asia. So too has it become China’s biggest trading 
partner, and as of 2015 the host to circa twenty million immigrants from the region 
(an increase of around 70 per cent since 2000).1 The United States has become the 
outside country on which the Asian region has most depended, politically, eco-
nomically and in terms of aspirations.
Within a generation, Asia is expected to be home to over five billion people, or 
more than half the world’s population.2 It is also projected to boast over 40 per cent 
of world GDP.3 Obama recognised the importance of Asia for the future of America 
and the world, and it formed one of the core pillars of his foreign policy, albeit 
slowly, initially, given the wars his administration inherited. The “Pivot” to Asia 
redeployed political, security and economic resources to the region across a wide 
range of initiatives,4 including driving regional economic integration, checking 
Chinese territorial expansion with naval freedom of navigation operations,5 and 
engaging with India (including massive arms sales) to build a real counter- weight 
to China. Obama billed himself as America’s first “Pacific President” to signal his 
commitment to the region.6
The Asia Pivot consisted of a wide array of initiatives: many of its key elem-
ents, such as the Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the strategic outreach to 
India, predated Obama’s administration but were accelerated and deepened. Other 
elements such as the strategic engagement with ASEAN were newly conceived. 
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strategy,7 it undeniably recognised the ongoing global rebalancing underway in 
Asia’s favour. The overarching goal of the Pivot therefore was to ensure continued 
US strategic relevance in the region and to balance a growing and more assertive 
China in ‘an effort that harnesses all elements of US power – military, political, 
trade and investment, development and our values’.8 A  clearly critical part of 
the Pivot was the importance of multilateralism as the basis for any American 
initiatives, embedding US actions into partnerships and alliance. Importantly, the 
Pivot was not conceived to be a discrete initiative, but an encapsulation of a longer 
term refocusing of American military, political and economic resources to con-
tinue after Obama.
Donald Trump’s approach to foreign policy in Asia, between his election in late 
2016 to early 2019, was very different. The overarching philosophy of “America 
First” prioritises domestic over international affairs, making an implicit assumption 
that the two are somehow disconnected.9 Trump, a self- confessed “deal- maker”, is 
focused on getter a “better deal” for America, through transactional and bilateral 
engagements on trade, security and investment, where its superior scale provides 
negotiating leverage. Within this context, the Trump administration formulated 
only a limited vision for the Asia Pacific. Where Obama sought to both engage and 
contain China, at least until it learned to abide by the rules of the world order and 
recognise the values underpinning it, Trump’s approach appears to favour con-
frontation, raising the stakes and threatening a unilateral trade war. The rhetoric 
aside and not speculating on motivations, both represent the continuation of a 
multi- decade, multi- presidency effort to maintain US primacy in Asia, countering 
China’s rapid rise to achieve a more balanced sharing of power. The question 
remains of whether the current approach raises unacceptable risks and thereby 
undermines these longer- term goals.
How US policy under Trump in Asia is playing out
After approximately two years of Trump’s presidency, the full ramifications of 
“America First” on the United States and the world are still playing out. Yet it is 
already clear that its impact on Asia will be significant. There is little doubt now 
that “America First” has profound implications for US engagement across security, 
trade, investment and society and values in the region, with China’s reactions 
potentially exacerbating the consequences for America and the world along all of 
these dimensions.
Security engagement
The North Korean nuclear crisis has become among the most visible and imme-
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office, the Trump administration adopted a highly inconsistent approach to Korea, 
threatening the use of overwhelming force against Pyongyang before attending the 
first summit between a North Korean leader and US president in June 2018. Two 
opposing interpretations of the President’s approach see him as either successfully 
employing Nixon’s “madman” theory to encourage North Korea to negotiate, or 
simply acting irresponsibly towards the safety of billions of people because they 
are far away from America. While the Trump administration throughout 2018 
in particular adopted a more conciliatory approach to North Korea, the second 
summit between the leaders in Hanoi in February 2019 which produced no mean-
ingful outcomes highlighted the limitations of the President’s personal ability to 
strike a deal, and may in time lead to the pendulum swinging back to escalation.
Either way, Trump’s North Korea “strategy” is a good example of Extreme 
Asymmetric Risk. A high stakes game in which risks are borne by America’s Asian 
allies and the upside is shared more broadly; a North Korean military strike would 
probably target Japan or Seoul with little direct risk to the US homeland, while 
any lasting negotiated de- escalation would see the President hailed a hero. This 
Extreme Asymmetric Risk approach, which provides binary outcomes in which 
the United States comes out ahead or neutral, is a key element of the President’s 
“America First” strategy, delivering high gains for America at the rest of the world’s 
expense.
Meanwhile, China is demonstrating the will to actively displace America in 
regional power projection; building and militarising reclaimed islands; acquiring 
regional ports in a “String of Pearls”; opening its first overseas military base, in 
Djibouti; and extending its BRI mega- project to the ends of Asia. The Trump 
administration appears to have deprioritised these issues while proposing the 
notion of a “Quad” framework focusing on maritime security between the United 
States, India, Australia and Japan.
Trade engagements
The importance of trade for US foreign policy also shifted dramatically under 
President Trump. Under previous US administrations, trade was not just about eco-
nomic gains but also a source of stability underpinning international relationships 
and economic integration, secured by a set of international rules. And while these 
rules may have initially favoured American interests, other countries too have 
created surpluses and, more importantly, developed interdependencies that have 
disincentivised conflict. This post- war liberal trade order enabled the greatest 
explosion of wealth the world has ever seen, with global GDP increasing six- fold 
and global trade twenty- fold between 1950 and the turn of the twenty- first cen-
tury.10 The percentage of the world’s population living in poverty declined from 
75 per cent to under 10 per cent.11 Average household wages and incomes expanded 
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Under Trump, trade’s role refocused to being about US wealth and jobs, with 
America’s trade deficit seen as a drain on both. US objectives have refocused from 
maintaining a global trade order to reviving American manufacturing in the 
heartland. Importantly, the President’s “America First” trade policy espouses hard- 
line economic nationalism focused on bilateral agreements and rejects multilat-
eral trade deals. When Trump pulled the United States out of the TPP, he took 
with it an opportunity to lead new rules that could define trade in the region for a 
generation or longer.
This lack of US multilateral trade engagement represents a major opportunity 
for China. Its home- grown alternative to the TPP, the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP), covers an area accounting for half of the world’s 
population and almost one third of global GDP. The position at the centre of the 
global “system” of trade that Trump is abandoning has been a source of consid-
erable power for the United States. Given that the United States remains the lar-
gest market in the world, it retains the clout to negotiate favourable deals and 
is likely to do so when negotiating with smaller nations, further accelerating the 
Trump administration’s effective withdrawal from the global and regional trade 
systems. China, on the other hand, has begun to establish an alternative system 
with itself at the centre as a rule- setter. With the United States ceding leadership, 
China might also choose to play a more active role at the centre of the existing 
global and regional trade system, replacing America, rather than creating com-
peting alternatives.
Investment engagement
Under US leadership, multilateral institutions such as the UN, World Bank, and 
IMF, have built- out the infrastructure of developing nations, financed trade to 
open new markets, ensured that sea, road and airways remain open and attempted 
to deal with “rogue” nations. This has not been an altruistic endeavour; in doing so, 
Washington has reinforced its position in the global financial system. Withdrawal 
from these governing institutions, not to mention US threats to defund some of 
them for political reasons,13 risks weakening a system that has managed inter-
national development funding for decades and placed America in the driving seat 
of rule- setting and provided it with an important source of soft power globally.
In parallel, China is seeking to establish itself as the world’s premier investor, 
both by way of establishing China- led initiatives to compete with established 
international financial institutions, and by way of ambitious direct investing. The 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a good example of the former. 
With eighty members and US$100 billion in capital, it now competes with the 
World Bank and Asian Development Bank as a financier of infrastructure in 
Eurasia with fewer transparency and governance requirements. The BRI is per-
haps the most ambitious example of the latter. Covering countries inhabited by 
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over 4.4 billion people and generating over US$21 trillion USD in annual GDP, the 
BRI aims to build logistics and infrastructure links connecting China and the rest 
of Asia and Europe, facilitating the flow of goods, services, resources and informa-
tion between these regions.14 According to one estimate, China could invest over 
US$500 billion in sixty- two BRI projects over the next five years,15 breathing new 
life into its flagging economic growth model by compensating for construction 
overcapacity and lack of demand at home.
China also derives strategic benefits from its international lending, with 
its loans collateralised by strategically important natural assets, which can be 
seized in cases of default. China in 2018 was granted a ninety- nine year lease on 
Hambantota port in Sri Lanka to restructure US$8 billion of outstanding debt 
owed to Beijing. China’s plan comes at a time when America has decided that con-
trol over the international development finance system is a burden rather than a 
source of power, which should expedite China’s rise. China with US$3.1 trillion in 
reserves is well placed to exploit the opportunity.16
Yet the United States today remains the world’s premier investor. American 
domination of the global financial system is as much a function of US- style cap-
italism as a cultural phenomenon and the structure of its financial markets as it 
is of leadership and participation in multilateral institutions. US investment and 
fund managers control over half of the world’s investible assets.17 Further, America 
remains by far the world’s largest single source of foreign direct investment.18 
However, while previous administrations have believed that ongoing leadership 
of major institutions is a guarantor of America’s position as the world’s leading 
investor, Trump appears to believe that capitalism alone can sustain American 
pre- eminence.
Society and values engagement
Since the end of the Second World War, America had defined its leadership values 
in terms of championing freedom and opportunity, and, during the Cold War, 
in terms of the perceived superiority of its system over communism, promoting 
democracy, globalisation, capitalism, free trade and human rights. In contrast 
to his predecessors, President Trump espoused virtually no policies in areas like 
international human rights, global health, income inequality, environmental 
protection or climate change, endangering American soft power as a result (as 
evidenced by deteriorating global views of the United States19). This lack of lead-
ership is partly the result of deep divisions within American society on matters 
of politics, ideology, race, and ultimately values, with Americans asking whether 
their country should continue to play the role of the world’s “policeman” or with-
draw to focus on domestic matters.
Despite various adventures abroad, it was clear throughout his first two years 
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past administrations for a transactional bargaining chip. Trump’s refusal to take 
reporters’ questions at a joint press conference with Chinese President Xi Jinping 
during a trip to Beijing, at ‘Chinese insistence’,20 was widely perceived as a capitu-
lation on a long- standing tradition of supporting press freedom and freedom 
of speech generally. His willingness to endorse authoritarian strongmen also 
undermines America’s moral legitimacy; while Obama distanced himself from 
Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte, who boasted of once pushing a man out of 
a helicopter, Trump invited him to the White House.
The direction of travel is clear: America is now promoting a new set of values 
based on transactions, superseding older values that were based, at least in part, on 
principles. China, on the other hand, has a long- standing transactional approach 
to foreign relations, and its policy of non- interference is core to its attractiveness 
in parts of the developing world. Should America try to compete head- on with 
China (and its US$3 trillion of foreign reserves) in this regard, the two countries 
will quickly find themselves in a race to the moral bottom in terms of dealing with 
failing and rogue states. Importantly, it is highly unlikely that America will have 
the stomach to do the things that China might be willing to do.
Who wins and who loses
What are the implications of America’s withdrawal from, and China’s expanding 
engagement within, Asia? The realignment of power and interests in the region 
can be expected to create a series of winners and losers.
America as a traditional superpower: The biggest loser
America’s withdrawal from Asia and its shift to transactional engagements is both 
a symptom and a driver of its decline as a superpower. Powers in history con-
sistently go through a cycle of growth, plateau and decline, and the (twentieth) 
American century, which succeeded the (nineteenth) British century, is sure to be 
replaced itself in the future.21 While the United States refocuses priorities under 
“America First”, it also effectively cedes ground to a new generation of competitors 
such as China and India, who are both rising to world power status. Striking bilat-
eral trade deals in Asia will of course have a positive impact on the US economy 
and more importantly its financial markets; other markets may stabilise and rise 
too given the certainty they expect. However, this would be a false victory given 
the likely longer- term shift in the relationship between the United States and 
China. In addition, if these deals are accompanied by a longer- term withdrawal of 
US leadership in the region, the net benefits of such deals are a strong negative for 
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American withdrawal does not of course equate to a loss of primacy, at least 
for the time being. The United States still accounts for roughly a third of global 
defence spending.22 However, an increasingly inward- looking America may find 
itself militarily powerful, but increasingly less relevant in the global scheme of 
things. Importantly though, US withdrawal is also weakening the Western- led 
multilateral liberal order it has traditionally underwritten which in turn has 
driven America’s global influence and financial, security and political success. 
This order is already under attack from multiple sources:  domestic populism, 
anti- globalisation, the rise of authoritarian states, and income inequality, among 
others. A United States which does not proactively engage in the process of man-
aging this transition may find itself on the wrong side of change with the cards 
stacked against it when the dust settles.
China: The biggest winner
Xi Jinping has made it clear that China aspires to its share of global leadership, 
pledging the ‘renewal of the Chinese nation’ and ensuring what he sees as China’s 
rightful return to a place on the world stage. (It remains unclear, however, when, if 
ever, China will surpass the United States in terms of nominal GDP.23)
The BRI – pulling together past, current and future bilateral trade, investment 
and security initiatives into a geopolitical whole  – is a strategic cornerstone of 
Chinese ambition, increasing both regional integration and Chinese influence 
therein. Other China- led initiatives and institutions such as the RCEP, the AIIB 
and the New Development Bank, further augment China’s ability to chip away at 
the relevance and influence of existing multilateral institutions. At the same time, 
the United States’ loss of prestige under Trump has provided soft power opportun-
ities for China. President Xi’s reaffirmation of China’s commitment to globalisation 
and the Paris Climate Accord after Washington’s withdrawal advertises a maturing 
China in contrast to a United States which has lost its way. And while China’s 
execution on globalisation and trade issues may continue to fall short of inter-
national expectations, in the absence of credible alternatives it may end up being 
the only game in town. The United States demonstrated during the Cold War that 
it has the will, stamina, resourcefulness and might to destabilise and bring its rivals 
to overwhelming losses. However, even with sufficient motivation and determin-
ation such a policy would not be easy, given that China is learning how to use the 
same international institutions that America has to protect its interests.24
India: A potential winner
Following decades of neglect, US– India relations have deepened steadily in recent 
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century’ led to the US– India nuclear deal in 2007, and support during India’s 
various border conflicts with China.
For India, a closer relationship with Washington is partly being driven by 
China’s growing power- positioning in the region  – in Pakistan (China’s biggest 
arms customer), the Indian Ocean (by way of a “string of pearls” of Chinese built 
ports) and in neighbouring Nepal and Bangladesh. As the only country in the 
region not signed up to the BRI, India finds itself encircled by a web of Chinese- 
led and financed infrastructure. However, its need for foreign investment and its 
increasing participation in international forums means India’s requirements today 
have expanded well beyond security, providing the United States with many levers 
with which to deepen the strategic relationship. A more transactional approach by 
the United States under Trump, however, risks limiting engagement to a series of 
tactical alliances and even using India as a weapon in conflicts with China.
Despite this risk, India may yet emerge as a winner: the country’s long- standing 
multilateralist approach has strengthened under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, 
who has worked hard to promote India as an investment destination. As the 
world’s fastest growing major economy, India has already surpassed China in 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), creating a strong consumer base,25 
encouraging its major corporations to grow internationally and restructuring its 
finances through wide- ranging reforms. Unlike China, India is also enhancing the 
rule of law, reducing FDI restrictions, and maintaining open access to information 
and the Internet, thereby becoming an increasingly attractive partner for a wide 
range of developed regions and nations including Japan, Australia, Canada and 
the EU. India’s democracy and multilateral approach makes it a natural long- term 
strategic partner to others including future US administrations.
Japan: A potential loser
Japan risks becoming one of the biggest losers in the reshuffling of Asian power. 
The country remains almost entirely dependent on the United States for security, 
and while Washington is unlikely to fully withdraw from its long- standing 
commitment, it is now more likely to charge heavily for it. A more transactional 
mode of accommodation between the United States and China may also encourage 
a more aggressive stance in Beijing across a range of regional security issues (e.g. the 
Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands sovereignty dispute). Japan’s current interest in defence ties 
to other countries in the region stem from this fear, further driven by the continued 
American insistence that Japan shoulder more of the costs of its security.
Economically though, Japan is very much tied to its biggest trading partner 
China, partly to the RCEP (by necessity) while continuing to push the TPP as a 
hedge, albeit not a very strong one without the United States.26 However, Japan is 
no longer core to China’s economic growth. While Japan was critical in building 
China’s economy in the first wave of liberalisation, China has leveraged Japanese 
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displacing former Japanese partners domestically and increasingly internationally 
too.27 While Japan has an opportunity to partner with India to aid its development, 
cultural differences make this a slow and difficult process, despite the strategic 
imperative to do so and the strong personal efforts of the country’s leaders.
Ultimately, while the United States’ Asian withdrawal provides a strong impetus 
to Japan remilitarising and building stronger alliances with regional allies, these 
actions cannot compensate for the loss of America’s sponsorship in the short term 
and perhaps not in the longer term, either. Japan will face the challenge of keeping 
the quality of its culture and values intact while leveraging its massive intellectual 
property and highly educated population to create value in a much rougher and 
mercenary world order.
America as an information age power: A potential winner
No power in history has successfully reversed a period of decline to re- attain 
leadership once ceded. However, the end of the “American century” is occurring 
during a broader transition, from the industrial to the information age, and the 
United States remains the undisputed global leader in technology. The United 
States leads global research and development in nearly every field of new tech-
nology – computer sciences, biotech, nanotech and alternative energy – and has 
the culture of entrepreneurship to commercialise innovation, and the financial 
systems of risk capital to rapidly scale it. While American industrial power may be 
on the decline, America as an innovator remains well positioned for the informa-
tion age, leveraging technology to build and sustain its power across diverse areas 
such as energy, where shale and alternatives are leading to potential energy inde-
pendence, and security, where advanced computing capabilities are positioning 
America as a leader in tomorrow’s cyber warfare.
Importantly, freedom of information will be a key prerequisite for success in 
the coming era, and it bodes well for the United States that China is increasingly 
restricting information flows, reducing its ability to compete in the long- term 
transition underway. The United States “winning”, however, will also require its 
own society to embrace the changes the information age brings. The 2016 presi-
dential election has highlighted parts of the country’s desire to cling to the indus-
trial age at whatever cost necessary. Without resolving this internal tension, the 
United States will not be able to fully leverage its advantages and risks not having 
a new platform to replace its old one.
Two futures: Spheres of influence vs. an orderly transition
Obama was the custodian of America’s post- war strategy built on the premise 
that its power rested on free trade, capitalism, globalisation, democracy, multi-
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a series of international institutions to facilitate orderly and peaceful conduct 
among nations. While this system clearly benefited the United States as the source 
of much of its power, the inclusive values upon which it was based imbued it and its 
allies with a sense of noble or moral purpose that was almost universally accepted. 
Therefore, while critics at times accused Washington of abusing the system to its 
own ends, and many examples exist, the wider benefits of the system were suf-
ficient to fend off challenges to it. Leveraging this system, Obama recouped the 
losses to American prestige caused by the global financial crisis and two foreign 
wars,28 and left behind one of the strongest economies in modern times.29 In Asia, 
Obama acted to contain China through a combination of both trade and confron-
tation, much like his own predecessor George W. Bush had done.
The Trump presidency, by contrast, arrived at a time when many Americans 
felt that the major benefits of the system have already been realised unevenly 
distributed. With a large domestic population experiencing income and oppor-
tunity inequalities, blame was, and still is, placed on America’s political class and 
the global system it built. Trump’s own solution to the problem was to advocate 
exactly what his predecessors had sought to prevent others pursuing: a nationalist 
economic agenda that appears at core to be predatory, eschewing noble, moral or 
universal purpose and therefore without broader appeal internationally.
“America First” placed the United States in competition with the likes of Russia 
and China, who have traditionally played by more self- interested rules. China 
is open about its domestic priorities over promoting the values America once 
espoused. Russia understands how to use its military strength to extend its ter-
ritory and fight ruthless wars in Syria, Ukraine and elsewhere. While the United 
States has so often behaved in highly questionable and immoral ways, it also 
established sets of international checks and balances to leave it open to being held 
account by others, at least some of the time. As President Trump further weakens 
these checks and balances, he risks finding that the Hobbesian world he sees suits 
China and Russia far better than that of the United States.
The United States today stands at a crossroads. The path it takes from here will 
help shape the contours and character of the United States itself, along with those 
of Asia and the wider world. The two approaches open to US foreign policy and 
values – continuity of global stewardship versus predatory nationalism – bring the 
potential for very different outcomes.
Outcome 1: The domestication of America – declining world 
power by design
In a world shaped by “America First”, a domestically focused United States will 
spend less time, money and effort on foreign issues generally and assess any 
remaining engagements based on their domestic impact: short- term jobs creation, 
the US trade balance and electoral popularity. This shifting of interests is already 
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leading to a United States that is willing to compromise on its own values, the 
interests of long- held allies, and the continuity of institutions that have under-
written global security and prosperity. This approach makes it more likely that the 
United States will withdraw into a geographically defined sphere of interest, and 
aggressively pursue a narrowly defined set of non- negotiable goals outside of which 
nearly everything can be ceded given the right deal. The unfolding of this scen-
ario would provide an opportunity for China to establish its own growing sphere 
of influence across East Asia, Southeast Asia and Central Asia. Moreover, with 
the United States relinquishing leadership of and even undermining key multilat-
eral institutions, China can become the unimpeded “rule- setter” in the region and 
increasingly the rest of the world. Just as the United Kingdom, exhausted by war 
and the cost of its colonial empire, handed over the reins of power to a brash and 
energetic upstart America, so would the United States, exhausted by its leadership 
of the “free world”, pass the reins to a brash and energetic successor.
Outcome 2: Primacy and power sharing – orderly transition 
to multilateralism
The alternative to decline is continued American leadership, providing an orderly 
transition to a new world order. The President and his policies do not enjoy the 
support of a majority of Americans,30 and the repeated cases of misalignment 
between the President and nearly every branch of government point to a wish 
among key parts of the US government to pursue a continuity of policy and to lead.
Under this scenario, “America First” would be undone and America would draw 
on its deep resources to re- establish its influence in Asia: its military expenditure 
is three times the size of China’s; the World Bank is twice the size of the AIIB; the 
United States remains the largest trading partner of North Asia and the third lar-
gest of ASEAN; and the TPP is still alive and ready for US re- engagement; to name 
a few. Additionally, the United States would draw on friends, allies and institutions 
to counterbalance China within an established rules- based system. This would 
provide the time to reform the current world order to reflect major changing real-
ities, including the decline of the West and rise of emerging nations, as well as soci-
etal changes wrought by technology. America would be a constructive shaper of 
this reform, rather than a nation seeking to place itself outside of inevitable change 
by clinging to its industrial era hegemony.
Of course, the real world is not binary, and the path America takes will no doubt 
veer somewhere between these extremes, shaped by unforeseen events regardless 
of who happens to be president. Two “certainties” remain:  the first is that Asia 
is home to two giants representing 36 per cent of the world’s population who, 
barring a major world event, will continue to rise. The second certainty is that few 
countries are better placed than America to rise to whatever future challenges may 
present themselves. Given these “certainties” it is most likely that the United States, 
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China and India will share economic and political power over the long term. The 
nature of America’s relationships with these countries is currently being recast by 
the Trump administration.
“America First” seems to deny that American power is based on its leadership 
of a multilateral world order in favour of the view of a world governed by authori-
tarian muscle, and is placing uneven and sometimes catastrophic risk on US allies 
the world over. If it succeeds, a new, aggressive and overtly predatory America 
may emerge, without the moral compulsions to balance its primacy with multi-
lateralism. Given that its success involves undermining allies (and potentially 
strengthening China), “America First” lacks a unifying moral purpose for others 
to rally behind. Its failure clearly leads to a loss of trust in American leadership 
given that it risks both military and trade wars associated with its gambles with 
North Korea, China and the Middle East.
The transactional approach preferred by the President seems to suit China well. 
However, China has long had its own China First policy, and countries that have 
experienced its approach in resource trading, intellectual property and FDI, among 
others, will likely reject China’s leadership given a reasonable alternative. More fun-
damentally, China recognises that “America First” offers the best chance for it to 
succeed America as the next great power, consummating deals with the United 
States that give the Trump administration a short- term victory while hurting 
America’s long- term interests. With Xi having secured a potentially indefinite term 
as China’s leader, these types of deals will be at the forefront of his agenda.
For it to succeed in recovering its authority, not least in the realm of ideas and 
the challenge to them seemingly brought by China, the United States will need to 
re- embrace multilateralism. This development is being facilitated by voices both 
in America31 and abroad,32 which increasingly perceive China as both a strategic 
competitor and geopolitical threat. The implication is clearly that, at this critical 
juncture, with China on the brink of great economic power presaging great polit-
ical power, the multi- decade endeavour to integrate China into the world order of 
shared values is believed to have failed. If what began as a transactional approach 
to China results ultimately in a resetting of the rules of engagement and inducing 
of China to re- join the world order, President Trump may in the end have found 
his “noble” purpose.
Whatever the eventual outcomes of the Trump administration’s foreign policy, 
democracy offers a potential respite from any negative consequences. Taking a 
larger view of the sweep of history, in the wings of the industrial power that is the 
United States today, stands an information age America establishing its position 
and getting ready to take over. This new energy rising in America is certainly a 
match for a rising China and may yet lead to the United States being the world’s 
next great power too. What is certain is that Asia is the key theatre of twenty- 
first-century geopolitics and America will therefore face its most important 
challenges there.
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The return of the United States to the Indo- Pacific is one of the most significant 
elements of former President Barack Obama’s foreign policy legacy. He ordered 
a bold alteration of course, in the midst of an economic storm, to save the crum-
bling maritime empire against continental China’s advancing influence. As will 
be shown, this occurred as part of Obama’s efforts to rejuvenate the United States’ 
Asia Pacific presence, a strategy his successor Donald Trump built on throughout 
the relabelled Indo- Pacific. Even so, the United States has long recognised itself as 
the dominant regional power; as far back as the 1950s, Washington’s strategic com-
munity identified the Pacific as an “American Lake”. At that time the United States 
was consumed by the war in Korea and throughout the 1960s it fought in Vietnam. 
US troop numbers in East Asia peaked around this time, at around 800,000 by the 
late 1960s.1 It was only in the 1970s, after the Sino- Soviet split, that it temporarily 
retreated from the region.
In 1963 President John F. Kennedy announced the establishment of an “Atlantic 
community” by which the United States would focus on strengthening its eco-
nomic and security relations with Europe, while remaining conscious of the threat 
of Chinese communism to ‘Vietnam, Free China, Korea, India, Pakistan, Thailand, 
Greece, Turkey, and Iran’. His last speech that remained undelivered due to his 
assassination that year contained proposals to use these countries on the ‘per-
iphery of the Communist world’ to contain China, ‘infusing 3.5  million allied 
troops along the Communist frontier at one- tenth the cost of maintaining a com-
parable number of American soldiers’.2 Immediately after Kennedy’s death, Roger 
Hillman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, spearheaded an 
“Open Door” policy with China. Hillman wanted to restart trade with China both 
for the economic health of the US west coast and in order to see a ‘fatter China’, 
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China has always been a key US focus in the region, and today, from the realms 
of currency and cyberspace to trade and future technologies, China is challen-
ging American power in almost every conceivable sphere. A  recent decline in 
US authority over global affairs has gradually led twenty- first-century American 
presidents to once again move from courting China to confronting and containing 
it. This increasingly demands the direct application of US hard power. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, US presidents depended largely on the army to implement their Pacific 
policies. From 2009 Obama made the US Navy the linchpin in his Asia Pacific 
strategy, a policy choice to which President Donald Trump from 2017 added more 
marine machismo.
This chapter argues that, as more than a foreign policy shift, Obama’s “Pivot” 
to Asia from around 2011 represented a fundamental reorientation of the US 
Navy from the Atlantic to the Pacific. This charting of a new course by the US 
Navy was not only aimed at revitalising US foreign policy but also stemming its 
own decline.4 The chapter explores Obama’s and Trump’s maritime approaches in 
the Indo- Pacific against the backdrop of the continual rise of China’s Navy. The 
chapter also asks whether a continued reliance on Mahanian tenets – in particular, 
fleet engagements and securing overseas bases to control maritime domains – is 
sufficient for Washington to protect its empire from continental China.
Will history remember Obama’s “Rebalance” to Asia as a masterstroke, or 
condemn him – perhaps along with Trump – for restricting American strategic 
choices in the maritime domain by failing to anticipate the technological revolu-
tion in land logistics, and neglecting Halford Mackinder’s predictions of the rise 
of Eurasia? It is argued that while China is fashioning the future world order with 
bricks and mortar across the Eurasian landmass, America is busy hoisting flags 
and bunting throughout the maritime “marginals”.
A bold alteration of course
After defeating the Soviet Union in the Cold War the United States shifted its gaze 
towards the Middle East, launching regional wars at will. As Monteiro observes, 
‘the US has been at war for 13 of the 22  years since the end of the Cold War. 
The first two decades of unipolarity, which make up less than 10% of US history 
account for more than 25% of the nation’s total time at war.’5
The economic and financial crisis of 2008, North Korean nuclear posturing, and 
the rise of China led maritime America to rethink its involvement in the Middle 
East and Afghanistan as the primary arenas of its post- 2001 “war on terror”. In 
November 2009, President Barack Obama proclaimed himself ‘America’s first 
Pacific President’ and declared the United States an ‘Asia- Pacific nation’.6 This self- 
labelling exercise in Tokyo was aimed at announcing to Asian nations that the 
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In 2011, the Obama administration articulated this reorientation of US foreign 
policy as its “Pivot” to Asia. This was a shift away from the ‘Middle East- centric 
legacy of the Bush era’7 and one with roots in history; Senator Gale W. McGee 
predicted in 1959, that
in the time of those who listen to me today, our real concern in the world may 
not be Moscow, but possibly Peiping [Beijing] or New Delhi; indeed, what was 
once the Atlantic age of history will be swept away, or at least supplemented, by 
the new Pacific age of history.8
Writing in Foreign Policy, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton insisted on 
directing US resources in a ‘smart and systematic’ manner to the Asia Pacific 
region.9 Relatedly, Clinton assured APEC members of the American commitment 
to establish an elaborate trans- Pacific network of institutions and relationships in 
2011.10
Despite maintaining a conciliatory tone towards China, Obama spoke about 
building multilateral alliances and strengthening existing and new bilateral 
relations in the region, which signalled a clear intention to try to limit China’s 
increasing influence. Yet the Obama administration refrained from taking firm 
action to halt Chinese base- building projects in the South China Sea. It was careful 
to avoid antagonising Beijing because the American economy, in its recovery 
phase after the crash of 2008, relied heavily on China as its biggest trading partner. 
Furthermore, the pace and scale of Washington’s planned “Pivot” away from the 
Middle East and Europe was held up due to the Russian moves into Crimea and 
Ukraine.
The most crucial element in Obama’s policy realignment was the placement 
of maritime geography at the centre of international security discourse. It 
reinvigorated the US sea services trio of Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, 
giving them a fresh raison d’être to secure maritime commons and reassert 
American hegemony. In 2012, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the US Navy Chief of 
Naval Operations argued that the Asia Pacific was a maritime region and that sea 
power underwrote America’s rebalancing to the region.11 The Navy got the green 
light to curtail the growing maritime ambitions of China’s People’s Liberation 
Army- Navy (PLAN) in particular, and effectively counter its anti- access/ area- 
denial (A2/ AD) strategies. Plans were soon afoot to position 60 per cent of US 
naval assets, including the Carrier Strike Group and Amphibious Ready Group, in 
the Asia Pacific theatre by 2020.
Towards the very end of Obama’s time in office, in 2015, the US Navy revised 
its 2007 report, ‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’, to incorp-
orate the economic and political changes underway in the world.12 The 2007 report 
posited a liberal international order in which the global maritime commons was 
policed by a coalition of US- led partners. The revised strategy was more explicit 
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Navy and the push to pool the resources of regional partners inspired medium 
and small maritime powers in the region to increase their naval spending. As a 
result, submarines became the most sought- after vessel in the region. As of 2019 
it is estimated that 228 full- sized submarines operate in the East and South China 
Seas, and that within a decade this number will rise to 300.14
The introduction of modern, quiet vessels has changed the operational picture 
in the region with Australia, India, Pakistan, Japan, South Korea and Indonesia 
expanding and modernising their fleets. In February 2019, Australia signed a deal 
worth US$30 billion to build twelve attack submarines with a French shipbuilding 
firm. India ordered six advanced submarines at a cost of over US$5 billion.15 China 
has more than seventy submarines which are likely to grow to eighty by 2030. The 
United States is also deploying in the region its nuclear attack submarine armed 
with sub- launched torpedoes and anti- ship missiles. Another important outcome 
of Obama’s Asia Pacific policy was the gradual emergence of the Indo- Pacific as 
the centre of gravity in the international geostrategic discourse.
The Indo- Pacific as an economic concept has existed for centuries. The south-
ernmost region of Vietnam under French colonial rule, for example, was known 
as Cochin- China to signify the connectivity between the Indian Ocean and South 
China Sea. During the Cold War, the United States kept India out of the Asia 
Pacific matrix and after the Sino- Indian war of 1962, which helped to widen the 
Sino- Soviet wedge, American strategy did not envisage any significant role for 
India. Washington rarely did much to oppose India’s demand for the Indian Ocean 
as a “zone of peace” and neutrality. However, as the region’s perceived geostrategic 
relevance to the United States increased, not least during the years of the Obama 
administration, the need to expand the imagined boundaries of the Asia Pacific 
correspondingly increased to accommodate India, a formidable naval power. This 
new Indo- Pacific was to be a geostrategic entity stretching from East Africa in the 
Indian Ocean, to the western and central Pacific, including Japan and Australia, to 
the west coast of the United States.
Officially, the term Indo- Pacific was first articulated by US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton at Honolulu in October 2010. Clinton referred to an integrated 
theatre where maritime activities could be coordinated between the United States 
and its allies.16 The Australian Defence White Paper of 2013 consolidated the idea 
by stressing India’s trade and strategic connectivity with the Pacific.17 The US 
Pacific Command, up until 2017, used the term “Indo- Asia- Pacific”. However, as 
the term Indo- Pacific continued to gather legitimacy scholarly and media articles 
started using it liberally.18 Since its entry into the White House in 2017 the admin-
istration of President Donald Trump has furthered the use of the term “Indo- 
Pacific” in official policy discourse.
The Indo- Pacific is an important concept to the United States, not least 
within the context of what were identified by the Pentagon in 2018 as the five 
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extremist organisations. Four of these are located in the Indo- Pacific.19 As such, a 
key part of the strategic logic behind the creation of the Indo- Pacific is to counter 
the growing Chinese vision of Eurasia, bound by the so- called “Silk Road Spirit”, 
a notion designed to encapsulate Beijing’s visions to bind together a vast and dis-
parate economic- political- cultural landscape.20 With Europe in recent years dem-
onstrating some preference (though cautiously at times) for conjoining with this 
continental landmass rather than limiting itself to the transatlantic connect, it has 
recently become imperative for the United States to utilise the Indian Ocean region 
to ward off isolation and return that maritime realm back to global discourse.
Another key reason for Washington to prioritise the Indo, over the Asia, 
Pacific is to better reflect the United States’ deep entrenchment throughout the 
former. The US Indo- Pacific Command (renamed in 2018) is based at Hawaii. In 
the Western Pacific the United States has a large naval base in Guam which can 
berth aircraft carriers, as well as the Andersen airbase from where strategic B- 52 
bombers operate. In June 2018, Guam hosted the ‘Malabar’ series of exercises in 
which the naval forces of the United States, India and Japan participated. The US 
Marine expeditionary forces are based at Okinawa and the US Navy operates a 
base at Yokosuka, both in Japan. These forces also enjoy basing facilities at Palawan 
in the Philippines and Singapore. In addition, the United States occupies Diego 
Garcia, a base in the middle of the Indian Ocean equipped to operate bombers. In 
2016 the United States signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement 
with India, to provide its units refuelling and replenishment facilities in India.
Freedom of navigation in the Indo- Pacific
On becoming President in January 2017, Donald Trump withdrew the United 
States from the vast, twelve- member Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP) without 
presenting an alternative economic roadmap capable of competing for influence 
with new Chinese- led regional multilateral frameworks, notably the Belt and 
Road Initiative and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. This 
singular move generated concerns within an American foreign policy establish-
ment and strategic community increasingly committed to treating China as a peer 
competitor.
This early apparent disengagement by Washington from the Indo- Pacific 
equally worried Asian partners who hoped to see a reinforced US naval presence 
in regional waters, especially the South China Sea where Beijing had begun an 
extensive island- building programme. The Trump administration’s 2017 National 
Security Strategy (NSS), however, openly outlined the need to respond more assert-
ively to a ‘revisionist’ China. While raising some concerns about the future direc-
tion of the US– China relationship, the NSS also helped allay fears that Washington 
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Importantly, and much like that of Obama which ordered six freedom of navi-
gation operations (FNOs) from August 2013 to January 2017, the Trump adminis-
tration in its first two years in office relied on American sea power to signal intent 
in the Indo- Pacific. It sanctioned enhanced FNOs by the US Navy in the disputed 
South China Sea, where claims and counter- claims over island sovereignty and 
maritime delimitation, involving China, Brunei, Vietnam, the Philippines and 
others, constitute among the most complex political- legal territorial disputes in 
the world. The escalation of these disputes has the potential to generate serious 
disruptions in the free flow of trade and the safety of maritime navigation.
For instance, in September 2018, while the United States and China were 
engaged in talks to resolve their ongoing trade dispute, the USS Decatur sailed into 
the Gaven and Johnson reefs in the Sparkly Islands. In response, China’s People’s 
Liberation Army Navy dispatched its destroyer Luyang to warn the US warship. 
The two vessels came within tens of metres of one another, endangering the 
prospects for the Cold Peace which exists between the two powers.21 In January 
and February 2019, the US Navy completed two FNOs near Mischief Reef on 
which China has installed significant military structures and resources, provoking 
further Chinese indignation against perceived infringement of its sovereignty.
Like most coastal states, in accordance with the 1982 UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China retaliates against the warships of other 
nations which engage in naval exercises and surveillance activities within its 200- 
nautical- mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs), including those of the United 
States. Washington, as a non- signatory to UNCLOS, maintains that its navy has 
a right to conduct military activities in EEZs without informing or seeking the 
coastal state’s consent.22 Despite its close security partnership with the United 
States, India also fails to agree with the US interpretation of UNCLOS and the 
movement of foreign warships within national EEZs.23 To some degree at least, 
the “unsafe interactions” – bullying and counter bullying at sea – raise the prob-
ability of war between the two, especially from incidents in what we might call 
security “grey zones”. These include incidents involving China’s coast guard, or 
its so- called “maritime militia” or “third navy” which is constituted primarily of 
Chinese fishing boats widely considered to be acting under orders from Beijing to 
provide a seemingly benign but highly visible naval presence in the region to help 
advance Beijing’s security interests. Categorising the Chinese fishing vessels as 
combatants is fraught with danger as it puts severe restrictions on legitimate eco-
nomic activity by Chinese fishermen in their own waters, and is likely to exacer-
bate anti- Americanism in China.
US actions in the Indo- Pacific are also testing the professionalism of its naval 
personnel who are now patrolling in a more challenging environment than 
they are used to. Increased stresses on naval crews were evident in 2017 when 
two US Navy destroyers, USS Fitzgerald and USS McCain, were involved in sep-
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respectively, resulting in the deaths of seventeen American sailors and significant 
damage to the image and reputation of US Navy professionalism. According to the 
Stars and Stripes military newspaper, ‘The Japan- based 7th Fleet – which included 
both destroyers  – was undermanned. Sailors were working 100- hour weeks, 
cutting corners on training and repairs just to keep pace with their tasking.’24 
Commenting on the incident, Seth Cropsey argued that ‘[t] he deployable battle 
force, at 276, is far smaller than what is needed to meet the demand. And it isn’t 
growing. So, the navy has looked for other ways to answer the call.’25
One way to strengthen the United States’ presence throughout the Indo- Pacific 
is to extend the periods of patrol for ships deployed in the region and the other 
is involving friendly navies to share the burden. While the former option is an 
internal matter for the United States’ Department of the Navy, the latter is more 
complex as it involves weaving together an integrated maritime security architec-
ture. It could, however, enable the navies of the United States, India, Japan and 
Australia – the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad) – to 
operate in an interoperable environment.
The Quad, composed of four democracies, remains fragile because all of its 
members are intricately tied to the Chinese economy making their oppositions 
to China inherently timid. India is a founder- member of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) which funds BRI projects, and yet New Delhi opposes the 
BRI. India is an important member of Quad, designed to contain maritime China, 
but is also a member of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) that supports 
continental China’s Eurasian connectivity. Similar contradictions are evident in 
Japan and Australia.
Over the years, the United States has capitalised on growing regional dissent 
against China’s increasing power, in an attempt to build a credible trans- Indo- 
Pacific security and economic architecture that might prevent Beijing from 
bringing US allies and partners into mega infrastructure projects such as those 
included within the BRI and funded by Beijing’s AIIB. In its first two years in 
office, the Trump administration has sought to rejuvenate American commitment 
to Indo- Pacific allies by launching the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), 
promising an additional US$1.5 billion to the region.26 Under Trump in 2018, 
the annual Malabar naval exercises between Japan, India and the United States 
were hosted for the first time by the US naval base at Guam, where Nimitz- class, 
nuclear- powered super- carriers participated. The Malabar series started as a bilat-
eral exercise between the US and Indian navies in 1992, with the Japanese navy 
added in 2007. The next US president may invite Australia in to make the series 
an annual event of the Quad. Regardless, these continuities show that successive 
American presidents have contributed to a long- term US naval strategy which 
envisages controlling the Indo- Pacific sea space with the help of friends and allies. 
To fully appreciate Washington’s need to gather regional allies, one always has to 
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Continental China’s maritime power
As of early 2019, China’s PLAN is the second largest navy in the world. The US 
Navy continues to enjoy an asymmetric advantage over China’s in military mari-
time capabilities, including in aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, anti- submarine 
warfare and amphibious capabilities. But with the speed at which the PLAN is 
constructing state- of the- art ships, Chinese naval power is likely to inch closer 
to that of the US Navy before 2050. Between 1990 and 2010, ten destroyers were 
launched from Chinese shipyards. Between 2010 and 2018, by contrast, China 
produced twenty- four.27 China has also built an indigenous aircraft carrier and 
by 2030 the Chinese navy is expected to possess three more aircraft carriers;100– 
110 destroyers and frigates ranging from 5,000 to 12,000 tons; around eighty 
submarines, including sixteen SSNs and eight or more SSBNs; and eight or more 
large landing ships in the amphibious category.28
In April 2019 China celebrated the seventieth anniversary of the founding of 
the PLAN, with the main attraction of the naval parade being the Nanchang (101), 
10,000 ton destroyer with the capacity to become equipped with a railgun. The 
Chinese navy’s modernisation is aimed at protecting China’s trade and coastline 
and for expeditionary roles. At the moment, China’s naval force is incapable of 
defeating the US Navy but it is already puncturing its vanity and signalling to the 
world that American sea power is no longer invincible.
Washington’s strategy, meanwhile, centres on neutralising the Chinese 
navy’s anti- access and area- denial capabilities (precision strike capabilities 
that restrict the movement of US naval platforms) with its own naval assets. 
Washington also seeks to encourage allies to develop area- denial “bubbles” of 
their own in various choke points. Ashley Tellis argues that Japan and South 
Korea are capable of restricting Chinese naval movements in the Korea Straits, 
and that the Philippines/ Taiwan and Indonesia could similarly constrain its 
activities through the Luzon Straits and its access to the Sulu and Celebes Seas, 
respectively.29
The Chinese navy may be gaining in numbers, but its experience at sea is for the 
moment relatively limited. Chinese sailors have no experience of naval battle and 
are completely new to carrier- borne air operations. However, the American navy’s 
continuous presence in the South China Sea is providing them with valuable 
experience of regional operations, and an opportunity to test their latest weapons. 
In December 2016 for example, a Chinese naval vessel picked up an underwater 
US spy drone which they refused to return.30 The fear is now that the Indo- Pacific 
is soon to become an arena in which live artificial- intelligence weapons will be 
tested. Equally, however, often forgotten is that in the post- Cold War world the 
United States has enjoyed absolute sea control, operating largely without fear of 
significant challenges to its dominance in all theatres of operations. This situation 






From Obama to Trump in Asia and the Pacific234
234
Beijing’s more aggressive, or at least more assertive, behaviours in the South 
China Sea and Indian Ocean are in fact in some respects benefiting the United States, 
leaving the likelihood of a large- scale Sino- US confrontation at sea more remote. 
Indeed, much like New Delhi’s recent naval investments, Chinese developments 
are also helping preserve the current maritime order. Chinese construction activ-
ities in the South China Sea and its corresponding naval build- up, for example, 
have given the United States an opportunity and justification to reinforce its mari-
time capabilities. Without a real or perceived threat of China’s naval build- up, 
Washington would also find it difficult to mobilise regional actors and encourage 
arms purchases. In short, then, the still- gargantuan US Navy needs a worthy enemy 
and at the moment China is a very useful candidate. An overstretched United States 
across the maritime commons is also conducive for China, as it allows relatively 
tension- free involvement in building Eurasian land routes.
However, a limited naval battle between China and a regional actor would add 
to ongoing nautical neurosis in the Indo- Pacific, and this possibility cannot be 
ruled out. Navalists in some European countries as well as the United States are 
using Chinese aggression as a pretext to demand more from their governments, 
notably in Paris and London. ‘The dormant overseas territories held by France in 
the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific have suddenly come alive. The [British] 
Royal Navy has woken up from its imperial grave to open its new military base in 
Bahrain.’31
Transcontinental trade corridors and maritime order
In terms of commercial maritime capabilities, China is the world’s largest ship-
builder, boasts the third- largest merchant marine and the largest number of 
vessels; and claims almost 700,000 fishing vessels. In addition, China accounts 
for around a quarter of the world’s container trade. Indeed, ‘almost all the steel 
boxes shipped on the world’s oceans are made in China’.32 It is widely argued 
that China owes its post- 1970s industrial success to the open trading regime and 
transport channels provided and protected by the United States. China, indeed, 
is often blamed for being a “free rider”. ‘Much of the security of that trade across 
the Pacific is the gift of America. China “free- rides” on the protection provided 
by the United States Pacific Fleet [and] America’s enforcement of the rules of sea- 
based activity.’33
Yet this argument overlooks the fact that “rising” China itself, by taking on 
the burden of global manufacturing and shipbuilding, has played a large role in 
ensuring that the world’s oceans continue to be the mainstay of global trade and 
commerce. By erecting modern shipyards and ports, China has aided the sustain-
ability of the maritime order.34 It is estimated that the Atlantic Ocean’s share of 
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the same time period, the share accounted for by the Pacific Ocean rose from 35 
per cent to 39 per cent. ‘Meanwhile, ship traffic on the Indian Ocean and China 
Sea now make up 25 to 30 percent of global traffic, up from 17 percent in 1992.’35
China is also the biggest importer of dry bulk commodities and crude oil from 
the Gulf, as well as the largest exporter of finished products. It is flawed to label 
China (or any other maritime actor) in such an interlinked global trading net-
work as a “free rider”, then, because increased traffic at sea means more revenue 
for Western, including American and British, firms that control the insurance 
and reinsurance of sea trade. Control of the marine service industry also gives 
the United States the power to unilaterally impose sanctions on other coun-
tries; currently, the United States alone is able to so effectively pressure global 
ports and freighting companies, for example, to deny insurance cover to Iranian 
vessels transporting oil and other goods. The United States is also the only actor 
able to threaten the Belgium- based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Communications (SWIFT) financial messaging service, to keep Iranian banks 
out of their global financial network. With US hegemony now more contested, 
however, the UK, France, Germany, Russia, China and Iran launched INSTEX 
(Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) to bypass unilateral US trade 
sanctions on Iran.36 In 2016 China established a train service to Iran, increasing 
the prospect of an alternative supply chain completely independent of US- 
controlled sea lines of communication (SLOCs).
Chinese naval and commercial fleets are not the only instruments by which 
China is increasingly disrupting the US- led maritime order. Washington’s 
ability to underwrite global shipping and the pre- eminence of its navy to pro-
tect sea trade is under stress from Chinese investments in alternative land- 
based trade routes which bypass US naval protection and its insurance industry. 
Land- based transportation networks across Eurasia will not deliver an era of 
shipless oceans, but in the coming decades high speed land networks are likely 
to draw a significant proportion of international cargo away from the oceans. 
The impact of competitive land routes on the future of the oceanic order, as 
well as US maritime hegemony, is being overlooked by much of the American 
strategic community.
It should be noted that before its departure from office in 2017, the Obama 
administration sensed this erosion of maritime American power but was unable 
to see that the troubles were emerging primarily from land. To tackle Chinese 
challenges to US command of the oceans, Obama and then Trump both identified 
the Indo- Pacific as the primary strategic theatre, relying almost exclusively on the 
navy. Mahanian sea power theories, which focus exclusively on commanding the 
maritime domain and controlling global commerce, have served America well in 
the past. Yet Halford Mackinder saw Europe and Asia as an amalgam, and believed 
that the key to global power was ultimately located in the Eurasian landmass rather 
than in major SLOCs. Mackinder advocated controlling this “World Island”, but 
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not necessarily through military means or by engineering strategic splits within 
the continental landmass. He believed this vast landmass could either be con-
trolled from Eastern Europe or from maritime “marginals” – seas which border 
the continents such as the Baltic Sea or the Arabian Sea.37
In early 2019, it is clearer than ever that Washington cannot continue to shy away 
from positively engaging with the “heartland” of Eurasia, to establish an improved 
maritime– continental equilibrium. The mobility advantage that sea power enjoyed 
over land power is unlikely to hold for much longer, as drones, hyper- links and 
bullet trains become the new carriers of global online commerce. Moreover, the 
three major regional continental powers of Germany, Russia and China are unlikely 
to waste this opportunity which now sits on the horizon after centuries, and cer-
tainly not to help keep the United States’ maritime order intact. Retaining hundreds 
of overseas military bases and carrier- borne fighter jets, which can penetrate deep 
inside a land- locked country with precision guided munitions, cannot guarantee 
the United States a continental edge; the United States spent around US$6 trillion 
on the war on terror between 2001 and 2019,38 but struggles to save its empire. 
In contrast, China, which has spent less than US$50 billion so far on enhancing 
transcontinental connectivity, is bringing economies including those of Sri Lanka, 
Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Myanmar and many others into the global supply chain. It is 
also maintaining a judicious balance between its maritime ambitions and contin-
ental concerns.
The United States built a good rapport with central Asian states after the fall 
of Berlin Wall, before losing its advantage with its disastrous post- 9/ 11 wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The result has been that China (as well as Russia) has been 
able to advance its Eurasian interests. Obama’s departure from the foreign policies 
of the Bush era was only partial; he lacked the vision to discard the relevance of the 
foreign wars he inherited and walked the beaten tracks by making the navy the ful-
crum of US external engagements. Obama could not imagine new ways to interact 
with the world, and ultimately failed to devise a strategy to effectively engage with 
Eurasia.
Despite the “America First” rhetoric and his tirades against the so- called lib-
eral international order, Donald Trump has so far been unable to overcome 
Washington’s war- syndrome which has afflicted almost all post- war presidents. 
Trump’s primary disagreement with the order is that Washington’s partners and 
allies of which it is constituted are not contributing enough to support it and, in 
the end, to fight America’s wars. Across his first two years, Trump also chose not 
to deviate from Obama’s concern with keeping the navy at the centre of US Indo- 
Pacific policy. The reassertion of sea power fits well with Trump’s unilateral and 
populist ideology; America’s maritime moorings are an emotive issue, and a useful 
political tool to whip up cultural nationalism. Yet Trump has so far proven devoid 
of ideas about how to make the world a more secure environment, and how to sus-
tain US authority in a rapidly changing geopolitical climate.
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Conclusion
This chapter has argued that in the transition between the presidencies of Barack 
Obama and Donald Trump, little continuity was evident in their US re- involvement 
strategies in the Indo- Pacific. Some elements of the current policy of penetrating 
China’s Exclusive Economic Zones, and the territorial claims it makes in the South 
China Sea and elsewhere, were visible in President George W. Bush’s Asia Pacific 
strategy too. Efforts by Washington to build wider alliances in the region, with key 
partners like India, also started before the announcement in 2011 of Obama’s Pivot 
to Asia. The question now is over the extent to which the Trump administration 
in its remaining time in office, as well as Trump’s presidential successor, can sus-
tain the United States’ regional naval involvement and retain the confidence of its 
Indo- Pacific allies.
Both Obama and Trump have pinned their hopes on the US Navy to save the 
US empire. Neither, to early 2019, has offered much in the way of new and innova-
tive policy to rescue US strategy from the Mahanian trap which prevents it from 
exploring continental connectivity options that are more benevolent than retaining 
naval bases and maritime control. Their strategy has been aimed at ensuring that 
Washington uses its core competences to contain power shifts in the global polit-
ical economy, which broadly speaking sees the centre of economic gravity shifting 
from West to East. However, this strategy is heavily skewed in favour of the mari-
time domain. Beyond actual war- fighting, Washington has few big ideas in its policy 
toolkit and, particularly since the election of Donald Trump as president in 2017, even 
fewer which find widespread acceptance among Washington’s international partners.
China’s naval build- up may be good for the revival of the US Navy, and for the 
profits of Washington’s arms industry, but the efficacy of the strategy in preserving 
US hegemony is less clear. Investments in the navy alone will not deliver strategic 
dividends to America. Engaging in hostile situations far from home will only con-
tinue to increase the financial burden on America and cause the Indo- Pacific region 
to become more prone to war. The continental powers cannot suck the oceans dry, 
but they are already diverting trade away from the primary SLOCs. The possibility 
of managing this fundamental shift in the international political economy without 
resorting to war is risked by blind faith at home in the United States’ maritime destiny. 
Mahanian bondage keeps Washington from recognising that a successful empire is 
unbound and unshackled from geographic confinements – maritime or continental.39
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Conclusion: Legacies and transitions in the 
twenty- first-century Indo- Pacific
Inderjeet Parmar and Oliver Turner
The world changes quickly, and a challenge for this volume was always to avoid 
being left behind by unfolding events. It is perhaps clichéd to argue that the world is 
in flux, but it is difficult to deny that today’s political- economic- security landscapes 
are rapidly evolving, and arguably nowhere more so than across the twenty- first-
century Indo- Pacific. All of the “big questions”, then, remain difficult to answer. 
Is the “rise” of the Asia, or broader Indo- , Pacific, sustainable? Are we witnessing, 
or have we already witnessed, the birth of an Asian Century? Are China, India, 
Indonesia, Vietnam and others central pillars of a new “world order”? Are they 
prepared to lead as rule makers? If so, what exactly would this mean?
The principal focus of this volume has been the legacies former US President 
Barack Obama and his administration leave in Asia and the Pacific after two terms 
in office between 2009 and 2017. His successor, President Donald Trump, was 
from the outset unusually vocal in his stated dissatisfaction with the intentions and 
achievements of his predecessor and the Washington “Establishment” he is said to 
have represented. From the outset, this left Obama’s presidential legacy unusually 
vulnerable; very likely more so than if Hillary Clinton, as a primary architect of the 
“Rebalance” or “Pivot” strategy, had been elected as president in late 2016.
Contributors to the volume, focusing on US engagement with Indo- Pacific 
states and institutions and on key policy realms, wrote up until early 2019, to 
around the halfway point of Donald Trump’s 2017– 21 term in office. The purpose 
of this final chapter is to form some concluding thoughts on what we see as the “big 
picture” issues and developments in the Indo- Pacific today, with close attention 
to what they mean for the United States as the region’s traditionally dominant 
actor. Moreover, it is to revisit the central, interconnected questions of the volume 
outlined in the Introduction: of the legacy former President Barack Obama leaves 
behind in the Asia and Indo- Pacifics, and of the nature of the transition taking 
place in regional US engagement from Obama to Trump.
We begin with the relationship between the United States and China which, 





further attention here because of the unparalleled degree to which its nature and 
contours are set to steer the course of wider regional (and global) affairs. We 
broadly frame this discussion around a question increasingly posed by observers 
and commentators of US– China dynamics: of whether or not the relationship they 
share, which so heavily weighs upon the constituent actors of the Asia and Indo- 
Pacifics, is planting the seeds of a new Cold War. We then discuss the develop-
ment and apparent future trajectory of the wider multilateral frameworks of Asia 
and the Pacific, and the United States’ present and future place within them. We 
conclude by drawing together some of the key arguments and conclusions of the 
individual chapters of this volume, to speak directly to the themes of “legacy” and 
“transition”, about which this volume is so centrally concerned.
The United States and China: A new Cold War?
When the Obama administration formulated its Pivot to Asia, the increasing eco-
nomic and military capabilities of China were a primary driving factor,1 though 
combined with its identity as an Other which is understood to fundamentally 
contradict core American values.2 As Peter Gries explains in Chapter  2 of this 
volume, in many important respects the relationship the United States shares with 
China  – its most significant and consequential both regionally and globally  – 
deteriorated during Obama’s time in office. Indeed, one short- to medium- term 
legacy Obama seems to have left is a noticeable decline in favourable views of 
China among the American public. Favourable views of China increased during 
the first few years of the Obama presidency, but reduced in frequency from around 
2011, after the formal announcement of the Pivot.3 (It should be noted, however, 
that the American public is yet to become as concerned about a “China threat” as 
are their nation’s political and military elites.4)
Rana Foroohar argues that the so- called US– China tariff war, which began in early 
2018, may represent more than mere posturing by an unpredictable president, and 
the possible beginnings of a new Cold War. This is not a policy emanating from the 
President alone, but ‘something much more dangerous and lasting: a true reset of eco-
nomic and political relations between the US and China, and the beginning of some-
thing that looks more like a cold war than a trade war’. The “reset” is supported by wider 
sections of the political establishment, including the Democrats, the Pentagon, and 
what Foroohar refers to as the ‘labour faction of the progressive left’ which ‘coalesce 
around the idea that the US and China are in a long- term strategic rivalry, and that … 
US trade policy and national security policy should no longer be separated’.5 While 
this idea has broad support within the political, military and American elite think tank 
establishment, under Trump we have nevertheless seen a significant intensification of 
strategic competition aimed at subordinating China via comprehensive pressure, some 










It is important to be cautious with predictions of a new Cold War. The Cold 
War period of the 1950s to 1980s was defined by open ideological conflict between 
the United States and Soviet Union; diplomatic dislocation, hostility and silences; 
the isolation of peoples and societies; and the forging of spheres of influence 
physically divided from one another. China’s economic model remains heavily 
state- driven, but has a strong and growing private sector. It is a “socialist market 
economy” with large numbers of state- owned corporations, but ones still driven 
by market incentives and profit- maximisation goals which have created China’s 
new “billionaire class”, now the world’s second largest. Today’s US– China relation-
ship is so fundamentally interdependent as to be referred to as “Chimerica”.7
As Gries explains in Chapter 2 of this volume, it is the ‘narcissism’ of Donald 
Trump, over structural international forces, which largely explains the downturn in 
Washington’s ties with Beijing which has characterised the relationship’s transition 
from Obama since 2017. Obama before him may have failed to “reset” the relation-
ship onto a more productive, long- term footing, Gries argues, but he still handed 
Trump a robust network of regional alliances grounded in a collective sense that 
China’s regional ambitions were becoming destabilising. Trump’s “America First” 
foreign policy strategy, then, has weakened many of these alliances, but one does 
not need to look very far into wider administration and congressional reports to 
see how systematically China is seen as a threat to American power and hegemony.
A 2019 report by US Senator Marco Rubio’s Committee on Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship, for example, entitled ‘Made in China 2025 and the Future of 
American Industry’, indicates that the threat from China is not primarily one of 
trade deficits. Rather, it is from the very model of China’s statist strategy which, it 
is claimed, provides unfair subsidies to Chinese businesses which enable them to 
outcompete high end US companies. China is no longer content to be the manufac-
turer of low end industrial products, the report concludes. Chinese corporations 
with close ties to the ruling Communist Party are said to be outmuscling Apple, 
Microsoft and others in 5G and other modern technologies, to make China ‘the 
global leader in innovation and manufacturing’.8
The Eurasia Group argued that in 2019 the Sino- US rivalry is the second 
biggest geopolitical risk in world affairs. Dangers highlighted by the Group include 
the perpetuation of trade disputes and clashes over territorial claims in the South 
China Sea, as well as the increasingly critical realm of cyber security.9 Indeed, the 
Trump administration’s National Cyber Strategy, published in 2018, labels China, 
alongside Russia, Iran and North Korea, an aggressor through cyber espionage 
and other forms of technological interference. Among other things, these states 
are accused of conducting cyber- attacks against the United States, targeting its 
economy, its democracy, and stealing intellectual property. The Cyber Strategy 
is a preparation for punishing adversaries who, it is claimed, ‘will conduct cyber 
attacks against the United States during a crisis short of war’.10 In a section entitled 








disrupt, degrade, and deter behaviour in cyberspace … while preserving United 
States overmatch …’11
Finally, a September 2018 Interagency Task Force report to the President 
claimed that the United States is unready in broad terms to ‘fight tonight’ and 
should therefore ‘retool for great power competition’. To ‘win the future fight’, 
it argues, the United States must prepare to ‘combat Chinese industrial policies 
targeting American intellectual property’; establish a more skilled technical work-
force; diversify its sources of supply away from competitor and politically unstable 
states; stockpile key resources; and create ‘an industrial policy in support of national 
security efforts’. Ultimately, the United States must possess greater ‘surge capabil-
ities’ to ensure imminent war readiness.12 This type of rhetoric complements the 
words of FBI Director Christopher Wray who, in February 2018, argued in terms 
highly reminiscent of the Cold War era that Chinese spies now represent ‘a whole 
of society threat’ to the United States.13
Today’s US– China relationship, so interdependent as to be referred to as 
“Chimerica”,14 seemingly already precludes a repeat of Cold War history. As such, 
Sino- US tensions are often not over fundamental ideology but the reach of the 
Chinese state into its economic strategy and capabilities, which the United States 
claims places it at a disadvantage. In addition, of course, the United States itself 
plays a key role in China’s development, beginning with the Washington– Beijing 
economic and political rapprochement of the 1970s and 1980s, to its support 
for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, to its importation 
of more than US$500 billion worth of Chinese goods each year. The concept of 
“Sino- capitalism”, as a symbiosis of state- led, bottom- up and globally networked 
entrepreneurship, points to the hybrid character of Chinese power and its compe-
tition as well as complementarities with Anglo- American capitalism. Indeed, the 
gap between the world’s traditionally dominant (“liberal”) economic models and 
Sino- capitalism has diminished since the 2008 financial crisis, not least from the 
rise of economic nationalism in the United States and Europe further increasing 
Western intervention in the economy.15
As Michael Mastanduno observes in Chapter  11 of this volume, across its 
first two years in office the Trump administration largely abandoned both the 
rhetoric and policies of American hegemony, the type of which was so firmly 
entrenched during the Cold War era. Instead it favoured an “America First” 
nationalism and a determination to counter perceived threats. Others including 
Dian (Chapter  4) and Kelton and Rogers (Chapter  6) point to Trump’s will-
ingness from the beginning to undermine key regional relationships which 
Obama – like his predecessors before him – worked to draw closer into the US 
security umbrella.
What we perhaps increasingly see, then, are signals that the United States and 
China, particularly through the nationalisms of Trump as well as President Xi 
Jinping, are willing to draw on their respective nation’s strengths to repel what 










name of individual security rather than a global ideological project. Thus while 
observations of a new Cold War between the United States and China can be 
premature and even historically myopic, intensifying rhetoric of competition and 
rivalry – audible under Obama but more forceful under Trump – along with a 
deeper narrative throughout the policy machinery of Washington, DC of a China 
which poses an “all of society” threat, points to a fundamental trend of American 
anxiety and suspicion. This trend is in many respects a hangover of the Cold 
War against communism and indeed reflective of the underlying US discourse of 
the “China threat” which has evolved for generations.16 As such, the froth at the 
surface of the water can be soothed, but powerful undercurrents are less easily 
controlled.
US Indo- Pacific authority and contested multilateralisms
The tone of the reports of the Eurasia Group, the Interagency Task Force, and 
the Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, among others, lent fur-
ther texture and detail to the principal concerns of the Trump administration’s 
2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Pentagon’s 2018 National Defence 
Strategy (NDS), both of which construct the image of a more dangerous, zero- sum 
and ultimately more Hobbesian world than that perceived by the Obama admin-
istration. The NSS and the NDS clearly articulate Trump’s highly nationalistic 
“America First” foreign policy programme.17 Not only do they explicitly portray 
China and Russia as “revisionist”, but they treat close allies like the EU, Canada, 
Japan and South Korea as threats to US (economic) authority, to legitimise puni-
tive measures against them.18
Nevertheless, there have also been concerted efforts by the Trump admin-
istration to realign relations with regional powers through renewed bilateral 
agreements and multilateral and minilateral organisations and institutions. The 
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, for example, aka the Quad, formalises the four- 
way links between the United States, Australia, India and Japan with closer security 
relations. The Quad was formally established in 2007, with Japan the driving force, 
as an intended “Asian Arc of Democracy” with perceived challenges of China’s 
non- democratic system firmly in mind.19 The Quad quickly stalled when Australia 
withdrew the following year, principally over concerns that it would antagonise 
China, but Canberra re- joined in 2017.
The role of the Quad, to a large extent, is interpreted to be in restricting China’s 
regional and global ambitions.20 Indeed, it is China’s vast Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), officially intended to enhance Asia’s physical connectivity and promote 
both intra- regional and inter- regional economic growth, which is increasingly 
viewed in Washington and elsewhere in geopolitical and security terms, as a poten-
tially enormous expansion of China’s influence across the Eurasian landmass. It 









overland to the Middle East, Africa and Europe, avoiding the regional sea power 
of the US Navy and its allies, will correspondingly increase.
The BRI, although promoted as peaceful economic development by Beijing, is 
open to military adaptation. For example, a cooling of US– Pakistan relations after 
President Trump openly criticised Islamabad in early 2018 for persistently “lying” 
to Washington about the locations of terrorists in Afghanistan, before withdrawing 
millions of dollars of military aid, created space for enhanced military cooperation 
including weapons development between Islamabad and Beijing.21 The China– 
Pakistan Economic Corridor represents a multi- billion dollar flagship project of 
the BRI, but in late 2018 a senior Chinese official stated that military ties were the 
‘backbone’ of the bilateral relationship.22 The reach of China’s BRI into the Middle 
East brings expectations that its security interests there may also correspondingly 
increase.23 Ultimately, both the (land) Belt and (maritime) Road networks are 
designed to grant China more ownership of the markets and transport routes of 
Eurasia, which have long been dominated both physically and ideationally by the 
United States and its allies.
Italy’s commitment to join the BRI in early 2019, which represented a notable 
diversion both from US policy prescriptions as well as the European Union’s dec-
laration just weeks before that China constitutes a ‘systemic rival’,24 was significant. 
That move by the Eurozone’s third largest economy, no matter how embedded 
within the BRI Italy eventually becomes, was an indicator of further erosion of 
what many call the prevailing US or Western- led world order. Indeed, since 2012 
China’s 16+1 Initiative has enticed Eastern European nations into deals their 
governments find difficult to turn down, exacerbating existing political- economic 
cracks within the EU by laying bare the willingness of its relatively poorer nations 
(where democratic systems are less well established) to welcome the overtures of 
an authoritarian outsider, despite stated concerns from their richer neighbours 
and Brussels.25 In the past, Washington would have had comparably more 
resources to draw these countries back into its sphere of orbit. Today, China’s vast 
wealth reserves – along with the post- 2007/ 8 economic struggles of the European 
Union – mean that, for now at least, Beijing’s economic influence in Europe (and 
elsewhere) continues to expand despite emerging resistance.26
A 2019 trilateral report by US, Russian and Chinese think tank and university 
scholars of the Carnegie- Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, the Carnegie Moscow 
Center, and the Center for Russia and Central Asia Studies at Fudan University 
respectively outlines some of the key opportunities and challenges presented by 
China’s BRI programme.27 Given the links of these institutions to national policy 
makers, such interactions constitute semi- official diplomacy that has long been 
used to manage great power relations, including hegemonic transition.28 Certain 
US corporations are involved in BRI projects,29 but embedded within the debate 
between American sceptics on the one hand and China’s promoters of the Initiative 












Western firms in securing BRI contracts. This, it is argued, fuels suspicion that 
the BRI fundamentally constitutes a ‘Trojan horse’ for Chinese global power, or 
an attempted ‘return to nineteenth century style imperialism’.30 A particular con-
cern is that the Made in China initiative operates as a Made for China initiative, 
with Western firms excluded by a lack of transparency and opaque governance 
processes. The report presents a scenario neither of liberal hegemonic accom-
modation/ “assimilation” of China, nor near- inevitable military conflict, as liberal 
internationalists and realists, respectively, typically contend. Rather, it points to 
two interdependent powers jostling for position and primacy while cooperating 
on numerous fronts.
It is worth noting at this point that, beyond IR realism and liberal internation-
alism, and Sino- capitalism, a Kautksyian approach based on the concept of “ultra- 
imperialism” may provide a more powerful explanation of recent and indeed 
future trajectories of Sino- American relations. For Kautsky, ruling classes form 
international class- based alliances to exploit and dominate the world’s resources 
and peoples, including their own citizens.31 Acknowledging the emergence of a 
transnational historic bloc encompassing US and Chinese ruling classes, polit-
ical elites, civil societies, and firms (or at least major elements of them), can aid 
explanations of China’s integration into a traditionally US- led global system and 
of why laws of uneven capitalist development and geopolitical interests combine 
to create turbulence and competition,32 including possible military confrontation. 
As Michael Swaine argues, however, managing the Sino- US relationship requires 
delicate diplomacy at all levels from their presidents down, not to mention track 
II (semi- official/ unofficial) diplomacy.33 This kind of work, funded by corporate 
foundations interlocked with US and Chinese power elites, has been undertaken 
by think tank networks over several decades.34
Under Obama, and before the announcement of the BRI in 2013, Washington 
had pinned its own hopes of regional economic authority on the vast Trans- Pacific 
Partnership (TPP). Comprising twelve economies of the Asia Pacific which col-
lectively accounted for around 40 per cent of global trade, the TPP was envisioned 
to help reignite US and international economic growth after the financial crash of 
2007/ 8. So too was it designed to ensure that the United States remained a principal 
architect of the blueprints for international trade and serve to pressure China’s 
statist economic model. Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the TPP in 
January 2017 is covered by authors in this volume, including Michael Mastanduno 
(Chapter 11). As Sutter (Chapter 9) explains, the Trump administration’s formal 
exit from the TPP, as well its broad rejection of the central tenets of Obama’s 
Rebalance to Asia which was rhetorically framed around regional cooperation 
and multilateralism, generated anxiety and dismay among some of Washington’s 
closest partners and allies over US commitment to the region.
As Parameswaran argues in Chapter 7, however, Obama’s legacy in Southeast 










mixed; his administration achieved successes including further committing 
Washington to Asia’s multilateral diplomatic frameworks such as the Association 
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Despite this, however, key issues such as 
how to formulate effective, joined- up responses to China’s territorial advances in 
the South China Sea, or engage the region in a manner which accommodated the 
diversity of its economies, were left relatively unaddressed for his successor. Since 
then President Trump has for the most part favoured a more crudely utilitarian 
approach to foreign policy in the form of bilateral transactionalism.
The Trump administration’s aim, moreover, is to build utilitarian measures into 
trade deals which reveal more than purely bilateral concerns. Under a clause of the 
US– Mexico– Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA) which replaced NAFTA 
in late 2018, for example, Washington can withdraw with six months’ notice in 
protest at another signatory’s efforts to strike a free trade deal with “non- market 
economies”, such as China. This confirms the tandem operations under Trump of 
international trade and national security. The tools and methods may differ, then, 
but the aims of both the TPP under Obama and of US trade agreements under 
Trump are designed in part to isolate China and bring pressure upon it to reform 
its economic model by restricting trade with American allies.
The future operations of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans- Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP), which brought together the eleven remaining signatories to 
the TPP, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership of ASEAN plus 
six states (including China), will be monitored closely by Washington in the years 
to come. At the centre of the CPTPP is Japan and at the centre of RCEP is ASEAN, 
with China the largest trade partner of each; suddenly, it is the United States which 
risks being frozen out of the rule- making machinery of some of the world’s lar-
gest, long- term economic projects, by both allies and “rivals” alike. Importantly, 
the overlapping memberships of both agreements also bring the potential for 
cross- breeding in rules and norms. For as long as it endures, Washington’s self- 
imposed absence from the CPTPP therefore leaves it even more distanced from 
the workings and future direction of RCEP, and by extension the wider landscape 
of modern international trade.
The US in the Indo- Pacific: Legacy and transition
As noted in the introductory chapter to this volume, alongside the core theme of 
“legacy”, the importance of “transition” has been a central concern of the book. 
The transition from the presidency of Barack Obama to that of Donald Trump 
did not begin and end during the formal handover of power on 20 January 2017. 
In most important respects, it was a process which unravelled gradually over the 
weeks and months of Trump’s first two years in office to early 2019 – at which point 




Contributors to this volume argue that, through the Pivot, or Rebalance, to 
Asia, President Obama helped reassure regional allies like Japan (Dian, Chapter 4) 
that the United States was “returning”, and remained committed, to the Asia Pacific 
after its lengthy and expensive war on terror in the Middle East and Afghanistan 
under the Bush administration (Bisley, Chapter  10). Obama’s rhetorical con-
cern with multilateral regional structures was welcomed and helped to reinforce 
Washington’s bonds with Southeast Asian actors in particular, including their 
peoples and societies (Parameswaran, Chapter  7). The Obama administration’s 
engagements with regional institutions was comparatively exceptional in the level 
of attention he afforded them, though not sufficiently transformational to ensure 
this high- water mark would continue to be met (Cook, Chapter  8). Indeed, in 
the context of the most serious challenges such as that posed by North Korea, 
Obama successfully diffused bilateral tensions before proving powerless to prevent 
Pyongyang from accelerating the advancement of its missile and nuclear capabil-
ities (Cumings, Chapter 5).
Several authors (for example, Colley and Ganguly, Chapter  3; Mastanduno, 
Chapter  11; and Kelton and Rogers, Chapter  6) point to “constraints” and 
“restrictions” on Obama, notably within domestic American politics, which served 
to make the achievement of a clear legacy in the Asia (and wider Indo- ) Pacific dif-
ficult. Others explain that Obama’s regional legacy in particular relationships and 
arenas of the Asia Pacific is subtle and not always materially visible, for example 
in closer people- to- people relations (Parameswaran, Chapter 7); or that it is “com-
plex” by generating moments of both of solidarity and frictions with close partners 
(Dian, Chapter 4); or even that it is “paradoxical” (Bisley, Chapter 10). In the end, 
then, we must speak of “legacies”, as the influences and impacts Obama had on 
Asia and Pacific between 2008 and 2017 are various and uneven.
So too is the transition from Obama’s presidency to that of Trump proving 
complicated and unpredictable. Obama’s somewhat “paradoxical” legacy in Asia 
and the Pacific emerged from a strong, strategic emphasis on the region but one 
combined with a vision for reduced capacity and leadership, causing Washington 
to act as if nothing there was changing. This long- standing inertia by the United 
States continued into the presidency of Donald Trump (Bisley, Chapter 10). This 
transition has no doubt been marked by a clear hardening of rhetoric towards 
perceived threats and allies alike, causing long- standing US partners to once again 
question Washington’s commitment and leadership qualities in the region (Sutter, 
Chapter 9). In the case of China, a far more confrontational approach leaves the 
United States under Trump in ‘painful search for a credible China policy’, but 
much in the same way as it was under Obama (Ljunggren, Chapter 12). Across its 
first two years in office the Trump administration also made few policy decisions 
to demonstrate that it was intent on withdrawing firmly embedded American 
resources from Asia and the Pacific (Mastanduno, Chapter 11; Kelton and Rogers, 
Chapter  6). In many important respects, then, historically familiar, long- term 

















To return full circle to Chapter 1 of this volume by Turner, the United States 
today is in many respects haunted by continuous expansions into Asia and the 
Pacific which, for more than 150  years, have passed down the responsibility to 
sustain US authority throughout an ever- inflating imaginative geography which 
is now reconstructed as a vast and unwieldy Indo- Pacific. Trump’s legacy in that 
region is yet to be written. What we know now, however, is that the myriad actors 
of the Indo- Pacific  – individual, state, non- state, institutional, and so on  – are 
becoming increasingly influential authors of a region which appears set to dom-
inate twenty- first-century global affairs. As Turner observes, a key question today 
is how the current and future US administrations will respond to this rapidly 
evolving and highly unfamiliar set of global circumstances.
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